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N
atural disasters such as prolonged droughts, ﬂoods, and cyclones threaten food se-
curity in many developing countries, directly reducing agricultural production and
food supply. Moreover, these disasters can disrupt local economies and reduce house-
holds’access to food by destroying infrastructure and private productive assets, reducing em-
ployment opportunities, and lessening the proﬁtability of private enterprises. The 1998 ﬂoods
in Bangladesh led to a reduction in the main monsoon season rice crop of more than 10 per-
cent of targeted production for the entire 1998/99 ﬁscal year and threatened the food security
of tens of millions of people. But, as this report shows, a combination of well-functioning
private markets, suitable government policies, public and NGO interventions, and effective
private coping strategies prevented a major disaster.
This report combines a careful analysis of government policy and private foodgrain mar-
kets with a detailed survey of 757 households in rural Bangladesh in November and December
1998, about two months after the ﬂoodwaters receded. The report describes short- and medium-
term government policy measures taken to encourage private trade, including an earlier trade
liberalization that permitted private-sector imports of rice from India that stabilized private
markets and largely offset the decline in production. The impact of the ﬂoods on household
assets, employment, consumption, and nutritional outcomes is analyzed using the micro-level
survey data. The study ﬁnds that ﬂood-exposed households were, in general, able to avoid
severe declines in food consumption and nutritional status through a combination of private-
sector borrowing that averaged almost 6,000 Taka (Tk) per household (equivalent to over 140
percent of average monthly expenditures) and targeted government and NGO transfers that
averaged 331 Taka per household.
This research report builds on earlier IFPRI work in Bangladesh analyzing the Public
Foodgrain Distribution System and the behavior of rice and wheat markets. It also extends
IFPRI work on preventing famines, efﬁciency in targeting of public-sector transfers, coping
strategies, and determinants of nutritional outcomes. Most important, it provides an analysis
of how appropriate government policy can both provide incentives for private markets to
maintain food availability and directly reduce the food insecurity of poor disaster-exposed
households through targeted transfers that increase access to food and minimize deterioration
in nutritional status.
Per Pinstrup-Andersen
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he 1998 ﬂoods in Bangladesh, deemed “the ﬂood of the century,” covered more than
two-thirds of the country and caused 2.04 million metric tons of rice crop losses (equal
to 10.45 percent of target production in 1998/99). This ﬂood threatened the health and
lives of millions through food shortages (resulting from crop failure), the loss of purchasing
power for basic necessities, and the potential spread of water-borne disease. Yet, in fact, very
few ﬂood-related deaths occurred, and reportedly none due to food shortages. Poor house-
holds did suffer substantial hardship during and after the ﬂoods, but the combination of well-
functioning private markets, broadly effective interventions by government, donors, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector borrowing to a large extent main-
tained availability and access to food.
This report examines in detail how the ﬂoods affected food security in Bangladesh at the
national and household levels and draws lessons for the management of future natural disasters
in developing countries. At the heart of this analysis is the food security triad of availability,
access, and utilization. Thus, we not only examine food production, imports, government in-
terventions, and prices, which determine availability, but place a major focus on households’
access to food (which was seriously threatened by loss of assets and income-earning oppor-
tunities) and utilization of food (including intrahousehold food distribution). The ﬁndings in
this report are largely based on data from a survey of 757 rural households in 7 ﬂood-affected
regions (thanas), supplemented by analysis of secondary data on foodgrain markets and gov-
ernment policy.
As described in Chapter 2 (Figures 2.1 and 2.2), the availability of food—particularly rice
and wheat, which together account for about 80 percent of the calories in the Bangladesh
diet—is determined by domestic production (which was severely impaired by the ﬂoods),
government net distribution on the domestic market (in turn determined by the availability
of stocks, government commercial imports, and food aid), and private sector imports. House-
hold access to food, however, requires not only well-functioning markets or effective gov-
ernment distribution programs, but also sufﬁcient resources to acquire food (obtained through
current incomes, transfers, savings, or borrowing). Intrahousehold distribution and the health
environment ultimately determine individual consumption and nutritional outcomes, as well.
The Impact of the Floods on Foodgrain Markets 
and the Policy Response
At the sectoral level, the government of Bangladesh (GOB) and donor ofﬁcials were keenly
aware of the potential ﬂood damage to the monsoon season rice crop (aman) and the threatto foodgrain availability, even while the im-
mediate relief operations were under way.
The GOB therefore launched an appeal for
international ﬂood relief and food aid in
August 1998, anticipating that by the time
the ﬂoodwaters receded it would be too late
to replant a large portion of the aman rice
area. Donors ultimately responded with 1.233
million metric tons of food aid delivered in
1998–99, but, in the short run, government
distribution of foodgrains was constrained
by available public stocks. Thus, public food-
grain distribution from July through Decem-
ber 1998 was only 631,000 metric tons greater
than planned before the ﬂood.
In spite of only a small increase above
previously scheduled supplies through gov-
ernment channels in the last six months of
1998, markets were stabilized by private
sector imports of rice and wheat. Inﬂows of
1.3 million metric tons of rice from India
kept prices from rising above import parity
levels following the ﬂood. Evidence from
letters of credit for rice imports shows that
large numbers of traders participated in the
rice import trade (which was mostly over-
land), with an average size of contract of
710 metric tons in 1994/95. Thus, private
markets appear to have worked competi-
tively to limit the price increases to only 12.4
percent between May–July and August–
December 1998 (compared with 58.2 per-
cent in the same months in 1974 when a
famine occurred) and to maintain availabil-
ity of foodgrains. Adequate levels of gov-
ernment stocks—659,000 metric tons at the
beginning of September 1998, compared
with only 347,000 metric tons in September
1974—may have also helped stabilize mar-
kets by inﬂuencing private traders’expecta-
tions of the ability of the government to
intervene in local rice markets.
Public stocks and distribution of food-
grains were signiﬁcantly larger following the
major ﬂoods in 1988. Several factors suggest
that the need for large public stocks to avert
famines in Bangladesh has decreased con-
siderably since 1974 or even 1988, however.
Large increases in the size of the boro rice
crop, harvested only ﬁve to six months after
the aman crop, have shortened the period of
uncertainty regarding domestic supply, in-
creased foodgrain availability, raised farmer
incomes, and reduced prices. Trade liberal-
ization in the early 1990s has enabled pri-
vate sector imports to help stabilize prices
and total supplies when production shortfalls
threaten domestic supplies, and the availabil-
ity of foreign exchange is no longer a severe
constraint on imports. Moreover, 20 years
of investment in rural infrastructure have
improved the efﬁciency of domestic rice
markets in Bangladesh, so shortages across
regions within the country can be more easily
met by domestic private (and public) grain
ﬂows. In addition, increases in real per capita
incomes and food consumption over time
have added to food security at household
levels.
Losses of Crops, Other
Assets, and Employment
During the 1998 ﬂoods, ﬂoodwaters on
sample farmers’ ﬁelds were almost double
their normal levels—137 centimeters com-
pared with 73 centimeters. On medium
highland, ﬂoodwaters were on average 88
centimeters higher than in normal years and
even high ﬁelds that normally are not ﬂooded
were covered by an average of 22 centime-
ters of water. This severe ﬂooding led to sub-
stantial crop losses, especially to the aus and
aman crops. Because of the ﬂoods, 69 per-
cent of aus production, 82 percent of deep-
water (broadcast) aman, and 91 percent of
transplanted aman was lost, representing 24
percent of the total value of anticipated agri-
cultural production for the year. Overall, rice
crop losses accounted for over half of total
agricultural losses, with vegetables (25 per-
cent) and ﬁbers (19 percent) accounting for
most of the remaining losses.
In addition to the losses to crops, the
ﬂoods damaged or destroyed many house-
hold assets, reducing household wealth as
well as future productive capacity. For the
55 percent of households that lost assets, the
average loss was 6,936 taka (Tk), equivalent
xvi SUMMARYto 16 percent of their pre-ﬂood total value of
assets. In all, 47 percent of households suf-
fered damage or loss to housing, the average
loss being Tk 5,675, or 59 percent of the
pre-ﬂood value; 17 percent of households
lost trees with an average value of Tk 5,137;
15 percent of households lost chickens,
though the average loss was only Tk 142.
The more severe the level of ﬂood exposure,
the larger the proportion of households suf-
fering damage to their assets: 78 percent of
the households exposed to very severe ﬂoods
and 69 percent of those exposed to severe
ﬂooding lost assets worth on average Tk
9,042 and Tk 6,679, respectively.
The rural economy suffered serious dis-
ruption from the ﬂoods. Average monthly
days of paid work decreased during the ﬂoods,
but increased in the period after the ﬂoods to
the same level as 12 months earlier for all
workers except day laborers. Day laborers
were the most severely affected: their em-
ployment fell sharply from 19 days per month
in 1997 to only 11 days per month in July
through October 1998. Wage earnings also
fell during the ﬂoods and had not recovered
to 1997 levels by October–November 1998.
For day laborers, average monthly earnings
in the period July–October 1998 were 46 per-
cent below those in the same months in 1997,
and in October–November 1998 were still
18 percent below 1997 levels. This decline in
number of days worked and wage earnings
occurred in the context of a labor market with
little open unemployment. Thus, underem-
ployment increased as people worked fewer
days, but at least most workers found some
form of employment.
Impacts on Household 
Food Security, Health,
and Nutrition
The decline in crop production, losses of other
assets, and lower employment opportunities
contributed to increased food insecurity.
Food consumption fell, along with house-
holds’abilities to meet their food needs on a
sustainable basis. Vegetables and many other
foods were in short supply, and as a conse-
quence the calorie consumption of ﬂood-ex-
posed households was 272 calories/person/
day fewer than that of households not ex-
posed to ﬂooding; 15.6 percent of ﬂood-
exposed households became food insecure.
We found no evidence that females’ con-
sumption of the main staples—rice and
wheat—was reduced by more than males’
as a result of the ﬂoods, or that male fa-
voritism in the consumption of animal prod-
ucts increased. Thus, the ﬂoods did not appear
to lead to an increase in discrimination
against females in food consumption within
households.
The ﬂoods also caused a major deterio-
ration in the quality of households’ health
environments. They damaged or destroyed
people’s homes, reduced their access to safe
water, and destroyed or damaged their toilet
facilities. These factors, combined with the
reduction in food consumption, led to sub-
stantial increases in illness, even after the
ﬂoodwaters had receded. In the immediate
post-ﬂood period, 9.6 percent of individuals
in the sample suffered from diarrhea, and
4.7 percent were affected by respiratory ill-
nesses. Individuals in all age groups experi-
enced a deterioration in health status at this
time, especially those who were severely or
very severely ﬂood exposed. Although ado-
lescents had the greatest increase in illness,
the most serious health problem posed by the
ﬂoods was the increase in children’s illness,
because they suffered more serious conse-
quences, even threatening their survival.
The ﬂoods led to increases in both wast-
ing and stunting among preschool children.
Severe or very severe ﬂood exposure caused
many children to lose weight and/or to fail to
grow at a critical period in their mental and
physical development—55 percent of chil-
dren in the sample were stunted and 24 per-
cent were wasted. This situation was brought
about by a combination of factors, including
reduced access to food, the increased difﬁ-
culties of providing proper care for children
that came with disruptions in home life, and
the greater exposure of children to contami-
nants. We also found some evidence that the
SUMMARY xviiﬂoods led to an increase in severe chronic
energy deﬁciency among women.
Household Coping
Mechanisms
Households adjusted to the shock of the
floods in several major ways: reducing expen-
ditures, selling assets, borrowing. Borrow-
ing was by far the major coping mechanism
of the households sampled, in terms of both
the value of the resources and the number of
households that borrowed. About 60 percent
of households in the sample were in debt in
the months immediately following the ﬂoods.
Average household debt rose to an average
of almost 1.5 months of typical consumption
compared with only a small percentage of
monthly consumption in January 1998, about
eight months before the ﬂoods. In addition,
56.6 percent of ﬂood-exposed households
in the bottom 3 quintiles resorted to pur-
chasing food on credit in the month preced-
ing the survey. This borrowing was sufﬁcient
to maintain the value of household expendi-
tures vis-à-vis pre-ﬂood levels but, because
of higher prices, poor ﬂood-affected house-
holds consumed fewer calories per capita
per day than non-ﬂood-exposed households,
suggesting that targeted cash transfers and
credit programs could have been an effective
complement to direct food distribution.
Mitigating the Effects of the
Floods: Government Food 
and Cash Transfers
Our survey suggests that government direct
transfers were well targeted to ﬂood-exposed
households and to the poor. In the initial
ﬂood period, immediate relief through the
Gratuitous Relief program went mainly to
seriously ﬂood-exposed households—35.7
percent of severely ﬂood-exposed households
received the transfer compared with 9.7 per-
cent of non-exposed households. Vulnerable
Group Feeding (VGF) transfers, which were
administered through union-level commit-
tees, were better targeted to the poor than to
the ﬂood-exposed households. Among ﬂood-
exposed households, 35.4 percent of house-
holds in the bottom quintile received grain
transfers compared to 17.8 percent and 7.5
percent in the top two quintiles, respectively.
Yet government transfers were small rel-
ative to the needs of households, as indicated
by the extent of household borrowing (equal
to about six to eight times the level of gov-
ernment transfers for poor, ﬂood-exposed
households). To eliminate borrowing would
have required a transfer of approximately
Tk 5,000 for each of the 60 percent of house-
holds that were in debt in December 1998,
several months after the ﬂoods. Extrapolat-
ing this ﬁgure to the national level, the cost
of such transfers would have been more than
US$1.5 billion.
Small cash transfers were part of the ini-
tial ﬂood relief efforts, but larger cash trans-
fers or credit programs were not included in
the medium-term relief to households two
to four months after the ﬂoods, even though
foodgrain stock constraints limited the ex-
pansion of the VGF program during this
period.
Policy Implications
Both short-term and long-term policies played
major roles in preventing the 1998 ﬂoods
from resulting in a major food security dis-
aster in Bangladesh. Public sector investments
in agricultural research and extension in the
1980s and 1990s, together with mainly pri-
vate sector investments in small-scale irriga-
tion, led to substantial increases in wheat and
boro rice production. This made the country
less vulnerable to ﬂoods by increasing total
foodgrain production in the country, reduc-
ing the length of time between major crops
from 12 months to only about 6 months, 
and leading to a shift away from highly ﬂood-
susceptible deepwater amancultivation in the
monsoon season to borocultivation in the dry
season. Continued investment in research
and extension could further increase produc-
tion efﬁciency and reduce the vulnerability
of the food sector to ﬂoods.
In addition, long-term public investments
in infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity,
and telephones) contributed to efﬁcient mar-
xviii SUMMARYketing systems that enabled the private sec-
tor grain trade to supply markets throughout
the country following the ﬂoods. Govern-
ment policies also encouraged private sector
participation in the grain trade. In particular,
the liberalization of rice and wheat imports
in the early 1990s enabled private sector
imports to quickly supply domestic markets
and stabilize prices at their import parity
levels following the ﬂoods. Short-term poli-
cies such as the removal of the import tariff
on rice in early 1998 and instructions to ex-
pedite port clearance of private sector food-
grain imports also provided clear signals to
the private sector of government support for
this trade. Moreover, these private sector
imports proved to be a far less costly way of
maintaining foodgrain availability than the
distribution of government commercial im-
ports or public stocks, the mechanisms by
which the government handled production
shortfalls after the 1988 ﬂoods, 10 years
earlier.
Donors responded to the ﬂood situation
with major increases in food aid that eventu-
ally permitted a major expansion of targeted
foodgrain distribution through the Vulner-
able Group Feeding and Food For Work
programs. However, almost inevitable de-
lays and uncertainties in food aid arrivals re-
sulted in only a small net increase in public
distribution beyond preﬂood plans until De-
cember 1998, in part because existing gov-
ernment stocks of wheat were insufﬁcient to
permit a large expansion in distribution. (Rice
stocks were kept in reserve for possible use
in stabilizing markets later.) Apolicy of hold-
ing more stocks might not have been a bet-
ter option though, given the substantial costs
of procuring, handling, and eventually dis-
tributing grain. With foodgrain supplies and
prices stabilized by private sector imports,
targeted cash transfers to supplement direct
food transfers could have been used to in-
crease household access to food (and other
basic needs) without increasing market prices
of foodgrains.
Nonetheless, programs already in place
and a rapid expansion of the VGF program
to more than 4 million households enabled
public foodgrain distribution following the
ﬂoods to be well targeted to the poor. Poor
women and children, many of whom were
chronically malnourished, were effectively
targeted through the VGF program. Greater
targeting of credit programs would have been
useful, however, given that poor households
borrowed heavily in the informal private
market during the ﬂoods, and NGO credit
programs were limited in scope. To avoid
delays and to minimize leakages, these rural
credit programs for disaster relief should be
designed and put in place before disasters
occur. Maintaining a structure of social pro-
grams that can be scaled up in the event of a
disaster is more important than maintaining
large stocks of food.
To reduce even further the impact of a
future natural disaster like the ﬂoods of 1998,
it is necessary to improve the scope and the
quality of the interventions so as to provide
food, water, and shelter at the time of the dis-
aster and in its immediate aftermath. Relief
should be targeted at both the village and
individual levels. This report shows that in-
terventions at the village level, such as pro-
viding shelter, improving sanitary conditions,
and creating economic opportunities, were
effective in alleviating the adverse impact of
the ﬂoods. We also present evidence that
targeting to individual poor, ﬂood-exposed
households can have a positive impact on
the well-being of individual children. Finally,
government policies to foster economic
growth in rural areas and to provide income-
earning alternatives to poor households can
both help to reduce poverty as well as in-
crease the capacity of households to with-
stand shocks resulting from natural disasters.
Conclusions
The combined efforts of the government 
of Bangladesh, donors, NGOs, and ﬂood-
affected households themselves, together with
private trade operating in well-functioning
markets, were in general extremely success-
ful in mitigating the effects of the 1998 ﬂoods
at the household level and in avoiding a major
SUMMARY xixfood crisis. Thus, the Bangladesh example
illustrates the importance of coordinated
actions at the sectoral and household levels,
by both public and private sectors, in main-
taining the availability of and access to food
to ensure food security following major sup-
ply disruptions. Private trade alone might
have provided sufﬁcient availability of food,
though this in itself would not have solved
the problem of access to food for millions of
households. Public sector actions enhanced
access to food by ﬂood-exposed households,
though these interventions were too small to
have a major direct effect on overall avail-
ability and market prices. Ultimately, food
security in Bangladesh was largely main-
tained through an appropriate mix of public
interventions, private market trade ﬂows,
and an extensive system of private borrow-
ing. Continued investments in agricultural
research, extension, roads, electricity, and
other rural infrastructure, along with policies
promoting efﬁcient markets and programs to
provide targeted transfers and credit to poor
households, could further enhance the food
security of the poor.
xx SUMMARYCHAPTER 1
Introduction
The nation is faced with a disaster of highest order. All signs, as they become more and
more visible, lead to one conclusion: we are faced with a disaster with catastrophic di-
mensions. . . . It is not just another ﬂood; it is THE FLOOD, which all Bangladeshis will
remember for generations to come. . . . This will be the reference point for many of our
national events. This will set the standard of our capability or incapability. We’ll measure
ourselves with this standard in future. So will the rest of the world.
These statements originally appeared in Professor Muhammad Yunus’s article in The Daily
Star, a major English-language newspaper in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on September 11, 1998, in
the midst of what has been called “the ﬂood of the century.”1
Fortunately, such a tragedy did not occur. In spite of massive ﬂoods that covered more
than two-thirds of the country, causing over 2 million metric tons (MTs) of rice crop losses
(equal to 10.5 percent of target rice production in 1998/99) and threatening the health and
lives of millions through possible food shortages, loss of purchasing power for basic neces-
sities, and the potential spread of water-borne disease, very few ﬂood-related deaths occurred,
and reportedly none due to food shortages. Poor households did suffer substantial hardship
during and after the ﬂoods, but the combination of well-functioning private markets, broadly
effective interventions by government, donors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and private sector borrowing to a large extent maintained availability and access to food.
This research report documents what is to a large extent a success story about a famine
that did not happen in spite of a massive food production shock. As von Braun, Teklu, and
Webb (1999) argue, famines are complex events that involve institutional, organizational, and
policy failure, not just generalized market- and climate-driven production failure. Moreover,
famines must be understood in their long-term context. In the same way, the avoidance of a
famine involves more than simply increasing food supply to areas affected by a national dis-
aster. Thus, we examine in detail how the ﬂood affected food security in Bangladesh at the
national and household levels, and the response of government, donors, markets, and house-
holds to the potential food crisis. Akey part of the story is the role of longer-term investments
in agricultural research, extension, and irrigation, along with earlier policy reforms (namely,
1 Professor Muhammad Yunus was the founder of the Grameen Bank. At about the same time (early September 1998),
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) quoted an international agency in reporting that 20 million people in
Bangladesh might die as a consequence of the ﬂoods (Khan and Obaidullah 1999).the trade liberalization in the early 1990s),
which played a major role in making the
1998 outcome so much different from that of
the Bangladesh famine in 1974.
At the heart of this analysis is the food
security triad of availability, access, and uti-
lization. The availability of food is naturally
an important issue when a major production
shortfall occurs. As this report will show, pri-
vate sector imports played a crucial role in
maintaining the availability of rice and wheat
following the 1998 ﬂoods. The contribution
of food aid to the availability and timing of
food aid arrivals is also highlighted.
But, as emphasized by Sen (1981), Dreze
and Sen (1989, 1991), and Ravallion (1997),
another key determinant of household food
security is households’ food entitlements—
their capacity to acquire food legally through
their own production, income, savings, and
private and government transfers (in other
words, household access to food). Sen (1981),
in fact, argues that insufﬁcient entitlements
can lead to famine and that loss of entitle-
ments, rather than a signiﬁcant decline in
the total availability of food, was the major
cause of the Great Bengal famine of 1943,
which killed between 1.5 and 3.0 million
people.2 The poor are particularly vulnera-
ble to natural disasters because of their lack
of assets and inadequate food entitlements
(World Bank 2000). This study examines how
access to food was affected by the loss of
assets and income-earning opportunities for
ﬂood-exposed households in 1998, using de-
tailed income and expenditure data from a
survey of rural households in ﬂood-affected
regions conducted just after the ﬂoods.
We do not stop at household access to
food, though. Because sufﬁcient access to
food at the household level does not ensure
adequate nutrition, especially for women
and young children, we extend our analysis
to cover the utilization of food (including
intrahousehold food distribution). Thus, we
also use household survey data to examine
determinants of nutrition (such as individual
food consumption, caring practices, and over-
all health status) as well as nutritional out-
comes for children.
Even though the availability of food
was maintained and targeted programs con-
tributed to increasing access to food by the
poor, this report shows that many households
resorted to borrowing money in informal
markets as their dominant coping strategy.
Credit was also an important coping mecha-
nism following the 1988 ﬂoods in Bangla-
desh, but inadequate access to credit by poor
households at that time adversely affected nu-
trition, contributing to reduced child growth
(Foster 1995). Thus, we also examine the
extent to which poor households were able
to borrow in 1998, and we discuss the impli-
cations of these increased debt burdens for
the medium-term welfare of the poor.
The 1998 Floods
Floods are a normal part of the ecology of
Bangladesh. The mid-1998 ﬂoods in Bang-
ladesh were unusual, however, for both their
depth and duration. Unlike the normal ﬂoods,
which cover large parts of the country for
several days or weeks during July and Au-
gust, the ﬂoods in 1998 lasted until mid-
September in many areas, killing hundreds
of people and destroying roads, houses, crops,
and other assets.
Three major rivers drain into the Bay of
Bengal through Bangladesh: the Ganges
(known as the Padma in Bangladesh), the
Brahmaputra (known as the Jamuna in Bang-
ladesh), and the Meghna. Less than 10 per-
cent of the 1.55 million km2 catchment area
of these rivers lies within the borders of
Bangladesh, so rainfall in neighboring India,
Nepal, Bhutan, and China and snowmelt in
the Himalayas are major determinants of the
ﬂow of water through Bangladesh. These
three major rivers have their peak ﬂows in
July, August, and September, during the mon-
soon season, when they overﬂow their banks
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2 The ofﬁcial estimate of famine deaths was 1.5 million. The higher ﬁgure is a calculation of excess mortality during the
famine period by Sen (1981), Appendix D.and deposit fertile silt on the ﬂoodplains.
These normal annual ﬂoods typically cover
about 30 percent of the country at various
times. However, in years when the peak
water levels of all three rivers occur at the
same time, as in 1954, 1974, 1987, 1988, and
1998, severe ﬂoods have occurred.3 In addi-
tion to these major river ﬂoods, Bangladesh
experiences ﬂashﬂoods in the eastern and
northern rivers, generally lasting only a few
days, local ﬂoods due to high rainfall in the
monsoon season, and coastal ﬂoods due to
storm surges generated by cyclones.4
The 1998 ﬂoods began in early July in
the southern part of Bangladesh and contin-
ued over the next three months in various
parts of the country, inundating 68 percent of
the total area at various times (a detailed
chronology of the 1998 ﬂoods is presented
in Table 1.1). Initially, ﬂooding (caused by
heavy rainfall) was mainly conﬁned to the
southeastern hilly basin and the Meghna
basin in the northeast of Bangladesh. During
the third week of July, however, a heavy
on-rush of water in the Brahmaputra, which
ﬂows into Bangladesh from the north, added
to rising levels in the Ganges (Padma) basin
in the western part of the country. By July 28,
1998, 30 percent of the total area was inun-
dated. Then, after two weeks of little change
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3 Pramanik (1994: 135, 144, 147).
4 Shahjahan (1998). See Ali, Hoque, Rahman, and Rashid (1998) for a more in-depth discussion of the hydrology of ﬂoods
in Bangladesh and the Flood Action Plan adopted after the 1988 ﬂoods.
Table 1.1 The 1998 ﬂoods: Chronology of events
Date Event
1998
First week of July The Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre (FFWC) of the Bangladesh Water Development Board reports
rising water levels in the major rivers.
July 16 First meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Disaster Management Co-ordination Committee (IMDMCC).
Emergency relief operations begin.
July 24 First National Disaster Council (NDC) meeting chaired by the Prime Minister.
August 13 Second meeting of the IMDMCC. Government plans to cope with the ﬂood situation with internal resources.
August 26 The government of Bangladesh appeals for international help to assist ﬂood victims.
August 32,000 tons of rice and 1,100 tons of wheat distributed through relief channels: Gratuitous Relief (GR), Test
Relief (TR), and Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF).
September 7 Peak of ﬂoods in terms of number of monitoring stations reporting ﬂows above danger levels; 51 percent of
total area of Bangladesh inundated.
September 16,575 tons of food aid arrive through World Food Programme; 52,000 tons of rice and 1,800 tons of wheat
distributed through relief channels.
September 25 Flood waters recede—all major rivers are below danger level.
October 1 Expansion of VGF program to 4 million cards, with 50 percent of the ration in wheat.
October 143,000 tons of government commercial wheat imports arrive; 42,500 tons of rice and 32,500 tons of wheat
distributed through relief channels.
October 44,344 tons of food aid arrive, bringing total since August 1998 to 61,883 tons.
November Atotal of only 77,000 tons of food aid are available for distribution by end of November. VGF program
continues. Wheat distribution through relief channels (56,700 tons) is now greater than rice distribution
through relief channels (37,800 tons).
Late November 138,902 tons of food aid arrive, bringing total since August 1998 to 200,785 tons.
November–December Aman rice harvest of 7.74 million tons, 1.76 million tons below target.
December Expansion of VGF program to 4.2 million cards and increase in the ration size from 16 kg to 20 kg/card
(5 kg rice and 15 kg wheat).
December 360,887 tons of food aid arrive, bringing total since August 1998 to 561,672 tons.
1999
February VGF distribution extended to February through April 1999.
May–June Record boro rice harvest of 10.05 million tons leads to drop in national average wholesale coarse rice price
from 14.0 Tk/kg in April to 12.4 Tk/kg in June.
Source: Grameen Trust ﬂood website.in the ﬂood situation, water levels in the
Padma river started rising sharply. Shortly
thereafter, other rivers also rose, so that by
August 30, 1998, 41 percent of the total area
was inundated. The ﬂood situation reached
its peak, in terms of the number of monitor-
ing stations reporting ﬂows above danger
levels, on September 7, 1998, when 51 per-
cent of the total area was inundated. Water
levels fell rapidly thereafter, and by Septem-
ber 25, 1998, no monitoring stations reported
flows above danger levels.5
Prior to 1998, the last major ﬂoods in
Bangladesh occurred in 1987 and 1988. In
1987, ﬂoods covered about 40 percent of the
land area, affected about 30 million people,
and caused about 1,800 deaths. The ﬂoods
in 1988 were even more serious, covering
about 60 percent of the land area, affecting
about 45 million people, and causing more
than 2,300 deaths.6 In terms of peak water
levels at various river monitoring stations,
the 1998 and 1988 ﬂoods were almost iden-
tical: they both averaged about 11.45 meters
above danger level (Table 1.2). The major
difference between the two ﬂoods was in the
duration of the ﬂooding: at the major river
monitoring stations shown in Table 1.2, the
water was above the danger level for an av-
erage of 59 days in 1998, compared with only
34 days in 1988.
Normal ﬂooding has little adverse effect
on rice production in Bangladesh (and, in
fact, adds to soil fertility), but the long dura-
tions of both the 1988 and 1998 ﬂoods led to
major production shortfalls (Figure 1.1). Ini-
tially, the 1998 ﬂoods caused only relatively
minor damage to standing crops but, as ﬂood-
waters persisted into September, the ﬂooding
destroyed seedlings of the main monsoon
season aman rice crop. Ultimately, the ﬂood
resulted in a shortfall in amanrice production
of 1.76 million MTs and a total rice produc-
tion shortfall of 2.04 million MTs, similar to
the production loss due to ﬂoods in 1988.
Ofﬁcial estimates of other losses and
damage in the 1988 and 1998 ﬂoods are
presented in Table 1.3. The sudden rise in
water levels in 1988 and the serious ﬂooding
within the city of Dhaka may account for the
higher number of deaths attributed to the
ﬂood in that year and the greater reported
damage to houses and schools. Nonetheless,
the damage to physical infrastructure (roads,
embankments, bridges, and culverts) appears
to have been greater in 1998. These com-
parisons should be treated with caution,
however, because of possible differences in
deﬁnitions and data coverage.
4 CHAPTER 1
5 Bangladesh Water Development Board (1998: 28, 29).
6 Irrigation Support Project for Asia and the Near East (1993: 1).
Table 1.2 Bangladesh ﬂood levels and duration, 1988 and 1998
Difference
1988 1998 1998–1988
Total ﬂood-affected area (km2) 89,970 100,250 10,280
Percentage of total area 61 68 7
Peak water level (meters)
Brahmaputra basin
Bahadurabad (Jamuna) 20.62 20.37 −0.25
Aricha (Jamuna) 10.58 10.76 0.18
Mymensingh (Old Brahmaputra) 13.69 13.04 −0.65
Dhaka (Buriganga) 7.58 7.24 −0.34
Narayanganj (Lakhya) 6.71 6.93 0.22
Ganges basin
Rajshahi (Padma) 19.00 19.68 0.68
Goalondo (Padma) 9.83 10.21 0.38
Bhagyakul (Padma) 7.43 7.50 0.07
Meghna basin
Bhairab Bazar (Upper Meghna) 7.66 7.33 −0.33
Average 11.46 11.45 0.00
Days above danger level
Brahmaputra basin
Bahadurabad (Jamuna) 27 66 39
Aricha (Jamuna) 31 68 37
Mymensingh (Old Brahmaputra) 10 33 23
Dhaka (Buriganga) 23 57 34
Narayanganj (Lakhya) 36 71 35
Ganges basin
Rajshahi (Padma) 24 28 4
Goalondo (Padma) 41 68 27
Bahgyakul (Padma) 47 72 25
Meghna basin
Bhairab Bazar (Upper Meghna) 68 68 0
Average 34 59 25
Source: Bangladesh Water Development Board 1998.
Note: Names of rivers are shown in parentheses next to station names.Outline of the Report
The rest of this report examines the impacts
of the 1998 ﬂoods on food security at the
national and household levels, the response
of government and markets, and household
coping strategies. Chapter 2 outlines the con-
ceptual framework used in the analysis at
both the sectoral and micro levels. Here we
also discuss the sampling frame and the
basic household characteristics in the survey
of rural households in ﬂood-affected regions.
Chapter 3 describes foodgrain markets, avail-
ability, and government policy interventions
during the ﬂoods, highlighting the important
role of private sector imports in stabilizing
prices and maintaining the availability of
rice and wheat.
The next two chapters focus on the as-
sessment of the impact of the ﬂoods on
households. Chapter 4 presents data on var-
ious measures of the immediate effects of the
ﬂoods on incomes and earnings, looking in
particular at losses of agricultural produc-
tion, losses of assets, and reduction in labor
market participation and earnings. Chapter 5
presents a detailed analysis of the impact of
the ﬂoods on food consumption and food se-
curity, gender discrimination, illness, and the
nutritional status of children and women.
Chapter 6 covers household coping strate-
gies. It begins with a description of the main
coping strategies used by households, as re-
ported during rapid appraisals. Then the key
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Table 1.3 Estimates of losses and damage in the Bangladesh ﬂoods 
of 1988 and 1998
1988 1998
Area ﬂooded (km2) 89,970 100,250
Average duration of ﬂoods (days) 34 59
Number of affected people 45,000,000 30,916,351
Number of deaths 2,379 918
Rice production lost (million tons) 2.00 2.04
Number of cattle lost 172,000a 26,564
Roads damaged (km) 13,000 15,927
Embankments damaged (km) 1,990 4,528
Number of bridges and culverts damaged 1,160 6,890
Number of affected houses 7,200,000 980,571
Number of schools damaged 19,000 1,718
Number of displaced people n.a. 1,049,525
Sources: Grameen Trust ﬂood website: hhtp://www.bangladeshonline.com/gob/ﬂood98/
foreign_1.html, cited in Ahmed 1999: 151. Average days of ﬂooding from Table 1.2. Num-
ber of affected people in the 1988 ﬂood from Irrigation Support Project for Asia and the Near
East 1993.
a Includes goats and other non-poultry animals.
Figure 1.1 Flooded area and aman production, 1970–98
Source: Bangladesh Water Development Board 1998 and Food Planning and Monitoring Unit.coping strategies—borrowing and purchases
of food on credit, changes in eating behavior,
and sales of assets—are discussed and the
factors determining the choice of coping
strategies are analyzed.
Chapter 7 examines the impact of major
government and NGO interventions on
household incomes and food consumption.
The chapter highlights the impacts of food
and cash transfers, examining the extent to
which they were targeted to the poor and
ﬂood-affected households and their contri-
bution to total incomes and expenditures.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the ﬁndings
presented in earlier chapters and presents
policy implications.
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Data and Methods
T
he 1998 ﬂoods in Bangladesh, and government policy interventions in response to the
ﬂoods, affected markets and households through numerous channels. Entire commu-
nities and markets experienced damage to infrastructure and disruption of local
economies. Yet this large aggregate shock also affected individuals or households in slightly
different ways, depending on the exact location of their houses and ﬁelds, their occupations,
and other household characteristics. As such, the ﬂoods had some of the characteristics of an
idiosyncratic shock.7
This chapter begins with the conceptual framework used in this study, which elucidates
these linkages between the ﬂoods, government policy, labor and commodity markets, house-
hold incomes and consumption, and nutrition and health outcomes. We describe the micro-
level data collection and sampling frame used for the analysis at the household and individual
level. Finally, we discuss two major issues important for the micro-level analysis in subse-
quent chapters: the definition of flood exposure and the extent to which flood exposure is
correlated with poverty.
Conceptual Framework
Figure 2.1 describes the relationship between production, markets, and household con-
sumption demand for foodgrains. As shown, the availability of foodgrains in the market is
determined by the level of domestic food production, the level of private imports, and the
distribution of food aid through the public food distribution system (PFDS). The distribution
of the PFDS, in turn, is determined by the availability of public stocks at that time, which are
themselves a result of past government procurement, government imports, and food aid in
the form of current and emergency aid. The ﬂoods caused major losses of domestic produc-
tion and households assets. As a result, food prices rose and the demand for labor fell, low-
ering household incomes and ultimately household consumption.
Figure 2.2, which draws on the United Nations International Children Fund’s (UNICEF
1990) framework for the causes of malnutrition, shows how the use and allocation of labor
and other household resources affect household income and expenditure and ultimately
people’s well-being. The allocation and level of expenditure, together with the level of prices
7 For a review of the literature on shocks and poverty, see World Bank (2000).and level of care and health environment,
determine the level of food security and ul-
timately the level of health and nutritional
status. In particular, Figure 2.2 shows the
many pathways through which ﬂoods, over
which people have little or no control, can
affect people’s lives. In this case the ﬂoods
had a direct impact on the endowment and
the activities of the household, which affect
household behavior, food security, and indi-
vidual health and nutritional status in several
ways.
First, the ﬂoods damaged or destroyed
infrastructure, workplaces, and household
assets, and disrupted the normal functioning
of labor, credit, and commodity markets.
Landowning farming households were par-
ticularly affected because the ﬂoodwaters
damaged standing crops and receded only in
late September, thus reducing the time avail-
able for planting another crop and reducing
the level of own food production. Nonfarm-
ing households were also affected, because
the ﬂoods destroyed the productive assets of
self-employed households, such as weaving
looms and rickshaws. Moreover, market dis-
ruptions caused shortages of critical recurrent
inputs (for example, seeds and seedlings) to
both farm and nonfarm production activities.
The reduction in agricultural production
and the slowing down of the economy
greatly affected the demand for labor, thus
reducing the income-earning opportunities
of household members. Long-term income
(or livelihood) security was compromised by
direct destruction or loss of assets that are
stores of value. It was further jeopardized by
depletions of savings or increased indebted-
ness, used as a coping strategy in response to
short-term income losses.
The ﬂoods were also accompanied by
reduced availability of food and other com-
modities. This led to higher prices and a
reduction in the amounts that could be pur-
chased by households. At the same time,
expenditures on items critical to the proper
care of household members, such as clothing
or medicines, may have also been smaller
than needed. Thus, food security was com-
promised by reduced expenditures on food
resulting from additional constraints on
household budgets and rising food prices.
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Figure 2.1 The pathways of ﬂood impact on the domestic availability and household consumption of foodgrains
Source: Authors.Finally, the health environment was
greatly disrupted. Water-borne diseases
were more prevalent because of contact with
contaminated ﬂoodwaters and a lack of
proper sanitation facilities. Moreover, health
infrastructures were by and large not avail-
able. At the same time, the ﬂoods led to
direct damage to and destruction of house-
holds’ domestic assets. The most important
of these were their homes, which were either
damaged or not habitable during the period
of the ﬂoods. Other assets included water
pumps necessary for accessing clean water,
toilet facilities, clothing, cooking equip-
ment, eating utensils, and food stocks. These
factors, together with a reduction in the
availability of fuel for cooking, disrupted
domestic production (for example, child-
care, meal preparation, and house cleaning),
which directly affected the quality of care
for household members and the quality of
households’health environments.
When food security and the quality of care
for household members are jeopardized, di-
etary intakes decline and illness increases,
ultimately compromising household mem-
bers’ nutritional status. In dire situations,
food scarcities may lead households to in-
crease discrimination in food consumption
against some of their members in order to
ensure the survival of others. In short, with
ﬂoods come multiple, simultaneous shocks
to households’economic resources and their
daily living environments. Poor households
in Bangladesh faced difﬁcult tradeoffs in
deciding how to cope with the immediate
losses and the deterioration in members’
physical well-being because the necessary
resources were undermined.
Data Collection Methodology
and Sampling Frame
The micro-level analysis of this report is
based mostly on The International Food
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Figure 2.2 The multiple pathways of ﬂood impacts on household resources and people’s
well-being
Source: Adapted from UNICEF 1990.Policy Research Institute’s Food Manage-
ment and Research Support Project (IFPRI-
FMRSP) Household Survey 1998, a detailed
survey of 757 households in seven ﬂood-
affected thanas in Bangladesh. Since the pur-
pose of the study is to analyze the impact of
the ﬂoods on food security and households’
resulting coping strategies, we selected areas
that would give a fair representation of the
parts of the country affected by ﬂooding. We
used three main criteria to select the seven
thanas.Our ﬁrst criterion was the severity of
flooding, as determined by the Bangladesh
Water Development Board. It classiﬁed
thanas as “not affected,” “moderately af-
fected,” and “severely affected,” depending
on the level and depth of the ﬂoodwater. Our
second criterion was the level of poverty in
the district in which the thanaswere located.
Thanas with more than 70 percent of the
population below the poverty line were clas-
siﬁed as poor. Finally, from the thanas se-
lected on the ﬁrst two criteria, we chose
those that had been included in other stud-
ies and that would give us a good regional
and geographical balance across the six ad-
ministrative divisions of Bangladesh (see
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3).
We randomly selected households using
a multiple-stage probability sampling tech-
nique.8 In the ﬁrst stage, three unions in
each  thana  were selected. In the second
stage, six villages were selected from each
union with probability proportional to the
population in each village. Then, in each vil-
lage two clusters (paras) were selected
using preassigned random numbers. Finally,
three households were chosen from all the
households in each cluster using a system-
atic random selection process. As a result,
we selected approximately 6 households per
village (36 per union, 108 per thana) for a
ﬁnal sample size of 757 households in 126
villages.
We used three different instruments. A
community questionnaire was used to col-
lect information at the union level during
the ﬂoods. Avillage-level survey conducted
during November and December 1998 in
64 villages collected information on rural
labor markets. A detailed household ques-
tionnaire, administered between the third
week in November and the third week in
December, sought information on the pattern
of household expenditures, the pattern of land
use by plot, participation in the rural labor
market, ownership and loss of assets, bor-
rowing strategy, and anthropometry. Several
sections in the questionnaire contained ret-
rospective questions on the situation during
and before the ﬂoods.
It is important to point out that, even
though we concentrated our analysis on the
area of Bangladesh affected by the ﬂoods,
there were signiﬁcant differences both be-
tween and within the thanas surveyed, and
in terms of both the level of exposure to the
ﬂoods and the level of economic activity.
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Table 2.1 List of thanas in the sample
Nonpoor thanas Poor thanas Total
Severely affected Muladi, Barisal District (Barisal) Mohammadpur, Magura District (Khulna)BINP —
Shibpur, Narsingdi District (Dhaka)BINP Saturia, Manikganj District (Dhaka)Micro 4
Moderately affected Shahrasti, Chandpur District (Chittagong)BINP Madaripur, Madaripur District (Dhaka)BINP —
Derai, Sunamganj District (Sylhet)HKI 3
Total 3 4 7
Source: Authors’calculations based on the 1998 Household Expenditure Survey (BBS 1998) and Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB 1998).
Notes: “BINP” superscript denotes thanas with Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project; “Micro” superscript denotes thanas where the International Food
Policy Research Institute micro-nutrients survey took place; “HKI” superscript denotes thanas used in the Helen Keller International Nutritional Surveillance
Survey.
8 In Saturia thana this was not done because we were using the random sample used by another IFPRI study.Figure 2.3 Map of ﬂood-affected areas of Bangladesh as of September 9, 1998, and thanas selected for the investigation
Source: Map of ﬂood-affected areas prepared by GIS Unit from Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre (FFWC) and Bangladesh Water Development
Board (BWDB).
Notes: Number of districts affected, 49; number of thanas affected, 290 (65 with normal ﬂooding, 96 with moderate ﬂooding, 129 with severe ﬂooding).Deﬁnition of Flood Exposure
In Bangladesh, the extent and the severity of
ﬂoods are generally measured in terms of the
height of water above danger level at various
points on major rivers and in terms of the
duration of ﬂooding (see Chapter 1). The
amount of damage to roads, submersion of
highways, and losses to agricultural output
are also general clues to the severity of the
flooding. These measures of aggregate shocks
provide an important indication of the envi-
ronment in which people lived and the hard-
ships they experienced. These regional and
community-level measures are relatively easy
to collect in a timely fashion and are useful
for immediate relief efforts.9
However, not all households within a
given geographical area were exposed to
ﬂoods to the same extent. During the 1998
floods, some households had a large amount
of water on their homestead and in their
homes, and some had to abandon their
houses for days or weeks at the peak of the
flooding. This direct exposure often depended
on the height of the homestead and the pres-
ence of an embankment or a road that kept
the water away.
In order to assess the degree of direct ex-
posure to the ﬂood at the household level we
developed a simple index using information
provided by the household on three meas-
ures: the depth of water in the homestead, the
depth of water in the home, and the number
of days water was in the house. First, for
each of those measures, we created an index
ranging from 0 to 5 (or 0 to 6). These in-
dices were then summed to form a combined
index, ranging from 0 to 16.10 Finally, based
on the combined index, we created a category
variable in which households are classiﬁed as:
(1) not exposed to the ﬂood, (2) moderately
exposed to the ﬂood, (3) severely exposed
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9 See the rapid appraisal analysis by del Ninno and Roy (1999a).
10 We recognize that the household ﬂood exposure level used here may incompletely measure the effects of the ﬂooding
on crop production. This might be of particular relevance for better-off agricultural producing households with more
land, but is less likely to be an issue for comparisons across villages, because village-level ﬂood exposure is likely to
be associated with ﬁeld and household damage. In any case, we constructed a village-level agricultural ﬁeld ﬂood ex-
posure variable by taking the village median of the average difference in ﬂood depth between a normal year and the
1998 ﬂood year, weighted by the size of the plots. We added this variable to the models to determine the level of per
capita expenditure; we found that the coefﬁcients of this variable are small and not signiﬁcant, that is, the village-level
agricultural ﬁeld ﬂood exposure variable does  not provide any additional explanation of the determination of per capita
expenditure.
Table 2.2 Construction of the ﬂood exposure index
Original variable Created category variable
Variable Range Unit of measure Range Categories
Depth of water in the homestead 0–12 Feet 0–5 0 to 4: number of feet
5: more than 4 feet
Depth of water in the home 0–45 Feet 0–6 0 to 5: number of feet
6: more than 5 feet
Number of days of water in the home 0–120 Days 0–5 0: None
1: > 0 ≤ 1 week
2: > 1 ≤ 2 weeks
3: > 2 weeks ≤ 1 month
4: > 1 month ≤ 2 months
5: > 2 months
Index 0–16
Flood-exposed categories 0 Not exposed
1–5 Moderate
6–10 Severe
11–16 Very severe
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.to the ﬂood, or (4) very severely exposed to
the ﬂood. A summary of the variables used
is reported in Table 2.2. Frequency distri-
butions of these variables and of the three
single indices and the combined index are
presented in Appendix A.
In addition to this measure of house-
hold ﬂood exposure we calculated a vil-
lage-level variable of ﬂood exposure. This
variable, calculated as the village-level me-
dian of individual household ﬂood expo-
sure, is used mainly in the econometric
analysis to take into account village-level
unobservable characteristics related to the
ﬂood, that is, the effects of village-level
ﬂood exposure.
The resulting frequency distribution of
household-level ﬂood exposure by thana is
reported in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3. These
show wide differences across households
within thanas in the severity of ﬂood expo-
sure as well as large variations across thanas.
All together about 50 percent of households
were exposed severely or very severely to
the ﬂood, while 29 percent were not exposed
directly to the ﬂood.
Three thanas in the sample were partic-
ularly severely affected: Madaripur, Muladi,
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Figure 2.4 Severity of ﬂood exposure and percentage of households in the bottom 40th percentile
of per capita expenditure by thana
Table 2.3 Household per capita expenditure by thana and severity of household ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Per capita Bottom 40th
expenditure percentile Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Thana District (Tk/month) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Number
Madaripur Madaripur 819.6 38.9 0.0 5.6 31.5 63.0 100 108
Muladi Barisal 633.6 56.5 1.9 32.4 50.0 15.7 100 108
Shahrasti Chandpur 809.2 38.0 4.6 13.9 43.5 38.0 100 108
Derai Sunamganj 716.7 47.2 29.6 38.0 18.5 13.9 100 108
Saturia Manikganj 758.4 35.8 51.4 34.9 8.3 5.5 100 109
Shibpur Narsingdi 807.2 26.9 52.8 10.2 22.2 14.8 100 108
Mohammadpur Magura 769.5 37.0 60.2 17.6 17.6 4.6 100 108
Total 759.1 40.0 28.7 21.8 27.3 22.2 100 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.and Shahrasti, where 95 percent, 66 percent,
and 82 percent of households, respectively,
were exposed severely and very severely to
the ﬂood. The relative severity of ﬂood ex-
posure across thanas, unions, and villages
as measured here corresponds with the ﬁnd-
ings and observations made at the time of the
household survey, as well as with the results
of a village-level rapid appraisal (del Ninno
and Roy 1999a).
Flood Exposure and Poverty
Before we begin the analysis of the impact
of the ﬂoods it is important to establish
whether the relatively poor areas covered by
the survey were exposed to the ﬂoods more
than richer areas. It is also important to es-
tablish whether relatively poor households
were exposed more than richer households.
This is important because in our analysis we
do not want to confound the impact of the
ﬂoods with the effects of initial endowments
and level of income. In other words, we want
to make sure that ﬂood exposure was a true
exogenous shock for each of the households,
independently of their initial economic status.
Even though some villages, some unions,
and some thanas were exposed more than
others to the ﬂoods, those areas do not appear
to be poorer than the other areas. Looking at
the average per capita expenditure by thana,
reported in Table 2.3, and the percentages of
households below the 40th percentile of total
per capita expenditure reported in Figure 2.4,
we cannot detect any association between
ﬂood exposure and poverty at thana level.
However, since we are observing per capita
expenditures after the ﬂoods, the possibility
remains that these observed per capita ex-
penditures were affected by the ﬂoods in the
preceding months.
The best way to assess if poor house-
holds were exposed more than richer house-
holds would be to directly compare their
expenditures before and after the ﬂoods.
Unfortunately, complete data on per capita
expenditures before the ﬂoods were not col-
lected because this would have involved a
recall period of ﬁve or more months.11 Some
variables that can indicate households’long-
term wealth and the level of asset ownership
before the ﬂoods are available, however.
Table 2.4 shows the level of pre-ﬂood
ownership of several types of assets by level
of exposure to the ﬂoods.12 Though, in gen-
eral, the total value of assets owned did not
vary by ﬂood exposure, the percentage of
households severely exposed to the ﬂood was
higher for those with little (less than 0.20
hectares) or no land (less than 0.02 hectares).
To check the hypothesis that there is a
correlation between level of household ﬂood
exposure and household endowment (includ-
ing land), we ran several regression models
in which ﬂood exposure is a function of long-
term wealth, assumed to be determined by
household composition, education, and pre-
ﬂood value of assets. The ﬁrst two equations
are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regres-
sions, in which we control for a possible
correlation between unobservable charac-
teristics at the village level and the other
speciﬁed independent variables using both
random effects and ﬁxed effects models
(Table 2.5).13 We also used the same ex-
planatory variables in logit regressions to
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11 The survey was undertaken in November and December 1998, ﬁve months after the ﬂood began in some parts of the
country in July 1998.
12 Pre-ﬂood asset values were calculated using the value of assets that households would have owned if the ﬂoods had
not occurred. In particular we used two sources of information:
1. The value of the assets owned in November–December 1998 and the percentage of the value lost owing to the ﬂoods.
This is a valid method for large assets that were not sold or consumed in the period of the ﬂoods.
2. The number and value of assets lost, sold, and consumed since July 15, 1998—at the beginning of the ﬂood. This
measure is better for smaller assets that might have been sold as a coping strategy by the household to deal with the
consequences of the ﬂoods.
13 Random and ﬁxed effects models are common ways to address the role of unobservable heterogeneity in subgroups of
the data (in this instance, unobservable factors that are common within villages in the sample). Writing the estimated
equation in simpliﬁed form, we have:
Y(h,v) = a + bX(h,v) + cF(h,v) + e(h,v)determine the probability of a household
being exposed to the ﬂood (Table 2.6).
In the OLS ﬁxed and random effects
models in which the dependent variable is
the index of the level of exposure to the ﬂood
(0–16), land has a positive and signiﬁcant
correlation with level of ﬂood exposure
(Table 2.5). In the logit models, in which we
are looking only at the difference between
ﬂood and non-ﬂood exposed households, the
correlation is not signiﬁcant and the odds
ratio is practically equal to 1 (Table 2.6).
Moreover, even in the OLS ﬁxed and ran-
dom effects regressions, the impact of land
ownership on household ﬂood exposure is
not very large. The difference in predicted
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Table 2.4 Availability of land and other assets in the period before the ﬂoods, by severity of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Landless
Percentage of households < 0.02 hectares 46.1 49.1 46.9 54.8 48.9
Percentage of households < 0.20 hectares 69.1 66.1 65.2 72.6 68.2
Land (total)
Percentage of households owning land 56.7 53.3 54.1 47.6 53.2
Average size of land (hectares) 0.45 0.86 0.43 0.40 0.53
Average value of land (Tk) 275,824 310,599 265,728 213,150 268,170
House assets
Percentage of households 100.0 97.6 97.1 98.8 98.4
Mean value (Tk) 23,863 31,668 24,884 23,368 25,715
Productive assets
Percentage of households 92.6 93.9 93.2 94.1 93.4
Mean value (Tk) 6,971 7,893 6,800 6,639 7,052
Domestic assets
Percentage of households 97.2 95.2 96.6 97.0 96.6
Mean value (Tk) 3,713 2,747 2,271 2,225 2,779
Consumer durables
Percentage of households 34.6 37.0 29.5 22.6 31.0
Mean value (Tk) 2,630 3,652 1,368 1,867 2,444
Liquid assets
Percentage of households 73.3 66.7 77.8 66.1 71.5
Mean value (Tk) 9,955 13,570 9,262 10,127 10,519
Other assets
Percentage of households 11.1 9.1 12.1 16.7 12.2
Mean value (Tk) 2,378 2,220 994 957 1,544
Livestock
Percentage of households owning cattle 53.9 48.5 48.8 42.3 48.8
Mean value (Tk) 8,371 9,093 8,633 8,427 8,610
Percentage of households owning chickens 76.5 77.6 83.1 85.7 80.6
Mean value (Tk) 348 388 454 456 412
Mean value of all assets (Tk) 42,396 52,315 40,426 38,934 43,251
Number of households 217 165 207 168 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
where e(h,v) = n(v) + u(h), for households, h, and village, v. In the random effects speciﬁcation, the error term, n(v) is
modeled as a random variable that is uncorrelated with the other right-hand-side variables. Estimation of this model
is done using Generalized Least Squares (GLS). In the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation, it is assumed that the unobservable
village-level characteristics, n(v), may be correlated with the ﬂood, F(h,v) (and possibly other exogenous variables,
X(h,v)). In this case we express each variable in the regression as the difference between the observed variable and its
village-level mean value, so the ﬁxed effects estimation measures only the effects of the right-hand-side variables to
the extent that they are different from their village mean values. Thus, the ﬁxed effects model essentially gives a com-
parison across households within the same village, whereas the random effects model combines within and across vil-
lage effects. A basic description of the models used and the tests performed is available in Greene (1997: 443–444),
Judge et al. (1985: 527), and Hausman (1978).ﬂood exposure between a household with no
land assets and a household with the largest
land assets is only 3 points on the 0–16 scale.
In the context of rural Bangladesh this result
can be explained by the fact that households
that have more land have the possibility of
building their house on slightly higher ground
than households without any land. This does
not mean that they were not exposed to the
ﬂood, just that they were not as severely ex-
posed as households with less land.
The main conclusion from the regres-
sion results in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, however,
is that pre-ﬂood determinants of wealth do
not explain variations in ﬂood exposure
across households in the sample. Based on
these results, we use the ﬂood exposure vari-
able in the following analysis as an inde-
pendent variable to explain the impact of the
ﬂoods on a series of individual- and house-
hold-level outcomes, such as the level of
caloric consumption, food security, and other
health and nutrition outcomes.
In most of our analysis, we use the OLS
ﬁxed and random effects models to examine
the impact of the ﬂoods on individual- and
household-level outcomes. These models
capture the impact of the level of ﬂood ex-
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Table 2.5 Determinants of household ﬂood exposure: Regression results (dependent variable:
ﬂood index 0–16)
OLS with village OLS with village
random effect ﬁxed effect
Description Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Female-headed household −0.0916 −0.15 0.0292 0.05
Age of household head 0.0104 0.73 0.0108 0.76
Proportion males: 0–4 years 0.0043 0.26 0.0064 0.39
Proportion males: 5–14 years 0.0255 1.63 0.0286 1.83*
Proportion males: 15–19 years 0.0072 0.39 0.0085 0.46
Proportion males: 20–34 years 0.0014 0.09 0.0058 0.35
Proportion males: 35–54 years 0.0231 1.51 0.0260 1.71*
Proportion females: 0–4 years 0.0073 0.46 0.0042 0.27
Proportion females: 5–14 years 0.0113 0.79 0.0113 0.79
Proportion females:15–19 years −0.0027 −0.15 −0.0019 −0.11
Proportion females: 20–34 years −0.0128 −0.86 −0.0124 −0.84
Proportion females: 35–54 years −0.0200 −1.42 −0.0167 −1.19
Household size −0.0621 −0.34 −0.1182 −0.65
Number of males: Any primary education −0.1705 −1.14 −0.1797 −1.20
Number of males: Any secondary education 0.0498 0.22 0.0210 0.09
Number of females: No education 0.0022 0.01 0.0661 0.20
Number of females: Any primary education −0.0978 −0.29 −0.0965 −0.29
Number of females: Any secondary education 0.3136 0.78 0.3645 0.91
Pre-ﬂood value of land (Tk thousands) −0.0120 −2.15* −0.0136 −2.43*
Productive asset value (Tk thousands) 0.1119 0.92 0.1103 0.91
Liquid asset value (Tk thousands) −0.0139 −0.41 −0.0234 −0.69
Housing asset value (Tk thousands) 0.0010 0.03 0.0002 0.01
Domestic asset value (Tk thousands) 0.0553 0.13 0.4924 1.17
Other assets value (Tk thousands) −1.4218 −1.36 −1.3406 −1.28
Credit before1998 (dummy variable) −0.1989 −0.49 −0.0748 −0.18
Constant 5.4998 4.30* 5.2820 4.27*
Number of observations 753 753
Number of villages 117 117
R2 .02 .01
Random effects versus ﬁxed effects (p-value)** .01
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less. ** values for random versus ﬁxed effects are
the result of the Hausman test.posure at the household level, taking into
account unobservable village characteristics.
In some cases, we also use the village ﬂood
exposure variable, capturing the direct and
indirect effects of the ﬂoods common to all
households within a village.
Determinants of Current 
Per Capita Expenditure
The above discussion argues that household
exposure to ﬂoods can be treated as an ex-
ogenous variable in our analysis, since pre-
ﬂood household and village characteristics
do not explain the variation in ﬂood exposure
across households. Thus, in discussing the
results of the survey in subsequent chapters
of this report, we will present tables com-
paring various outcomes of interest across
households with various levels of ﬂood ex-
posure. Likewise, the regression analyses
will treat both household-level and village-
level ﬂood exposure variables as exogenous
variables.
In addition, we will compare various out-
comes across per capita expenditure quin-
tiles because of the policy relevance of the
level of household incomes (expenditures).
We now show that, although per capita ex-
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Table 2.6 Determinants of household ﬂood exposure: Regression results (dependent variable:
household ﬂood exposure (0 or 1))
Logit with village Logit with village
random effect ﬁxed effect
Description Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z-statistic
Female-headed household 1.19 0.25 1.86 0.81
Age of household head 0.95 −2.64* 0.96 −2.05*
Proportion males: 0–4 years 0.97 −1.14 0.97 −1.20
Proportion males: 5–14 years 0.99 −0.32 1.00 −0.14
Proportion males: 15–19 years 1.00 −0.19 1.00 0.00
Proportion males: 20–34 years 0.99 −0.64 0.99 −0.35
Proportion males: 35–54 years 1.03 1.56 1.04 1.65*
Proportion females: 0–4 years 0.98 −1.08 0.99 −0.64
Proportion females: 5–14years 0.97 −1.90 0.97 −1.42
Proportion females:15–19 years 0.96 −1.83* 0.98 −1.03
Proportion females: 20–34 years 0.95 −2.93* 0.96 −2.00*
Proportion females: 35–54 years 0.95 −2.92* 0.96 −2.08*
Household size 1.09 0.34 1.11 0.43
Number of males: Any primary education 0.71 −1.64* 0.64 −1.92*
Number of males: Any secondary education 1.48 1.23 1.40 1.02
Number of females: No education 1.35 0.69 1.17 0.38
Number of females: Any primary education 1.11 0.23 0.97 −0.06
Number of females: Any secondary education 3.67 2.15* 2.93 1.74*
Pre-ﬂood value of land (Tk thousands) 0.99 −1.72* 0.99 −1.18
Productive asset value (Tk thousands) 0.90 −0.57 0.76 −1.11
Liquid asset value (Tk thousands) 0.98 −0.29 0.83 −0.88
Housing asset value (Tk thousands) 1.06 1.04 1.04 0.68
Domestic asset value (Tk thousands) 0.67 −0.77 0.96 −0.07
Other assets value (Tk thousands) 0.07 −1.84* 0.02 −1.49
Credit before1998 (dummy variable) 1.41 0.69 1.52 0.81
Number of observations 753 286
Number of villages 117 40
χ2 36.8 37.4
Prob χ2 0.06 0.05
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.penditures are endogenous,14 they are not
determined by either the household or the
village level of exposure to the ﬂoods.
To test the relationship between current
per capita expenditure and long-term wealth
status and the level of exposure, we used a
model in which we explain the level of
current per capita expenditure as a function
of household characteristics (gender, age of
household head, proportion of household
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Table 2.7 Determinants of per capita household expenditure: Regression results
Household-level ﬂood expenditure
Village-level With village With village
ﬂood exposure random effect ﬁxed effect
Description Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Female-headed household −0.3679 −4.76* −0.3752 −4.45* −0.3933 −4.38*
Age of household head −0.0027 −1.42 −0.0023 −1.20 −0.0012 −0.59
Proportion males: 0–4 years −0.0059 −1.48 −0.0057 −2.46* −0.0052 −2.15*
Proportion males: 5–14 years −0.0044 −1.78* −0.0048 −2.22* −0.0055 −2.40*
Proportion males: 15–19 years 0.0008 0.27 0.0010 0.39 0.0015 0.55
Proportion males: 20–34 years 0.0025 1.01 0.0025 1.10 0.0025 1.03
Proportion males: 35–54 years 0.0017 0.83 0.0016 0.77 0.0013 0.56
Proportion females: 0–4 years −0.0045 −2.30* −0.0044 −2.06* −0.0044 −1.92*
Proportion females: 5–14 years −0.0062 −3.38* −0.0058 −3.00* −0.0047 −2.27*
Proportion females:15–19 years −0.0027 −1.14 −0.0025 −1.00 −0.0019 −0.70
Proportion females: 20–34 years 0.0004 0.23 0.0008 0.37 0.0014 0.65
Proportion females: 35–54 years 0.0021 1.14 0.0020 1.02 0.0015 0.71
Household size −0.0553 −1.49 −0.0561 −2.18* −0.0613 −2.21*
Number of males: Any primary education 0.0042 0.23 0.0067 0.33 0.0129 0.58
Number of males: Any secondary education 0.0366 1.16 0.0374 1.19 0.0431 1.28
Number of females: No education −0.0263 −0.48 −0.0313 −0.70 −0.0422 −0.89
Number of females: Any primary education 0.0378 0.63 0.0350 0.75 0.0257 0.52
Number of females: Any secondary education 0.1245 1.81* 0.1287 2.28* 0.1390 2.35*
Pre-ﬂood value of land (Tk thousands) 0.0013 1.44 0.0013 1.74* 0.0012 1.48
Productive asset value (Tk thousands) 0.0442 2.37* 0.0447 2.69* 0.0467 2.60*
Liquid asset value (Tk thousands) −0.0006 −0.13 0.0004 0.08 0.0017 0.35
Housing asset value (Tk thousands) 0.0211 4.39* 0.0201 3.87* 0.0184 3.30*
Domestic asset value (Tk thousands) 0.0507 1.04 0.0538 1.01 0.0704 1.15
Other assets value (Tk thousands) 0.3972 4.24* 0.4162 2.91* 0.4630 3.04*
Credit before1998 (dummy variable) 0.0765 1.33 0.0638 1.17 0.0284 0.48
Number of dependent workers −0.0142 −0.49 −0.0102 −0.34 −0.0008 −0.02
Number of day laborers −0.0633 −1.99* −0.0661 −2.25* −0.0761 −2.39*
Persons engaged in business 0.0116 0.34 0.0120 0.36 0.0154 0.42
Persons in own farm 0.0820 2.88* 0.0838 2.86* 0.0841 2.60*
Having electricity supply 0.1353 3.26* 0.1432 2.94* 0.1677 3.02*
Moderately ﬂood exposed 0.0076 0.14 0.0031 0.07 0.0103 0.17
Severely ﬂood exposed 0.0180 0.39 0.0121 0.27 0.0400 0.61
Very severely ﬂood exposed 0.0801 1.65* 0.0414 0.88 0.0394 0.55
Constant 6.8980 41.69* 6.8944 39.52* 6.8664 36.58*
Number of observations 757 757 757
Number of villages 117 117 117
R2 .37 .37 .36
Random effects versus ﬁxed effects (p-value)** .33
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
Note: The dependent variable is the log of per capita expenditure.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less. ** values for random versus ﬁxed effects are the result of the Hausman test.
14 We treat the issue of endogeneity of per capita expenditures through standard statistical techniques in the regressions,
including per capita expenditures as an explanatory variable in subsequent chapters.members in different age categories, house-
hold size, number of members with different
educational levels, number of people in dif-
ferent occupations, and level of pre-ﬂood
assets), as well as of the level of exposure to
the ﬂoods. The results, presented in Table 2.7,
show that ﬂood exposure is not a determi-
nant of current per capita expenditure when
controlling for level of pre-ﬂood assets and
other household-level characteristics. This
was possible for several reasons. First, despite
flood-exposed households’lower resources,
they were able to maintain at least the same
level of expenditure, though not the same
level of consumption because of higher food
prices and additional expenditure needed
for things such as health and fuel. Second, as
shown later, households were able to smooth
their expenditure by borrowing and by pur-
chasing food on credit. This means that the
level of current per capita expenditure is a
good measure of long-term economic status
and can stand as a proxy of the level of
poverty. Thus, it can be used to rank house-
holds from the poorest in the bottom ex-
penditure quintile to the richest in the top
quintile. Moreover, because post-ﬂood per
capita expenditure indicates both long-term
economic status and the level of resources
available at the end of the ﬂoods, it has rele-
vance for targeting ﬂood relief and transfers.
Summary
The theoretical framework presented in this
chapter outlines the pathways by which the
1998 ﬂoods affected markets, households,
and individuals. Particularly important are the
pathways emanating from the loss of agri-
cultural production, reductions in employ-
ment opportunities, and the loss of assets,
which caused major reductions in household
incomes and wealth.
The micro-level data set used in the em-
pirical analysis of the impact of the ﬂoods on
household welfare derives from a household
survey in November and December 1998 that
covered 757 rural households in seven ﬂood-
exposed thanas in Bangladesh. At the house-
hold level, ﬂood exposure was based on the
depth of water in the homestead, the depth of
water in the house, and the number of days
water was in the house.
Ideally, to examine the impact of the
ﬂoods, a panel data set with information on
household incomes and expenditures both
before and after the ﬂoods would be used.
However, since pre-ﬂood income and expen-
diture data are unavailable, it is important to
disentangle the effects of pre-ﬂood wealth
and incomes from the impacts of the ﬂoods.
The regression analysis presented in Tables
2.5 and 2.6 indicates that pre-ﬂood determi-
nants of wealth do not explain variations in
ﬂood exposure across households in the sam-
ple. Based on these results, we use the ﬂood
exposure variable in the following analysis
as an independent variable to explain the im-
pact of the ﬂoods on a series of individual-
and household-level outcomes, such as the
level of caloric consumption, food security,
and other health and nutrition outcomes.
Finally, the regression analysis presented
in Table 2.7 indicates that ﬂood exposure is
not a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of
post-ﬂood household expenditures; in other
words, the ﬂoods were a true random shock
that affected households independent of their
level of wealth. Thus, we can use the level of
current per capita expenditure as a measure
of long-term economic status.
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Foodgrain Markets and Availability
T
he 1998 ﬂoods in Bangladesh were a major threat to national food security in
Bangladesh, not because of the initial damage to standing crops, but because of po-
tential damage to the major monsoon season rice crop and rural incomes. This chap-
ter focuses on the behavior of foodgrain (rice and wheat) availability during and after the
ﬂoods. We begin with an overview of the importance of rice and wheat in national food avail-
ability in Bangladesh and the roles of the private and public sectors in foodgrain marketing.
Turning to the markets and government policy at the time of the ﬂoods, we discuss initial
food relief efforts, including the contribution of food aid. We then focus on rice and wheat
markets following the ﬂoods, highlighting the massive private sector imports from India. We
follow this with an analysis of the contribution of private sector imports to food security at
the national level in Bangladesh, discussing alternative estimates of the volume of trade, the
structure of the market, and alternative sources of supply. The chapter concludes with a com-
parison of government policies and market behavior in 1998 with those following earlier
large production shortfalls owing to ﬂoods in 1974 and 1988.
Domestic Foodgrain Production and Markets
Domestic Foodgrain Production
Rice dominates agricultural production and food consumption in Bangladesh, accounting for
58.3 percent of value-added in agriculture (9.1 percent of total GDP) and 72.8 percent of calo-
ries consumed in 1998.15Over the 1980s and 1990s, domestic rice production slightly outpaced
population growth (2.0 versus 1.9 percent per year), enabling annual per capita rice avail-
ability to increase from 137.1 kilograms in the 1980s to 144.2 kilograms in the 1990–99
period while annual average rice imports declined from 308,000 tons to 160,000 tons (Table
3.1). In contrast, per capita wheat availability has declined despite sharp increases in wheat
production (from 112,000 tons at Independence in 1971 to 1.91 million tons in 1999), be-
cause of lower levels of food aid.
15 Unpublished 1997/98 national accounts data (in current prices) from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) and
Food and Agriculture Organization, Food balance sheet, various issues.Bangladesh annually produces three
crops of rice: aman, typically transplanted
in June–July and harvested in November–
December, boro, transplanted in December–
January and harvested in May–June, and
aus, often directly sown in March–April and
harvested in July–August. Depending on
the extent of normal seasonal ﬂooding and
water availability through irrigation during
the dry winter season, two crops of rice are
often grown on the same plot of land. Wheat,
which requires cold nights to produce a crop,
can be grown only during the winter season
in Bangladesh, and is typically sown in No-
vember–December and harvested in March–
April.16This sustained increase in rice avail-
ability per capita has enabled a long-term
decline in real rice prices, as demand growth,
limited by lower per capita demand by urban
households, relatively slow rural income
growth, and changing tastes, has not kept up
with supply (Dorosh 2000).
Most of the increase in rice production
in the 1980s and 1990s was due to increases
in boro production; aman production stag-
nated and aus production fell as boro cultiva-
tion replaced ausin many areas (Figure 3.1).
Prior to the mid-1980s the boro harvest in
Bangladesh was relatively small—only 20
percent of rice production in 1974. A major
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Table 3.1 Foodgrain availability and requirements in Bangladesh, 1980/81 to 1999/2000
Per Gov-
Per Per capita ern-
capita capita food- ment
rice Net wheat grain Food com-
Rice Net Pri- Net avail- Wheat Net Pri- Net food- avail- avail- aid mer-
pro- PFDS vate rice ability pro- PFDS vate wheat grain ability ability (total cial
duc- distri- im- avail- (kg/ duc- distri- im- avail- avail- (kg/ (kg/ food- im-
Year tion bution ports ability capita) tion bution ports ability ability capita) capita) grain) ports
1980/81 13,880 −327 0 12,165 135.3 1,092 852 0 1,835 14,000 20.4 155.7 751 325
1981/82 13,629 482 0 12,748 138.7 967 1,282 0 2,153 14,901 23.4 162.1 1,141 114
1982/83 14,215 328 0 13,121 139.7 1,095 1,415 0 2,401 15,522 25.6 165.3 976 868
1983/84 14,509 358 0 13,416 139.7 1,211 1,427 0 2,517 15,933 26.2 166.0 1,441 615
1984/85 14,623 266 0 13,426 136.9 1,464 1,948 0 3,265 16,692 33.3 170.1 1,306 1,287
1985/86 15,038 153 0 13,687 136.5 1,042 1,039 0 1,977 15,664 19.7 156.2 1,087 113
1986/87 15,406 358 0 14,223 138.8 1,091 1,574 0 2,555 16,779 24.9 163.7 1,425 342
1987/88 15,413 180 0 14,052 134.2 1,048 1,948 0 2,891 16,943 27.6 161.8 1,787 1,130
1988/89 15,544 326 0 14,316 134.0 1,021 2,199 0 3,117 17,433 29.2 163.2 1,356 780
1989/90 17,856 −243 0 15,827 145.3 890 1,447 0 2,248 18,075 20.6 166.0 949 584
1990/91 17,852 244 0 16,311 146.9 1,004 1,345 0 2,248 18,559 20.3 167.2 1,540 37
1991/92 18,252 −180 0 16,246 143.8 1,065 1,509 0 2,468 18,714 21.8 165.6 1,414 150
1992/93 18,341 243 0 16,750 145.7 1,176 597 355 2,010 18,761 17.5 163.1 735 93
1993/94 18,041 202 74 16,512 141.1 1,131 1,008 238 2,338 18,851 20.0 161.1 654 0
1994/95 16,833 83 583 15,816 132.9 1,245 1,213 430 3,347 19,162 28.1 161.0 935 620
1995/96 17,687 240 650 16,808 138.9 1,369 1,133 200 3,215 20,023 26.6 165.5 738 839
1996/97 18,883 226 15 17,236 140.1 1,454 550 222 2,096 19,331 17.0 157.2 618 112
1997/98 18,854 130 993 18,106 144.8 1,803 875 142 2,640 20,745 21.1 166.0 549 253
1998/99 19,905 35 2,661 20,610 162.3 1,908 1,346 804 3,867 24,477 30.5 192.7 1,233 763
1999/2000 22,840 120 390 21,066 163.3 1,700 845 745 3,120 24,186 24.2 187.5 895 0
Av. 1980/81
–1988/89 14,695 236 0 13,462 137.1 1,115 1,520 0 2,524 15,985 25.6 162.7 1,252 619
Av. 1989/90
–1998/99 18,250 98 498 17,022 144.2 1,305 1,102 239 2,648 19,670 22.4 166.5 937 345
Sources: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Marketing Information System (MIS), Directorate General of Food, and authors’calculations.
Notes: The unit of measure is thousand metric tons unless otherwise noted. Before 1985/86, per capita requirements were calculated at 15.5 oz/day. Before
1991/92, private imports of foodgrains were not allowed. The data for 1999/2000 are projected. PFDS = Public food distribution system.
16 See Dorosh (2000) and Zohir (1995) for further discussion of cropping patterns.expansion in boro production followed the
liberalization of imports of diesel engines
and pumps for tubewell irrigation in 1988
and the expansion in fertilizer use and plant-
ing of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice
(Ahmed 2000).
These changes in cropping patterns re-
sulting from an increase in minor irrigation
and the availability of modern varieties have
reduced the susceptibility of Bangladesh agri-
culture to ﬂoods in two ways. First, the area
planted to deepwater (broadcast) aman rice,
grown on ﬂood-prone land during the mon-
soon season, has declined by 58 percent, from
1.83 million hectares to 775,000 hectares be-
tween 1975/76 and 1999/2000. Because this
land has been increasingly left fallow during
these months and planted with irrigated boro
rice in the dry season, the potential crop dam-
age due to severe ﬂooding has diminished.
Second, the large expansion of the borocrop
has greatly increased the quantity of rice pro-
duced within ﬁve to six months of a damaged
rice harvest (Hossain, Bose, and Chowdhury
2001).
In fact, the most rapid expansion in boro
cultivation took place in 1987/88 and 1988/89
after severe ﬂoods damaged aman rice crops,
providing additional incentives for rice farm-
ers to expand their boro production. Boro
production rose by 45 percent in these two
years, from 4.01 to 5.83 million tons. Thus,
by the late 1980s boro production acted as a
major automatic stabilizer to annual produc-
tion following aman production shortfalls
(Chowdhury and Haggblade 2000).
The Private and Public Sector Roles
in Foodgrain Markets
Along with the growth in domestic produc-
tion, the size of the domestic foodgrain mar-
kets and the role of the private sector has also
increased dramatically in Bangladesh in re-
cent decades. As rice production increased
from 12 million tons per year in the 1970s to
18 million tons per year in the 1990s, the vol-
ume of rice sold rose from 3 to 9 million tons,
from 27 percent to 49 percent of production
(Chowdhury and Haggblade 2000). At the
same time, the public share of marketing fell
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Figure 3.1 Total rice production and availability in Bangladesh, 1976/77–1999/2000
Sources: Food Planning and Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Food.
Note: Aus, aman, and boro production ﬁgures are net of 10 percent seed, feed, and wastage.by half, from 15 percent to 7 percent. More-
over, the number of marketing agents ex-
panded dramatically as well. In the 1960s,
there were only about 4,000 itinerant traders
in the former East Pakistan, compared with
48,000 in Bangladesh in the 1990s. Similarly,
the number of millers doubled from 6,155 in
the 1960s to 11,592 in the 1970s, then in-
creased more than fourfold by the 1990s to
nearly 51,000.
The large expansion in the number of par-
ticipants, the size of the market, investments
in infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity,
and telecommunications), and a gradual eas-
ing of restrictions on private sector trade
(including the lifting of a ban on commercial
bank credit for foodgrain trade) have re-
sulted in a well-functioning private market.
Das, Zohir, and Baulch (1997) have shown
that wholesale markets for both rice and wheat
are spatially integrated, with over 80 percent
of price changes transmitted between pairs
of markets within two weeks.17
Though its size relative to the private
market has diminished, public sector food-
grain distribution in Bangladesh plays an im-
portant role in the domestic procurement of
rice and wheat, the management of food aid
inﬂows, public sector targeted distribution,
and the maintenance of emergency foodgrain
stocks. Foodgrain is typically procured at
ﬁxed prices. Most government procurement
is done through ﬁxed-price purchases of grain
directly from farmers or traders.18
Until Bangladesh instituted major re-
forms in the early 1990s, subsidized sales 
of grain through ration channels dominated
foodgrain distribution. Between 1988/89 and
1990/91, on average 612,000 tons of rice and
wheat were sold through the Rural Rationing
and the urban Statutory Rationing channels,
or 26.7 percent of total foodgrain distribu-
tion (which averaged 2.294 million tons).
Total sales, including open market sales and
other programs, accounted for 63.5 percent
of distribution in this period, with relief and
Food for Work channels accounting for the
other 36.5 percent of distribution. Reforms
in 1991/92 and 1992/93 closed the Rural Ra-
tioning and Statutory Rationing channels, in
an effort to improve the targeting of food-
grain distribution as well as to reduce ﬁscal
costs (Ahmed, Haggblade, and Chowdhury
2000). As a result, both the percentage and
the total amount of foodgrain distributed
through targeted and relief channels increased
in the mid to late 1990s, averaging 1.166 mil-
lion tons per year from 1995/96 to 1997/98,
or 72.8 percent of the 1.603 million tons total
annual average distribution during these three
years.
With the increasing role of the private
sector in foodgrain markets and a reduction
in total public sector foodgrain distribution,
government stocks were gradually reduced
through most of the 1990s. From 1988/89
to 1990/91, prior to the closing of rationing
channels, total stocks averaged 1.131 mil-
lion tons (566,000 tons of rice and 565,000
tons of wheat). From 1995/96 to 1997/98,
stocks were on average only 870,000 tons
(425,000 tons of rice and 445,000 tons of
wheat), a decline of 261,000 tons. At the start
of July 1998, just before the ﬂoods, stocks
were 630,000 tons, and rose to 711,000 tons
at the start of August as boro procurement
continued.
Food Aid and Public
Foodgrain Distribution
In late August 1998, it became clear that the
ﬂoods would likely lead to a very large short-
fall in rice production. The ﬂoods had al-
ready caused substantial damage to existing
crops, road infrastructure, and other assets.
Damage to the aus rice crop, harvested in
July and August, led to losses of 300,000 tons
(16.0 percent of the initial target production,
FOODGRAIN MARKETS AND AVAILABILITY 23
17 Das, Zohir, and Baulch (1998) used data from 1988 through 1996. Goletti (1994: 27–38) also presents evidence of “a
moderate degree of market integration” in rice markets using data from 1989/90 to 1991/92.
18 Local tenders have also been used in recent years, particularly when ﬁxed-price procurement has failed to meet gov-
ernment targets.but only 1.4 percent of projected rice produc-
tion for 1998/99).
Throughout August and September, as the
extent and duration of the ﬂooding increased,
the aman rice crop loss estimates were ad-
justed upwards. With ﬂoodwaters spreading
over more and more areas of the country and
prospects for the December aman crop be-
coming increasingly bleak, the government
of Bangladesh launched an international ap-
peal for aid on August 26, 1998, including a
request for additional food aid. Subsequently,
projected  aman production shortfalls rose
from 0.53 million tons on August 26, 1998,
to 1.9 million tons in mid-September, mak-
ing the total projected loss in rice production
2.2 million tons.19
The Projected Food Gap and 
Food Aid Inﬂows
In estimating its food aid needs, the gov-
ernment of Bangladesh supplied donors with
calculations of the projected food gap in
Bangladesh, deﬁned as the difference be-
tween net foodgrain production and a food-
grain consumption requirement (target) of
454 grams/person/day. Pre-ﬂood levels of
food aid commitments to Bangladesh had
been based on a food gap of 2.13 million tons
(Table 3.2). By mid-September, the projected
food gap had risen to 3.84 million tons, based
on a 2.2 million ton projected production
shortfall (0.3 million tons aus and 1.9 mil-
lion tons aman).20 Note that these calcula-
tions made no attempt to estimate actual
demand for foodgrain, which would likely
have been reduced somewhat by the increase
in market prices and a decline in real house-
hold income.21
In an effort to offset the 1.62 million ton
increase in the food gap, donors pledged an
extra 1.083 million tons of ﬂood relief food
aid to supplement the 596,000 tons of regu-
lar program food aid.22 Ultimately, though,
foodgrain availability in Bangladesh in 1998/
99 turned out to be much larger than the
food gap calculations suggested. As described
below, in response to the increase in market
prices, private foodgrain imports surged,
largely offsetting the production losses from
the aus and aman crops. Moreover, record
wheat and boro rice harvests in March and
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19 Ultimately, the ﬁnal ofﬁcial estimate of 1998/99 aman rice production was 7.74 million tons, making the shortfall in
aus and aman 2.04 million tons below the pre-ﬂood target.
20 Later adjustments to both aman and boro production forecasts brought the projected food gap down to only 1.85 mil-
lion tons.
21 Some commentators have pointed out that the government of Bangladesh had an incentive to overestimate the ﬂood
damage to the aus and aman crops in order to get more food aid. However, as the discussion on alternative estimates
of rice imports (later in this chapter) indicates, total rice production for the December 1997 to April 1999 period seems
to have been overestimated rather than underestimated.
22 Note, however, that delivery of 300,000 tons of US 416-B food aid was postponed until after the June 30 end of the
1998/99 Bangladesh ﬁscal year.
Table 3.2 Estimates of the Bangladesh food gap, 1998/99 (million metric tons)
Foodgrain
Gross food Net food consumption
Aus Aman Boro Wheat production productiona requirementb Food
gap
Pre-ﬂood estimate (June 1998) 1.90 9.50 7.80 1.80 21.00 18.90 21.03 2.13
Projection with ﬂood damage to aus
and aman (August 26, 1998) 1.60 8.97 7.80 1.80 20.17 18.15 21.03 2.88
Projection with increased boro
production (mid-September 1998) 1.60 7.60 8.00 1.90 19.10 17.19 21.03 3.84
Final estimate 1.62 7.74 10.05 1.91 21.31 19.18 21.03 1.85
Sources: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Food Planning and Monitoring Unit, and authors’calculations.
a Net food production equals gross food production less 10 percent adjustment for seed, feed, and wastage.
b The foodgrain consumption requirement is calculated as the target per capita foodgrain consumption (454 grams/person/day) times the population (127
million).May/June 1999, respectively, boosted pro-
duction for the ﬁscal year. Foodgrain from
the wheat and boro harvests, however, was
of course not yet available for households
to consume in the six months immediately
following the ﬂoods.
The government of Bangladesh re-
sponded to the crisis by supplying food for
immediate relief efforts during the ﬂoods
and by helping to coordinate food aid com-
mitments and deliveries. At the same time,
as part of its price stabilization strategy, the
government encouraged private sector im-
ports, a policy that helped avoid a food supply
shortage following the ﬂoods.
Government Foodgrain Distribution
Major ﬂood relief efforts began in August
1998 through the provision of 20,400 tons of
rice through Gratuitous Relief (GR) in ﬂood-
affected thanas and an additional 30,800 tons
of rice in September. In addition, the Vulner-
able Group Feeding (VGF) program began
on a large scale in August with an initial dis-
tribution of 1.3 million cards, which entitled
the holder to 8 kilograms of rice per month.
During August and September, 27,500 tons
of rice were distributed through this pro-
gram. At 8 kilograms per card, an estimated
1.35 million households received VGF ra-
tions in August and 2.13 million households
in September. Almost no wheat was distrib-
uted through relief channels in the early
months of the ﬂoods.
In late September, the World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP) strongly urged the govern-
ment of Bangladesh to expand the VGF
program to 4 million cards (households) with
an allotment of 32 kilograms of wheat per
card. The WFPurged that this expansion take
effect for both September and October, but
the 141,680 tons of wheat needed for two
months’distribution would have had to come
almost exclusively from government stocks
because little food aid had arrived.23 Recog-
nizing the urgent need for more relief to
poor, ﬂood-affected households, the govern-
ment of Bangladesh agreed to the expansion
in the number of VGF cards to 4 million.
However, given that delays in food aid ar-
rivals were likely, the allotment was reduced
to 8 kilograms of rice and 8 kilograms of
wheat per card for October only, postponing
a decision on the November distribution
until more deﬁnite information on food aid
arrivals was available.
Initial estimates of foodgrain availability
greatly overestimated the arrivals of food-
grain because of unforeseen delays in ship-
ments and unloading. By the end of October,
only 52,000 tons of food aid had actually ar-
rived, 71,000 tons less than assumed by the
WFP in its late-September analysis. During
November, only an additional 25,000 tons of
food aid wheat arrived and were available
for distribution, so that, by the end of No-
vember, cumulative food aid arrivals were
only 77,000 tons, compared with the WFP-
projected 431,000 tons. Fortunately, the
government of Bangladesh’s own commer-
cial imports of 224,000 tons of wheat arrived
and were unloaded from mid-October to early
November 1998, permitting a continuation
of the expanded VGF program in November
as well.
The VGF program was again expanded in
December 1998, to cover 4.2 million house-
holds with an increase in the ration size to
20 kilograms per card (5 kilograms of rice
and 15 kilograms of wheat) for the month
of Ramadan. No distribution of foodgrains
through the VGF program took place in Jan-
uary, but the program restarted in February
with a ration size for February through April
of 15 kilograms of wheat and 5 kilograms of
rice per card.
Altogether, planned offtake for 1998/99
was increased from 1.718 million tons to
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23 The government of Bangladesh also explored the possibility of drawing on the food security reserve of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) or direct purchases from the government of India. However, admin-
istrative procedures were found to be very cumbersome and no agreement could be reached on a sales price of grain
for transactions with the government of India, so ultimately no foodgrain came through government-to-government
channels.2.279 million tons. Through December, how-
ever, limited government wheat stocks, un-
certainties about rice supplies after the aman
harvest, and ﬁnancial constraints limited total
distribution to 630,000 tons, only 26,000 tons
more than in the pre-ﬂood government dis-
tribution for this period (Figure 3.2). Rice dis-
tribution was greater than originally planned
only in August and September, mainly be-
cause of VGF distribution. Thereafter, it
was signiﬁcantly less than planned, espe-
cially in March and April because originally
budgeted open market sales (OMS) did not
take place. The story for wheat is the exact
opposite. Actual wheat distribution was below
initial plans in August and September, and
exceeded initial plans every month there-
after. To a large extent, additional foodgrain
distributed through VGF and other relief
channels was offset by reductions in previ-
ously budgeted OMS rice sales and a post-
ponement of planned Food for Education
(FFE) disbursements. Later, disbursements
for Food for Work (FFW) fell behind sched-
ule so that total distribution of foodgrains
through April 1999 was only 1.578 million
tons, 69 percent of the target for the entire
ﬁscal year.
The VGF program accounted for 29.3
percent of the total distribution of foodgrains
from July 1998 through April 1999 (that is,
up until the 1998 bororice harvest): 167,000
tons of rice and 296,000 tons of wheat. Gra-
tuitous Relief accounted for 65,000 tons of
rice and 7,000 tons of wheat, or 4.6 percent
of total distribution. Food for Work, which
began on a large scale only in January 1999
when soil conditions permitted heavy earth-
work, accounted for 26.0 percent of distri-
bution; Test Relief accounted for another
3.2 percent. In all, these four relief channels
accounted for 63.1 percent of distribution.
For the entire July 1998–June 1999 ﬁscal
year, Food for Work wheat offtake was
690,000 tons, or 32.3 percent of the total
offtake of foodgrains (2.133 million tons).
Overall, increases in Food for Work
(173,000 tons) and Vulnerable Group Feed-
ing (435,000 tons) were the major compo-
nents of the 415,000 ton increase in 1998/99
food distribution compared with the original
budget (Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.2 The government’s budgeted and actual distribution of rice and total
foodgrains, 1998/99
Source: Food Planning and Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Food.Rice and Wheat Markets
Following the Floods
Government rice policy was based on the
realization that government imports and
food aid alone would not be sufﬁcient to
make up the projected 1.9 million ton short-
fall in foodgrain supplies before the wheat
and boro harvests in April–June of 1999.
Thus, the government encouraged private
sector imports of rice, a policy that predated
the ﬂoods.
Private Sector Rice Imports
As shown in Figure 3.3, market prices of
rice had been high in the ﬁrst half of 1998,
even before the ﬂoods, because of a poor
1997/98 aman rice harvest in November–
December 1997. Domestic prices rose swiftly
to import parity levels (equal to the cost of
rice in Indian markets plus transport, han-
dling, and a normal proﬁt margin), thus
making it proﬁtable for the private sector to
import rice from India. Private sector imports
of rice had been permitted since 1994,24 but
in early 1998 the government of Bangladesh
took deliberate steps to encourage private
sector imports of rice through removal of a
2.5 percent tariff on imports, limitations on
government open market rice sales, instruc-
tions to expedite clearance of rice imports
through customs, and a decision not to re-
impose anti-hoarding laws. As a result, dur-
ing the ﬁrst ﬁve months of 1998, the private
sector imported 894,000 tons of rice from
India (according to government of Bangla-
desh customs ﬁgures), mainly by truck and
rail across land borders.
With the onset of the boro rice harvest in
May, the national average wholesale price of
coarse HYV rice fell from a peak of Tk 14.2
per kilogram in April to Tk 12.0 per kilogram
in June, and private imports slowed to
59,000 tons in June. Soon thereafter, as the
ﬂoods began, however, prices again rose to
import parity. By continuing its policy of
encouraging private sector imports, the gov-
ernment enabled the private sector to import
substantial quantities of rice and keep the
domestic market price from rising above im-
port parity levels. According to ofﬁcial gov-
ernment of Bangladesh estimates, more than
200,000 tons of rice per month were im-
ported from August 1998 to March 1999,
with private rice imports reaching 288,000
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Table 3.3 Budgeted and actual foodgrain distribution, by channel, 1998/99 (thousand metric tons)
Budget 1998/99 Actual 1998/99
Channel Rice Wheat Total Rice Wheat Total
Priced channels
Essential priorities (EP) 124 85 209 127 85 212
Open market sales (OMS) 200 0 200 2 0 2
Fair price campaign (FPC) 0 0 0 9 5 14
Other priority (OP) 6 6 12 7 5 12
Large employee industries (LEI) 0 15 15 0 14 14
Non-priced channels
Food for Work (FFW) 125 400 525 8 690 698
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) 60 120 180 11 193 204
Food for Education (FFE) 150 200 350 60 227 287
Test Relief (TR) 40 16 56 37 53 90
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) 20 10 30 168 297 465
Gratuitous Relief (GR) 66 24 90 66 8 74
Others 22 29 51 36 24 60
Total 813 905 1,718 530 1,603 2,133
Source: Food Planning and Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Food.
24 Wheat imports were liberalized in 1992/93.tons in January and 345,000 tons in Febru-
ary, 1999.25
Thus, because of the poor 1997/98 aman
harvest and the ﬂood-damaged aus and aman
harvests in 1998/99, Bangladesh rice prices
(wholesale Dhaka) remained close to ex:
India import parity prices for most of calen-
dar year 1998.26 Wholesale prices after the
ﬂoods were in fact remarkably stable. The
national average wholesale prices of coarse
rice remained in the range of Tk 14.14–14.83
per kilogram from September 1998 through
mid-April 1999.27 With a good boro harvest
in April and May, market prices fell by 19
percent, from Tk 14.46 per kilogram (aman
coarse rice) in the third week of April to Tk
11.74 per kilogram (boro HYV rice) in the
second week of May, bringing to an end a
nine-month period of high rice prices and
concerns about post-ﬂood food availability.
Note that the large quantities of private
sector rice imports during 1998 and early
1999 were unprecedented in Bangladesh.
Prior to 1994, when international trade in
rice was liberalized, private sector imports
were not permitted. And, for about one and
a half years prior to the poor amanharvest in
1997/98, rice prices in Bangladesh had been
signiﬁcantly below the cost of rice imported
from India. As a result, there were essentially
no private sector imports of rice from June
1996 to December 1997. The only other pe-
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Figure 3.3 Rice prices and quantity of private sector rice imports in Bangladesh, 1993–2000
Source: Dorosh 1999a, calculated using data from the Food Planning and Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Food; Market-
ing Information System (MIS), Directorate General of Food; CMIE 1998–2000; and Baulch et al. 1998.
Notes: Price data for April 2000 are up to the fourth week only; private sector imports are as of April 26, 2000. Since
November 1998, the carrying cost has increased by Tk 1.1 per kilogram. Since January 2000, a 5 percent tax has been
imposed on rice imports.
25 The extremely high ﬁgures for recorded rice imports in early 1999 may overstate actual rice imports. It is possible that
other commodities were imported using false invoices to avoid import tariffs and other surcharges.
26 In Figure 3.3, a marketing margin of Tk 2.0/kilogram is used to calculate the West Bengal import parity prices shown
for July 1993 to September 1997.
27 Note that Figure 3.3 shows that domestic prices were Tk 0.5–2.0 below ex: Delhi import parity prices from May through
August 1998, yet private sector imports continued. The main explanation is that rice exports during this period origi-
nated mainly from West Bengal’s rabi (boro) crop, where prices are generally Tk 1.5–2.0/kilogram lower than Delhi
prices during this season (as evidenced in the data from 1996 and 1997).riod of large-scale private sector rice trade
was April 1994 to June 1996, when 1.31 mil-
lion tons were imported, about 39 percent of
the total imported in the 16-month period
from January 1998 through April 1999 (see
Dorosh 1999b).
Government Interventions in the
Domestic Rice Market
In comparison with private sector rice im-
ports, government interventions in the do-
mestic rice market were small, only 399,000
tons from July 1998 through April 1999.
Private sector rice imports, at 2.42 million
tons in this period, were 6.1 times larger
than government rice distribution. Of the
rice distribution, 57.7 percent was targeted to
flood-affected households through Vulner-
able Group Feeding (41.5 percent) and Gra-
tuitous Relief (16.2 percent). However, total
rice distribution during these months was only
slightly above the original target, in part be-
cause the Ministry of Food faced substantial
difﬁculties in procuring rice through either
domestic or international tenders.
Problems related to the instability of
prices and unreliability of suppliers limited
actual procurement of rice through commer-
cial international tenders to only 94,670 tons
out of 310,000 tons in contracts through
March 8, 1999 (31 percent of contracted
amount). Local tenders faced similar prob-
lems: ﬁve local tenders for 295,000 tons of
rice resulted in only 17,000 tons of procure-
ment from 174,000 tons contracted (10 per-
cent of the contracted amount) through March
15, 1999. Efforts to procure grain through
the Bangladesh State Trading Corporation
likewise resulted in little procurement.
Regional Rice Markets
Because Bangladesh domestic wholesale
markets for rice are well integrated, the in-
ﬂux of imports stabilized not only the price
in Dhaka but the price throughout Bangla-
desh as well. Overall, the extent of rice price
variations across wholesale markets through-
out Bangladesh was similar in the ﬂood year
1998/99 to those in 1997/98, a nonﬂood
year (Table 3.4). Though rice prices were on
average 48 percent higher in August and
September 1998 compared with the same
months in 1997, the ratio of the maximum to
minimum prices observed across markets
was actually slightly less in 1998/99 (1.29
compared with 1.33). The standard deviation
of rice prices was higher, however, indicat-
ing that more market prices were relatively
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Table 3.4 Wholesale rice prices in Bangladesh, 1997/98 and 1998/99
Average price (Tk/kg) Standard deviation Maximum/minimum Number of markets
1997/98 1998/99 1997/98 1998/99 1997/98 1998/99 1997/98 1998/99
July 9.20 12.37 0.64 0.68 1.37 1.31 57 61
August 9.24 13.32 0.62 0.70 1.33 1.28 56 57
September 9.47 14.32 0.61 0.82 1.33 1.29 42 52
October 9.99 14.29 0.64 0.72 1.32 1.24 55 53
November 9.79 14.05 0.62 0.66 1.30 1.25 41 36
December 11.10 14.34 0.92 0.89 1.41 1.32 43 36
January 12.55 14.34 0.83 0.87 1.33 1.35 50 46
February 13.34 14.60 0.84 0.78 1.28 1.26 48 42
March 13.67 14.58 0.66 0.77 1.24 1.29 46 47
April 14.15 13.49 0.80 0.86 1.27 1.34 39 37
May 11.90 11.72 0.86 0.90 1.38 1.43 49 50
June 11.32 11.83 0.81 1.01 1.39 1.55 60 58
Average:
August–September 9.36 13.82 0.61 0.76 1.33 1.29 49 54
Annual average 11.31 13.60 0.74 0.80 1.33 1.33 49 48
Sources: Department of Agricultural Marketing unpublished data and authors’calculations.far from the mean price in 1998/99 than in
1997/98.
Figure 3.4 shows the dispersion of
monthly average prices across districts
within the six divisions of Bangladesh in
June, August, and October 1998. Prices rose
sharply across all divisions between June and
August, though the price rise was steepest in
Rajshahi, Dhaka, and Sylhet. In these major
boro rice-growing divisions, prices were
generally lower than in the rest of the coun-
try at the time of the boroharvest in June, but
rose to levels closer to the national average at
the peak of the ﬂoods in August. The largest
wholesale price variations across districts in
August and October occurred in Chittagong
and Dhaka divisions. Nonetheless, the vari-
ations across districts remained relatively
small—the ratio of the maximum to mini-
mum average district price was 1.17 to 1.20 in
these divisions during August and October.
Domestic Wheat Markets
Somewhat surprisingly, the private sector
continued to import substantial volumes of
wheat following the ﬂoods, even though
large amounts of wheat food aid ﬂowed into
Bangladesh and distribution through VGF
and Food for Work was expanded. In Janu-
ary and February 1999, 90,000 tons of wheat
were imported, raising total wheat imports
from July 1998 through February 1999 to
624,000 tons, 435,000 tons more than in
the same period in 1997/98. As shown in Fig-
ure 3.5, domestic wheat prices were slightly
below calculated import parity prices based
on wheat export prices in the United States
(U.S. Hard Red Winter, No. 2, FOB Gulf of
Mexico). However, much of the imports in
early 1999 came from other exporters, in-
cluding Turkey, Australia, and Central Asian
countries. (The quality and cost of transport
differences likely account for the deviation
between calculated import parity and domes-
tic prices of wheat.28) Thus, given the large
private sector imports, it appears that food
aid inﬂows did not provide a disincentive for
domestic wheat producers.
Overall, the supply of wheat in Bangla-
desh was 3.87 million tons in 1998/99, an in-
crease of 46 percent over 1997/98. The large
increase in apparent wheat consumption may
be explained by several factors: (1) the effects
of high rice prices on wheat consumption (as
determined by the cross-price elasticity of
demand for wheat with respect to the rice
price); (2) the adverse income effects of the
floods, which may have induced some house-
holds to substitute wheat for rice (given a
negative income elasticity of demand for
wheat in rural areas); (3) the secular increase
in wheat consumption as tastes for wheat
change over time, in part owing to the use of
higher-protein wheat for milling into ﬂour
for baking; (4) the positive income effects of
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Figure 3.4 Variations in wholesale rice prices across districts in
Bangladesh, 1998
Sources: Department of Agricultural Marketing data and authors’calculations.
Notes: This ﬁgure shows price variations across districts within each of the six divisions
of Bangladesh. The boxes on this whisker plot denote the range of prices from the 25th
percentile to the 75th percentile the interquartile range (IQR). The median price is
shown by the line in the middle of the box. The lines emerging from the box (called
whiskers) extend to the largest (smallest) data point less (greater) than or equal to the
75th (25th) percentile plus (minus) the IQR. J = June, A=August, and O = October.
28 Reportedly, much of the wheat imported by the private sector during the ﬂood was lower-quality “feed” wheat, brought
into Bangladesh with false papers (personal communication with private sector importers).wheat transfers to very poor, ﬂood-distressed
rural households; and (5) increased use of
lower-quality wheat as animal feed.
Private Foodgrain Imports
and National Food Security
Alternative Estimates of the Volume
of Rice Imports and Availability
The behavior of market prices in Bangladesh
suggests that rice imports from India were a
major source of supply. The volume of this
rice trade remains somewhat uncertain, how-
ever, for two major reasons. First, Bangladesh
import data differ substantially from India
export data. Second, calculations of the total
availability of rice in Bangladesh are not
consistent with market price movements and
estimated rice demand.
Comparisons of Bangladeshi rice import
data and Indian rice export data since the
liberalization of the private sector rice trade
by Bangladesh in 1994 indicate a systematic
overstating of rice imports by Bangladesh
compared with exports by India. For example,
according to Bangladesh customs data, 3.172
million tons of rice were imported from
India from April 1998 through March 1999,
2.827 million tons (89.1 percent) by the pri-
vate sector.29 Indian data on the quantity of
rice exports to Bangladesh30 indicate that in
1998/99 exports totaled only 2.215 million
tons, 958,000 tons (30.2 percent) less than
the Bangladesh customs ﬁgures.31
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Figure 3.5 Wheat prices, quantity of private sector wheat imports, and net public wheat
distribution in Bangladesh, 1993–2000
Sources: Food Planning and Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Food; Department of Agricultural Marketing; Marketing In-
formation System (MIS), Directorate General of Food; U.S. Department of Agriculture; and CMIE 1998–2000.
Notes: Domestic price data for April 2000 are up to the ﬁrst week only; private sector imports are as of January 14,
2000; and net public food distribution system data are as of March 31, 2000. The import parity price is based on U.S.
No. 2 Hard Red Winter and includes import tariffs.
29 The data are presented according to India’s April–March ﬁscal year in order to permit direct comparison.
30 Estimated using the values of basmati and non-basmati rice exports to Bangladesh and the average prices of total In-
dian exports of these two types of rice (Dorosh 2001). Note that non-basmati rice accounted for 99.8 percent of the
value of rice exports to Bangladesh in 1998/99 (CMIE 1999).
31 Possible explanations for the discrepancies in the data are false customs declarations to avoid import duties on non-
rice products, capital ﬂight from Bangladesh, or simply reporting mistakes in one or both countries (Dorosh 2001).
Note that smuggling of rice from India is not a likely explanation of the discrepancies since this rice would be unlikely
to enter Bangladesh through ofﬁcial customs channels, and, as shown below, demand calculations indicate that the of-
ﬁcial ﬁgure for the volume of Bangladesh rice imports appears to be overstated.Examination of calculated rice availabil-
ity and movements in market prices in Bang-
ladesh gives another indication of the volume
of rice imports from India in recent years
(Table 3.5). In 1996/97, the most recent ﬁs-
cal year in which private imports were neg-
ligible (only 35,000 tons), net supply—
calculated as the sum of net production, net
government distribution (offtake less do-
mestic procurement), and private imports,
assuming no change in private stocks—was
17.259 million tons. Using the 1996/97 level
of per capita consumption and the real price
of rice as a base, per capita demand for rice
in each period is calculated using the per-
centage change in the real price of rice and
an assumed own-price elasticity of demand
for rice of −0.15. Then, using the level of pop-
ulation in each period, total rice consump-
tion is estimated.32 Finally, the difference
between net supply and the calculated de-
mand is reported as the implicit private stock
change.
Thus, for example, real prices of coarse
rice (national average) in the December
through April period following the 1996/97
amanrice harvest averaged Tk 9.57 per kilo-
gram, 0.63 percent higher than the average
real price for 1996/97. Assuming an own-
price elasticity of demand for rice of −0.15,
per capita consumption of rice fell by 0.09
percent. Total demand for the period is esti-
mated at 7.16 million tons, resulting in an
implicit private stock change of 1.61 million
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Table 3.5 Estimated rice demand and implicit private stock change, 1996/97– 1998/99
1996/97 1996/97 1997 1997/98 1998 1998/99
Total year aman boro, aus aman boro, aus aman
Dec.–Nov. Dec.–Apr. May–Nov. Dec.–Apr. May–Nov. Dec.–Apr.
Rice production 18.884 9.550 9.334 8.850 9.595 7.700
Aman 9.550 9.550 0.000 8.850 0.000 7.700
Boro 7.460 0.000 7.460 0.000 7.979 0.000
Aus 1.874 0.000 1.874 0.000 1.616 0.000
Losses, seed, etc. (10 percent) 1.888 0.955 0.933 0.885 0.960 0.770
Net production 16.996 8.595 8.401 7.965 8.636 6.930
Domestic procurement (Dec.-Apr.)/(May-Nov.) 0.444 0.201 0.243 0.040 0.322 0.057
Offtake from government stocks 0.672 0.365 0.307 0.299 0.365 0.170
Private imports 0.035 0.004 0.031 0.758 1.285 1.472
Supply less private stock change 17.259 7.160 10.112 6.999 9.883 7.050
Demand 17.259 7.160 10.112 6.999 9.883 7.050
Implicit private stock changea 0.000 1.603 −1.616 1.983 0.081 1.465
Stock change relative to 1996/97b . . . . . . . . . 0.379 1.697 −0.138
Price of rice (Tk/kg) . . . 9.572 9.754 12.982 13.240 14.402
Real price (Tk/kg) (1996/97 prices) 9.553 9.572 9.535 12.405 12.367 13.150
Per capita demand (kg/period) 70.443 58.686 82.208 56.447 79.063 55.956
Change in per capita demand (%) . . . −0.03 0.03 −3.84 −3.80 −4.68
Source: Authors’calculations.
Notes: The unit of measure is million metric tons unless otherwise noted.
aAlso includes possible overestimates of production and imports, and underestimates of consumption.
b The difference between the implicit stock change in the season speciﬁed and the implicit stock change in the same season in 1996/97.
32 Income effects are ignored for three reasons. First, income elasticities of demand for rice are relatively small—about
0.4 for rural households and 0.15–0.27 in urban areas (Goletti 1993; Shahabuddin and Zohir 1995). Second, per capita
incomes at a national level did not fall signiﬁcantly. Third, as shown in Chapter 6, there was substantial borrowing by
ﬂood-exposed households.tons between the start of December 1996 and
the end of April 1997. This estimated stock
change can be considered a normal change
in private stocks for this period, given the
seasonality of production and prices.
Similar calculations for the December
1997 through April 1999 period (consisting
of a full year of harvests, plus the ﬂood-
damaged December 1998 aman crop) sug-
gest that, in response to the sharp increase in
average real prices of rice in Bangladesh, per
capita demand was 3.85 to 4.83 percent less
than in 1996/97. The implicit stock change
for these 17 months (the difference between
total demand and apparent availability) was
thus 3.528 million tons, 1.938 million tons
greater than the typical stock change esti-
mated for the December 1996–April 1997 pe-
riod (Table 3.6). A change in private stocks
of this magnitude seems highly unlikely,
given that the periods are deﬁned to end just
before major harvests.
Three other major factors might account
for this large discrepancy between calcu-
lated demand and net supply: overestimation
of production, overestimation of imports,
and underestimation of consumption. Since
production is the largest single determinant
of supply and the implicit stock change, a
rather small percentage change in production
estimates could account for the difference
between net supply and estimated demand.
For example, a 9.1 percent overestimation of
the total net rice production of the four rice
harvests from December 1997 through April
1999 of 23.53 million tons (net of 10 percent
for seed, feed, and wastage) would account
for the entire excess implicit stock change.
Similarly, the 958,000 tons total discrep-
ancy between Bangladeshi import data and
Indian export data for April 1998 to March
1999 reported above is equal to about half
(49.4 percent) of the excess implicit stock
change.
Plausible changes in the slope of the de-
mand curve, as measured by the own-price
elasticity of demand, have a smaller effect on
the calculations of implicit stock change. A
less price-responsive (more price-inelastic)
demand implies a smaller reduction in de-
mand following large price increases, and
thus a smaller implicit stock increase. How-
ever, even with an own-price elasticity of
demand of 0.00 (compared with −0.15 used
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Table 3.6 Implicit private stock changes under alternative assumptions for own-price elasticity of rice demand (million
metric tons)
1996/97 1996/97 1997 1997/98 1998 1998/99 Total
Own-price elasticity Total year aman boro, aus aman boro, aus aman Dec. 97–
of rice demand Dec.–Nov. Dec.–Apr. May–Nov. Dec.–Apr. May–Nov. Dec.–Apr. Apr. 99
Elasticity = 0.0
Implicit private stock changea 0.000 1.601 −1.613 1.703 −0.309 1.119 2.512
Stock change relative to 1996/97b . . . . . . . . . 0.102 1.304 −0.482 0.923
Elasticity =− 0.1
Implicit private stock changea 0.000 1.603 −1.615 1.891 −0.048 1.351 3.194
Stock change relative to 1996/97b . . . . . . . . . 0.288 1.567 −0.251 1.604
Elasticity =− 0.15
Implicit private stock changea 0.000 1.603 −1.616 1.983 0.081 1.465 3.528
Stock change relative to 1996/97b . . . . . . . . . 0.379 1.697 −0.138 1.938
Elasticity =− 0.2
Implicit private stock changea 0.000 1.604 −1.617 2.073 0.208 1.577 3.858
Stock change relative to 1996/97b . . . . . . . . . 0.469 1.825 −0.027 2.266
Source: Authors’calculations.
aAlso includes possible overestimates of production and imports, and underestimates of consumption.
b The difference between the implicit stock change in the season speciﬁed and the implicit stock change in the same season in 1996/97.in Table 3.5), the excess implicit stock change
is still 923,000 tons (Table 3.6).33
In principle other factors could affect the
calculations of implicit stock change, includ-
ing demand factors such as shifts in income
or cross-price effects. But, given that the own-
price elasticity of rice appears to be rather
small, and that little widespread per capita
income growth was likely in a period that
included two major rice production short-
falls and a major ﬂood, signiﬁcant positive
income effects on demand seem unlikely.
Similarly, given the low cross-price effects
of other prices on rice consumption (owing
to the large budget share of rice), cross-price
effects are likely also to be negligible.
The above calculations strongly suggest
that total supply has been overestimated for
the December 1997 through May 1999 pe-
riod. An overestimate of Bangladesh rice
imports is insufﬁcient in itself to explain the
large implicit stock change (assuming these
imports were at least as large as stated in the
Indian export data). Nonetheless, an over-
estimate of imports could account for as
much as about half of the difference between
net supply and estimated rice demand.
Market Prices in the Absence 
of Private Sector Imports
Though the quantity of private sector im-
ports from India is uncertain, it is clear that
this trade substantially augmented Bangla-
desh rice supplies in 1997/98 and 1998/99.
One measure of the impact of this trade on
national food security in Bangladesh is to
compare actual prices and imports with esti-
mates of prices and imports in the absence of
private sector imports from India. Given the
average wholesale price of coarse rice in
Dhaka of Tk 13.3 per kilogram in 1998/99,
rice imports from December 1997 through
November 1998 were 2.043 million tons
(according to the Bangladesh customs data).
Had rice imports from India not been avail-
able, the next lowest cost source for private
importers would have been Thailand,34 for
which the import parity price of 15 percent
broken rice in Dhaka in the same period was
Tk 16.1 per kilogram. Given this 20.9 per-
cent increase in the import parity price, esti-
mated rice demand would have fallen by
between 4.2 and 6.3 percent, assuming an
own-price elasticity of rice demand of −0.2
to −0.3. In this case, rice imports would
have declined by approximately 700,000 to
1 million tons.35
If private sector imports were unavailable
(or banned) from any source, then, with no
change in government imports, total supply
would have been 12.1 percent less (apart from
private stock changes) and rice prices could
have risen by 40–60 percent, to an average
of between Tk 18.7 and Tk 21.3 per kilo-
gram.36 Such an increase in the rice price
level would likely have been unacceptable
to the government of Bangladesh and public
sector imports would have been increased.
However, public sector imports of a magni-
tude equal to private sector ﬂows would not
have been feasible.
During the 1998 calendar year alone,
private sector imports, mainly from India,
reached 2.26 million tons. Had the govern-
ment of Bangladesh imported this grain it-
self, the average cost of the imported rice
delivered to local delivery points would have
been approximately Tk 14.9–15.9 per kilo-
gram, Tk 1.0–2.0 per kilogram above the
private sector import costs, owing to addi-
tional marketing costs of US$50–100 mil-
lion. And, if the government had received a
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33 Moreover, note that an own-price elasticity of demand of −0.15, though consistent with time-series estimates in Dorosh
(1999b), is low compared with cross-section estimates of −0.56 from Goletti (1993).
34 Bangladesh consumes mostly parboiled rice (in the parboiling process, the paddy is ﬁrst boiled and then milled). The
other major Asian exporter, Vietnam, sold only white (non-parboiled) rice in this period.
35 This calculation assumes no problems with the supply of imports from Thailand, an issue discussed below.
36 In the absence of private sector imports, domestic supply would have been 14.839 million tons, a 12.1 percent reduction
in per capita supplies relative to the actual estimated levels. Assuming an elasticity of demand of −0.2 to −0.3, prices
would need to rise by 12.1/0.3 (40 percent) to 12.1/0.2 (60 percent) to equilibrate market supply and demand.net price of Tk 11.5 per kilogram (the open
market sales price of Tk 12.0 per kilogram
less Tk 0.5 per kilogram OMS dealer’s
commission), the total unit subsidy would
have been Tk 3.4–4.4 per kilogram, and the
total ﬁscal cost would have been US$160–
210 million.
The Competitiveness of the Private
Rice Import Trade
In spite of the potentially high costs of mas-
sive government imports, such expenditures
might be deemed necessary if there was ev-
idence that private traders were manipulat-
ing the market. One indication that the rice
market was competitive in Bangladesh was
that the margin between wholesale prices in
Dhaka and India remained relatively low
and stable.37Data from letters of credit from
both 1994/95 and 1998 suggest that a large
number of traders participated in rice im-
ports, another indication of a competitive
market.38
Letters of credit data from 1994/95 indi-
cate that most of the rice imported from India
came in small lots. The average size of the
1,251 shipments of rice in 1994/95 was only
707 tons. Letters of credit data from Janu-
ary through mid-September 1998 indicate
an even smaller average quantity of only
268.7 tons per letter of credit for the 3,291
letters of credit issued. Moreover, these let-
ters of credit were opened by 793 different
traders, with an average amount of imports
per trader of only 1,115 tons of rice. The
largest 10 traders (in terms of total imports)
imported 142,369 tons, or 16 percent of the
total. Given this broad participation in the
rice import trade and the small share of the
largest suppliers, it appears that there has
been little scope for individuals or a small
group of traders to signiﬁcantly affect market
prices by restricting market supply (Dorosh
1999b).
However, private sector imports from
Thailand are likely to involve far fewer
traders because of economies of scale in sea
shipments. Whereas cross-border trade in-
volves shipments of approximately 10 tons
per truck or 70 tons per railway wagon
(generally grouped together in a rack of 24
wagons carrying about 1,600 tons), typical
ocean shipments involve 10,000–15,000 tons
of rice. Thus, instead of hundreds of partici-
pating traders, it is likely that only the larger
traders would be able to ﬁnance such large
shipments. Of course, competition is still pos-
sible even if the number of importers is only
5 or 10, but the risk of collusion is high.39
Reliability of the Indian Rice Market
as a Source of Supply
Fortunately for Bangladesh, market supplies
of rice in India in 1998/99 were plentiful.
Production of the kharif rice crop, which
accounts for about 85 percent of India’s
rice production, was 71.84 million tons, only
about 0.9 percent below the 1997/98 bumper
crop. Moreover, Food Corporation of India
rice stocks on October 1, 1998, were quite
high (8.7 million tons), nearly 3 million tons
above the buffer stock norm of 6 million
tons for that date. Wheat stocks were even
higher: 15.8 million tons on September 1,
1998.
Large-scale private imports from India
were possible in 1998/99 because, with large
government stocks of foodgrains and a good
rice harvest, the government of India was
willing to allow exports. Had stocks and/
or production been lower, an export quota or
even an export ban could have been imposed.
One important factor, then, is the probability
that both Bangladesh and India will have
poor rice harvests in the same year.
As shown in Table 3.7, from 1971/72
through 1998/99, total production of rice 
in Bangladesh fell about 5 percent or more
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37 As indicated in Figure 3.3, the marketing margin for shipment of rice by truck increased by approximately Tk 1.1 per
kilogram in November 1998 owing to new weight restrictions on truck loads in both India and Bangladesh.
38 See Murshid (1999) for details of the private sector rice import trade.
39 One safeguard against collusion is to encourage international grain companies to participate in the import trade as well.below trend in only ﬁve years: 1971/72,
1972/73, 1988/89, 1994/95, and 1995/96.
India’s production has been more variable
over the period as a whole, with six years
5 percent or more below trend: 1974/75,
1976/77, 1979/80, 1982/83, 1986/87, and
1987/88. However, from 1988/89 to 1998/99,
India’s annual rice production did not fall
more than 5 percent below trend in any year.
One reason for the greater stability in
Bangladesh’s annual production is that the
boroharvest, coming only about ﬁve months
after the aman harvest, acts as a natural sta-
bilizer of domestic production. Poor aman
harvests are often followed immediately by
good boro harvests owing to greater price
incentives for production, enhanced govern-
ment extension and input supply efforts, and
a desire on the part of farmers to build up
own-stocks of rice.
Comparing only aman production in
Bangladesh with kharif production in India
tells a somewhat different story. From 1980/
81 through 1998/99, production of aman in
Bangladesh fell below trend in four years:
1981/82, 1987/88, 1988/89, 1994/95, and
1998/99, but in 1988/89 and 1998/99, aman
production was 17.44 (1988/89) and 18.33
percent (1998/99) below trend. India also
experienced three years of substantial kharif
rice production shortfalls in the 1980s: 1982/
83 (17.32 percent), 1986/87 (6.49 percent),
and 1987/88 (16.41 percent). Since 1980/81,
only in 1986/87 did both India and Bangla-
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Table 3.7 Total production of aman and kharif rice in Bangladesh and India (million metric tons) and percentage deviation
from trend, 1971–99
Bangladesh India
Aman Percentage Rice Percentage Kharif Percentage Rice Percentage
Year production deviation production deviation production deviation production deviation
1970/71 6.22 −3.54 11.14 10.36 39.56 12.63 42.22 16.28
1971/72 6.12 −6.53 9.93 −4.94 39.99 9.57 43.07 13.20
1972/73 5.90 −11.33 10.09 −6.54 36.32 −4.10 39.24 −1.38
1973/74 7.10 4.99 11.91 6.84 40.90 4.21 44.05 6.08
1974/75 6.29 −8.51 11.29 −1.82 35.93 −11.58 39.58 −8.52
1975/76 7.45 6.79 12.76 7.74 44.74 6.52 48.74 8.30
1976/77 7.31 3.13 11.75 −3.63 39.27 −9.49 41.92 −10.32
1977/78 7.86 9.25 12.97 3.39 48.95 9.36 52.67 8.64
1978/79 7.89 8.07 12.85 −0.35 49.34 6.94 53.77 7.07
1979/80 7.11 −3.95 12.74 −3.81 38.49 −19.00 42.33 −18.53
1980/81 7.96 6.01 13.88 2.10 50.09 2.46 53.63 −0.13
1981/82 7.21 −5.37 13.63 −2.26 49.24 −2.03 53.25 −3.94
1982/83 7.60 −1.56 14.22 −0.55 42.70 −17.32 47.12 −17.59
1983/84 7.94 1.36 14.51 −0.92 55.05 3.84 60.10 2.01
1984/85 7.93 −0.07 14.62 −2.47 53.78 −1.13 58.34 −3.81
1985/86 8.54 6.17 15.04 −1.99 59.39 6.49 63.83 2.30
1986/87 8.27 1.43 15.41 −1.82 53.56 −6.28 60.56 −5.57
1987/88 7.69 −6.88 15.41 −3.92 49.05 −16.19 56.86 −13.68
1988/89 6.86 −18.01 15.54 −5.17 63.38 5.80 70.49 4.26
1989/90 9.20 8.64 17.86 6.66 65.88 7.51 73.57 6.09
1990/91 9.17 6.89 17.85 4.45 66.32 5.85 74.29 4.51
1991/92 9.27 6.75 18.25 4.65 66.37 3.65 74.68 2.55
1992/93 9.68 10.13 18.34 3.09 65.24 −0.25 72.87 −2.27
1993/94 9.42 5.88 18.04 −0.55 70.72 5.90 80.30 5.24
1994/95 8.50 −5.54 16.83 −8.96 72.60 6.52 81.81 4.83
1995/96 8.79 −3.51 17.69 −6.12 67.88 −2.39 76.98 −3.52
1996/97 9.55 3.65 18.88 −1.60 71.42 0.71 81.31 −0.25
1997/98 8.85 −5.07 18.85 −3.53 72.50 0.29 83.50 0.29
1998/99 7.74 −17.96 19.91 0.08 71.84 −2.48 86.00 1.18
Sources: Food Planning and Monitoring Unit and authors’calculations.
Note: Trend values have been derived from linear regression.desh have a 5 percent or greater shortfall in
the aman/kharifcrop. Since that year, India’s
kharif rice production has been above or
only slightly below trend, and in the two
most recent years of very low amanharvests
in Bangladesh (1988/89 and 1998/99), India’s
kharif production was 5.80 percent above
and 2.48 percent below trend. Overall, the
correlation coefﬁcients of the error terms of
linear time-trend regressions of rice produc-
tion are 0.34 for aman and kharif production
and 0.30 for total production in Bangladesh
and India.
Past trends are, of course, not perfect pre-
dictors of the future. But the lack of correla-
tion between poor Indian harvests and poor
Bangladeshi harvests has an agronomic basis.
India’s kharif rice production is spread over
a much wider area than Bangladesh’s aman
rice production, so weather effects are likely
to vary more across India’s kharif rice-
producing zone, reducing the risk of weather-
related failure of the entire crop. In partic-
ular, high rainfall or excessive snowmelt in
the Himalayas that cause ﬂooding in Bangla-
desh and parts of eastern India do not neces-
sarily correlate with poor weather in other
regions of India.
In spite of the low correlation of produc-
tion shortfalls, it is nonetheless prudent for the
Bangladeshi government to be prepared for
such an occurrence. In such a situation, rice
imports would likely have to come mainly
from Thailand at somewhat higher cost than
imports from India; fewer private traders
would be involved, and shipping schedules
and problems at Chittagong port might hinder
the smooth arrival of rice imports.
A Comparison with Earlier
Major Production Shortfalls
As shown above, private sector imports
played a major role in stabilizing rice and
wheat markets following the 1998 ﬂoods.
Government policy in two earlier periods of
major foodgrain production shortfalls caused
by ﬂoods (in 1974 and 1988) depended much
more on public sector market interventions.
In 1974, a large-scale famine, resulting in
30,000–100,000 deaths, followed ﬂoods that
damaged aus and aman crops.40 The 1988
floods, in contrast, resulted in an even sharper
fall in aman production (similar to that in
1998) but no famine occurred.
The 1974 famine was characterized by a
very sharp rise in nominal (and real) rice
prices following the ﬂoods in July. Rice prices
in August through November 1974 were on
average 58.2 percent higher than in May
through July 1974. This had disastrous con-
sequences for poor households lacking the
entitlements to acquire enough of their sta-
ple commodity.41 Following the ﬂoods in
1988/89 and 1998/99, in contrast, rice prices
rose by only 7.0 percent and 12.4 percent,
respectively, in these months.
This difference in market price behavior
is not explained by the size of the production
shortfall. As shown in Table 3.8, in compar-
ison with trend aman rice production, the
aman shortfalls in 1988 (18.1 percent) and
1998 (18.0 percent) were much larger than
the 1974 amanshortfall (8.5 percent). Instead,
speculative behavior by traders appears to
have played a major role in the price increase.
Ravallion (1985, 1990) provides econo-
metric evidence that exaggerated reports of
crop failure inﬂuenced traders’expectations
and led to “excessive hoarding” of stocks.42
In addition, traders appear to have believed
(correctly) that the government would be
unable to intervene effectively to stabilize
market prices in the event of a production
shortfall. Government rice stocks were ex-
tremely low at the time of the ﬂoods (end-
July 1974): only 27,000 tons, equivalent to
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40 The ofﬁcial death toll from the famine was 30,000 (Alamgir, 1980); unofﬁcial reports were much higher. Sobhan (1979:
175) quotes an ofﬁcial ﬁgure of 27,000 and an upper nonofﬁcial estimate of 100,000; Lifschultz (1979: 130) gives a
ﬁgure of 50,000.
41 Wheat prices also rose by 61.2 percent in the same period.
42 In his time-series regressions on rice price formation, Ravallion uses the number of newspaper articles about crop short-
ages as a proxy for traders’expectations about future production shortfalls.38 CHAPTER 3
Table 3.8 Rice shortfalls, public stocks, and market prices in Bangladesh, 1974/75–1998/99
1974/75 1979/80 1984/85 1988/89 1998/99
Rice production (million metric tons)
Aus 3.00 2.78 2.78 2.86 1.62
Aman 6.29 7.11 7.93 6.86 7.74
Percent below trend −8.5 −4.0 −0.1 −18.1 −18.0
Boro 2.29 2.48 3.91 5.83 10.55
Total rice production 11.58 12.37 14.62 15.55 19.91
Wheat production (million metric tons) 0.12 0.82 1.46 1.02 1.91
Total foodgrain production (million metric tons) 11.69 13.20 16.09 16.57 21.81
Per capita rice production (kilograms/person) 148.05 144.04 149.20 145.57 156.74
Aus and aman share of production (percent) 80.3 79.9 73.3 62.5 47.0
PFDS distribution, July–June (thousand metric tons)
Total rice 131 702 399 690 530
Total wheat 1,597 1737 2163 2251 1,603
Targeted rice 4 7 6 167 386
Targeted wheat 157 490 905 1259 1,488
PFDS distribution, August–November (thousand metric tons)
Total rice 43 263 201 231 216
Total wheat 616 725 891 700 223
Targeted rice 2 0 0 83 172
Targeted wheat 87 186 298 287 186
Food grain imports, July–June (thousand metric tons)
Private sector rice 0 0 0 0 2,663
Public sector rice 267 759 695 61 393
Private sector wheat 0 0 0 0 805
Public sector wheat 2,030 2,023 1,898 2,075 1,603
Total availability (million metric tons)
Rice 10.42 11.61 13.43 14.32 20.61
Wheat 1.70 2.35 3.27 3.12 3.87
Total foodgrains 12.12 13.96 16.69 17.44 24.48
Per capita availability (kilograms/person)
Rice 133.26 135.15 136.99 134.07 162.31
Wheat 21.76 27.38 33.32 29.19 30.46
Foodgrains 155.03 162.53 170.31 163.26 192.77
National wholesale prices (Tk/kg)
Rice: average, May–July 359 565 778 884 1237
Rice: average, August–November 568 565 807 946 1390
Percentage change 58.2 0.0 3.7 7.0 12.4
Wheat: average, May–July 256 335 438 538 857
Wheat: average, August–November 413 347 495 620 949
Percentage change 61.2 3.4 12.8 15.3 10.7
Public foodgrain closing stocks
End of July stocks (thousand metric tons)
Rice 27 170 101 710 438
Wheat 293 213 651 784 273
Total 320 383 752 1494 711
Average, August–November (thousand metric tons)
Rice 21 327 223 621 359
Wheat 187 397 413 546 310
Total 208 723 636 1167 669
Average, August–November (kilograms/person)
Rice 0.3 3.8 2.3 5.8 2.8
Wheat 2.4 4.6 4.2 5.1 2.4
Total 2.7 8.4 6.5 10.9 5.3
Foreign exchange reservesa (US$ million) 175 . . . . . . 863 1,744
Mid-year population (million) 78.2 85.9 98.0 1,06.8 127.0
Sources: Food Planning and Monitoring Unit; Directorate General of Food, Marketing Information System; Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics; Department of
Agricultural Marketing; and authors’calculations.
a End of June, previous ﬁscal year.0.3 kilograms per person. Moreover, the
Ministry of Food had great difﬁculties im-
porting foodgrains because of a shortage of
foreign exchange reserves, extremely high
world foodgrain prices, and delays in U.S.
food aid deliveries.43 Because of the tight
stock situation, total rice distribution during
August through November was only 43,000
tons.
Osmani (1991) argues that larger public
foodgrain stocks in 1979/80 and 1984/85 dis-
couraged speculative market behavior and
limited price rises following production short-
falls in those years. Public foodgrain stocks
and distribution appear to have played a major
role in 1988/89 as well. Total per capita
foodgrain stocks in August through Novem-
ber 1998 were 10.9 kilograms per person,
about four times those in the same period in
1974/75. Moreover, public foodgrain distri-
bution from August through November in that
year was 931,000 tons, 272,000 tons greater
than in 1974/75.
Hossain (1990), however, presents evi-
dence that, during the 1978–90 period, the
government of Bangladesh overreacted to
natural disasters by importing more food-
grain than needed, leading to an excessive
build-up of stocks. Only about 50–60 per-
cent of the additional imports were used to
augment domestic supply in the year of the
natural disaster, and the increased stocks
and distribution in the years immediately fol-
lowing a disaster were associated with lower
paddy prices for farmers. Three main factors
contributed to overestimation of import re-
quirements: a tendency of local government
ofﬁcials to overstate production losses in
hopes of receiving more aid, a positive sup-
ply response of producers in subsequent sea-
sons to higher prices, and lower consumer
demand by farmers with reduced incomes.
Thus, acquiring and holding additional stocks
implied signiﬁcant costs to the government
and to farmers, as the additional imports
were often purchased through commercial
channels at a high price, extra storage costs
were incurred, and market prices tended to
be depressed in the year following a natural
disaster.
Stocks in 1998/99 were signiﬁcantly
larger than in 1974/75 in the crucial August
through November months: 669,000 tons,
or 5.3 kilograms per person—twice the per
capita stocks of 1974/75, though half those
of 1988/89 (Figure 3.6). Discouraging pri-
vate speculation was a major Ministry of
Food rationale for maintaining a relatively
high level of stocks during these crucial
months in 1998/99.44 Moreover, the Min-
istry of Food made numerous efforts to in-
crease its stocks through international and
domestic procurement of grain through ten-
ders, with little success. Nonetheless, markets
were stabilized with fewer public stocks be-
cause of the continued ﬂow of private sector
imports in the months following the ﬂood.45
Several factors suggest that the need for
public stocks to avert famines in Bangladesh
has considerably decreased since 1974. First,
because of the stabilizing inﬂuence of boro
production, total rice production was only
5.17 percent below trend in 1988/89 and was
actually 0.08 percent above trend in 1998/99.
Total rice production in 1974/75 was 1.82 per-
cent below trend. The record 10.55 million
ton boroharvest in May/June 1999, only ﬁve
to six months after the failure of the aman
crop, shortened the period of uncertainty re-
garding domestic supply, increased foodgrain
availability, raised farmer incomes, and re-
duced prices.46 Second, as shown above,
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43 Sobhan (1979) argues that the proximate cause of the famine in 1974 was the withholding of U.S. PL480 food aid im-
ports; a new agreement for food aid for 1973/74 was not reached until July 10, 1974, and grain was not shipped until
October 1974. Contributing necessary conditions were the forces of the market (controlled by big farmers and traders)
and the refusal of the Bangladesh government to reallocate available food stocks towards rural channels, such as Mod-
iﬁed Rationing, and away from favored urban channels (through Statutory Rationing).
44 The sharp fall in rice stocks in early 1998 following the drought-damaged 1997 aman crop was seen by policymakers
as a cause of the sharp increase in prices in those months.
45 Early assurances of food aid by donors may also have contributed to calming markets in Bangladesh.
46 The record 1.91 million ton wheat harvest in March and April 1999 also added to food availability soon after the aman
crop shortfall.private sector imports have added to domes-
tic supplies and quickly stabilized prices at
import parity levels following aman crop
shortfalls in 1997/98 and 1998/99. Third,
rice markets in Bangladesh are much better
developed than in 1988/89, and especially
compared with 1974/75, so shortages across
regions within the country can be more
easily met by domestic private (and public)
grain ﬂows. (Public sector imports, an alter-
native to private sector imports, encountered
serious problems with tenders in 1998/99
and were not a signiﬁcant source of supply.)
Fourth, foreign exchange constraints, which
so severely hampered government efforts to
procure rice in 1974, have been greatly eased
through increased export earnings and the
availability of commercial and ofﬁcial credit.
Fifth, international markets for rice and other
grains have grown deeper and more stable,
so the risk of facing high international prices
has lessened.
In addition, demand-side factors have
increased the food security of Bangladesh.
As pointed out by Hossain (1990), real per
capita incomes and food consumption were
substantially greater in 1990 than in 1974
(and had increased further by 1998), so that
small decreases in availability need not
have the disastrous consequences they had
in 1974. Moreover, the expansion of the non-
foodgrain economy provides other employ-
ment opportunities for the rural poor when
foodgrain production falters.
Summary
Foodgrain and price stability following the
floods in 1998 was largely maintained
through a combination of private sector im-
ports (mainly from India) and subsequently
a bumper boro harvest, rather than through
increased public foodgrain distribution or
large public stocks. Government distribution
of foodgrains was only 631 tons above orig-
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Figure 3.6 Closing stocks of rice and total foodgrains in Bangladesh, 1995–2000
Source: Food Planning and Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Food.inally scheduled quantities in the last six
months of 1998, compared with ofﬁcial esti-
mates of more than 1 million tons of private
sector rice imports from India in the same
period.
Government policy nonetheless played
an important role in ensuring the availability
of food. The trade liberalization of the early
1990s permitted private sector imports and
concrete measures encouraged private sector
imports during 1998. Moreover, long-term
policies of investment in infrastructure, agri-
cultural research, and extension contributed
to well-functioning markets and an expan-
sion of boro rice production that reduced the
time between major rice harvests in Bangla-
desh from 12 months to 6 months.
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Impact of the Floods on Agricultural
Production, Employment, and Wealth
A
lmost all households in ﬂooded regions of Bangladesh in September 1998 were af-
fected either directly or indirectly. Many households lost standing crops, along with
productive and valuable assets; others could not ﬁnd employment that would other-
wise have been available if the ﬂoods had not been so severe. In this chapter, we assess the
impacts of the ﬂoods through loss of agricultural production (particularly for households’
main crops), loss of other assets, and loss of income from labor market participation. Along
with data by level of ﬂood exposure, we present data on direct economic losses from the ﬂood
by household per capita expenditures, in order to show the varying effect of ﬂood exposure
on poor and nonpoor households.
Agricultural Production and Crop Losses
As noted in the previous chapter, farmers’ choices of cropping patterns in Bangladesh are
constrained by the timing and depth of ﬂooding. In many of the low-lying areas of the coun-
try, a meter or more of water covers the land during the monsoon season every year, thus pre-
cluding any crop cultivation during that period. In a normal year, 41.0 percent of farmland
cultivated (owned) by the farmers in our sample is covered by more than 90 centimeters of
water during the monsoon season (Table 4.1). In Derai thana (Sunamganj district in north-
east Bangladesh), 48 percent of the land is covered by more than 3 meters of water during
the monsoon season. On this land, only one crop of boro rice, planted in November or De-
cember and harvested in March or April, is possible. Another 31 percent of the area culti-
vated in the sample survey was medium lowland and lowland, with average ﬂood depth of
0.9 to 3.0 meters. Deepwater aman or aus crops are typically cultivated on this land during
the monsoon season, with a crop of boro rice or wheat (on the medium lowland) often culti-
vated during the dry season (see Figure 4.1). On the medium highland and highland (the
remaining 59 percent of the land cultivated by survey farmers), transplanted aman rice dom-
inates the cropping pattern from the time of transplanting (normally around August) to har-
vest in November or December.
During the 1998 ﬂoods, ﬂoodwaters on sample farmers’ﬁelds were almost double their
normal levels—137 centimeters compared with 73 centimeters. On medium highland, ﬂood-waters were on average 88 centimeters higher
than in normal years and even highland
ﬁelds that normally are not ﬂooded were
covered by an average of 22 centimeters of
water. Flooding was especially severe in the
lowlands in Derai, where the average ﬂood
depth was 6.58 meters, 1.73 meters higher
than average.
This severe ﬂooding led to substantial
crop losses, especially to the aus and aman
crops (Table 4.2): 69 percent of aus produc-
tion, 82 percent of deepwater (broadcast)
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Table 4.1 Distribution of farmers’ land by ﬂood depth in a normal year and in 1998, by survey thana
Flood depth in normal year (in centimeters)
Medium Medium Very
Highland highland lowland Lowland low land
Thana (0) (0–90) (90–180) (180–200) (> 300) All
Derai (Sunamganj)
Share of farmland 0.27 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.48 1.00
Average normal ﬂood depth (cm) — 54.15 133.39 214.74 484.92 221.80
Average 1998 ﬂood depth (cm) 16.92 138.76 223.72 297.75 657.94 314.50
Difference 16.92 84.61 90.33 83.00 173.01 92.70
Madaripur (Madaripur)
Share of farmland 0.26 0.21 0.28 0.18 0.08 1.00
Average normal ﬂood depth (cm) — 51.27 110.97 223.84 426.44 98.77
Average 1998 ﬂood depth (cm) 15.56 149.90 209.84 309.03 452.33 163.44
Difference 15.56 98.62 98.87 85.19 25.89 64.67
Mohamedpur (Magura)
Share of farmland 0.69 0.19 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00
Average normal ﬂood depth (cm) — 44.77 100.48 182.76 418.83 23.16
Average 1998 ﬂood depth (cm) 17.70 95.54 172.08 253.83 418.83 53.04
Difference 17.70 50.77 71.60 71.07 — 29.88
Muladi (Barisal)
Share of farmland 0.32 0.40 0.24 0.04 0.01 1.00
Average normal ﬂood depth (cm) — 57.10 105.95 189.11 380.75 56.73
Average 1998 ﬂood depth (cm) 26.04 147.21 205.94 293.03 494.98 129.82
Difference 26.04 90.11 99.99 103.92 114.23 73.09
Saturia (Manikganj)
Share of farmland 0.39 0.28 0.25 0.07 0.01 1.00
Average normal ﬂood depth (cm) — 46.75 115.77 205.24 357.91 56.95
Average 1998 ﬂood depth (cm) 25.53 150.13 205.61 292.27 456.90 125.21
Difference 25.53 103.38 89.84 87.03 99.00 68.26
Shibpur (Narshingdi)
Share of farmland 0.52 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.05 1.00
Average normal ﬂood depth (cm) — 46.75 124.02 222.10 404.68 60.19
Average 1998 ﬂood depth (cm) 24.87 117.40 198.53 290.64 624.43 112.89
Difference 24.87 70.65 74.52 68.53 219.75 52.70
Sharasti (Chandpur)
Share of farmland 0.28 0.08 0.49 0.13 0.01 1.00
Average normal ﬂood depth (cm) — 55.25 116.73 206.47 472.13 90.24
Average 1998 ﬂood depth (cm) 30.67 151.70 215.13 293.98 553.36 166.92
Difference 30.67 96.46 98.40 87.50 81.23 76.68
Total
Share of farmland 0.39 0.20 0.22 0.09 0.10 1.00
Average normal ﬂood depth (cm) — 51.25 113.11 212.69 461.51 73.28
Average 1998 ﬂood depth (cm) 22.25 138.97 205.86 297.85 607.80 136.81
Difference 22.25 87.73 92.75 85.16 146.29 63.53
Total land available (hectares) 116.45 61.80 67.09 26.70 30.35 302.38
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999.
Note: The district name of the thana is in parentheses.aman, and 91 percent of transplanted aman
was lost because of the ﬂoods, representing
24 percent of the total value of anticipated
agricultural production for the year.47 Over-
all, rice crop losses accounted for over half
of total agricultural losses, with vegetables
(25 percent) and ﬁbers (19 percent) account-
ing for most of the remaining losses.
About 70 percent of households in our
sample were engaged in some form of agri-
cultural production in the 12 months prior to
the survey, and their average agricultural
production was Tk 8,277 (Table 4.3). In the
sample, 52 percent of all households culti-
vated foodgrains (rice and wheat), although
only 38 percent of households actually pro-
duced a crop.
The average crop loss for transplanted
aman and  aus crops was nearly constant
across ﬂood exposure category (moderate,
severe, and very severe), with essentially all
ﬂood-exposed households suffering nearly
total losses to transplanted aman. The aver-
age crop loss for deepwater aman varied
more substantially, ranging from 56 to 94
percent across ﬂood-exposed households,
in large part because it is not cultivated on
the very low lands in Derai and other thana
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Figure 4.1 Bangladesh crop calendar and seasonal ﬂooding
Source: Khan 1999.
Notes: Except for wheat, all names refer to rice crops. HYV = high-yielding variety.
47 Ofﬁcial unpublished Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics thana-level aman production estimates for 1998/99 are broadly
consistent with the survey ﬁgures. Six of the thanas reported total failure of aman production, while the seventh
(Shibpur thana in Narsingdi district) reported aman production down by 80 percent compared with 1996/97.where households were nonetheless severely
flooded. Overall crop losses were still broadly
similar for all farm households that were
exposed to the ﬂood, ranging from 42 to 62
percent of expected production. Crop losses
for farm households not exposed to the
ﬂoods were only 23 percent of expected pro-
duction, however.48
Only 19 percent of households sampled
grew ﬁbers (jute and sugarcane), but average
losses were high (62 percent). Overall, 26 per-
cent of farmers who cultivated vegetables
suffered losses to their vegetable crops, but
average losses were only 37 percent. One
reason for the high percentage of farmers
growing vegetables and the relatively low
percentage with ﬂood losses was that many
farmers decided to utilize their cropland for
vegetable production just after the ﬂood-
waters receded, when it was too late for
paddy cultivation. Price incentives appeared
to have played a role here, as well, as the
prices of vegetables went up during ﬂood
period, especially in the ﬂood-affected
areas. Within a few months, however, the
price of vegetables declined as market sup-
ply increased.
Table 4.4 reports the values of losses of
agricultural crop production of sample pro-
ducing households by size of farm and ﬂood
exposure (again excluding the forgone value
of amancultivation when no crop was trans-
planted). Households with smaller farms did
not appear to suffer greater percentage losses
than households with larger farms. In fact,
percentage production losses were highest
for medium-sized farms (0.2–0.6 hectares)
and very large farms (1.0 hectares and above).
Note, too, there is no correlation between
severity of household ﬂood exposure and the
size of landholding. The Spearman rank cor-
relation coefﬁcient between ﬂood exposure
and quintiles for 757 households is found to
be very small and insigniﬁcant, further evi-
dence that the severity of ﬂooding was not
signiﬁcantly different for the poor than for
the rich.
Ownership and Loss 
of Assets
All households in the sample reported own-
ership of some type of assets, such as cattle,
poultry, and other tangible assets.49 In addi-
tion to the losses to crops, 55 percent of the
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Table 4.2 Aggregate area, production, and loss of crops of sample farms
Area planted Production value Value lost Loss
Crops (hectares) (Tk thousand) (Tk thousand) (percent)
Transplanted aman 37.9 119.6 1,202.6 91.0
Deepwater aman 23.6 101.0 451.4 81.7
Aus 27.3 176.3 383.4 68.5
Boro 19.0 920.6 160.4 14.8
Total rice 107.7 1,317.5 2,197.9 62.5
Wheat 7.4 247.0 — —
Fibers 25.3 477.3 778.2 62.0
Vegetables 140.4 1,735.4 1,007.8 36.7
Other 32.7 524.0 45.1 7.9
Total 312.8 4,301.1 4,029.0 48.4 
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999.
48 Note, though, that, since our ﬂood exposure variable is based on measures of ﬂooding at the home, the 70 percent of
households “not exposed to the ﬂood” that cultivated crops still suffered signiﬁcant crop losses.
49 Inexpensive agricultural assets include plows, husking mills (diesel operated), and other similar items. Valuable agri-
cultural assets include goods such as power tillers, shallow pumps, deep tubewells, threshing machines, and electric
husking mills. Cheap household assets include metal cooking pots and handlooms. Valuable household assets include
items such as sewing machines and hand tubewells. The data related to number of animals in the livestock category
were obtained by weighting younger individuals as a fraction of adult animals.Table 4.3 Average area, production, and loss of crops, by ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Main crops Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Transplanted aman
Crop growers (% of households) 30.9 32.1 38.6 24.4 31.8
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 595 995 225 156 485
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.10 0.23 0.14 0.20 0.16
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) 3,060 6,500 5,357 4,561 4,990
Production loss (%) 82.8 86.7 96.0 96.7 91.0
Deepwater aman
Crop growers (% of households) 19.8 21.8 24.2 14.3 20.2
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 893 502 373 1078 660
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.09 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.15
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) 1,206 7,701 3,204 1,342 2,951
Production loss (%) 57.5 93.9 89.6 55.5 81.7
Aus
Crop growers (% of households) 22.1 21.8 23.7 12.5 20.3
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 1,714 1,213 815 496 1,145
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.09 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.18
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) 1,021 3,579 2,506 2,699 2,490
Production loss (%) 37.3 74.7 75.5 84.5 68.5
Boro
Crop growers (% of households) 21.2 17.0 14.5 8.9 15.7
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 7,926 11,733 4,476 6,212 7,736
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.15
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) 1,682 140 1,712 820 1,348
Production loss (%) 17.5 1.2 27.7 11.7 14.8
Wheat
Crop growers (% of households) 20.3 13.9 13.0 8.3 14.3
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 2,596 2,580 1,760 1,850 2,284
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) — — — — —
Production loss (%) — — — — —
All cereals (all rice and wheat)
Crop growers (% of households) 50.2 52.1 59.9 42.3 51.5
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 5,842 5,841 2,084 2,278 3,998
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.22 0.39 0.30 0.27 0.29
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) 3,517 8,773 6,152 4,059 5,636
Production loss (%) 37.4 60.0 74.7 64.1 58.4
Fibers (sugarcane and jute)
Crop growers (% of households) 28.1 20.6 11.6 13.7 18.8
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 1,944 4,554 7,436 1,104 3,361
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.12 0.28 0.14 0.21 0.18
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) 189 21,758 486 660 5,480
Production loss (%) 8.9 82.7 6.1 37.4 62.0
Vegetables
Crop growers (% of households) 52.5 53.9 58.9 47.6 53.5
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 4,865 3,497 5,542 2,419 4,285
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.30 0.50 0.33 0.27 0.35
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) 425 3,111 5,411 287 2,488
Production loss (%) 8.0 47.1 49.4 10.6 36.7
Other
Crop growers (% of households) 36.4 41.8 52.2 36.3 41.9
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 1,986 2,211 1,242 1,318 1,653
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.10
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) 93 412 68 25 142
Production loss (%) 4.5 15.7 5.2 1.9 7.9
Total
Crop growers (% of households) 72.4 68.5 78.7 61.3 70.8
Value of production (Tk/farm household) 9,343 9,920 7,651 4,476 8,015
Average land planted to crop (hectares/household) 0.48 0.87 0.55 0.48 0.58
Average production loss (Tk/farm household) 2,870 15,925 8,846 3,183 7,517
Production loss (%) 23.4 61.6 53.6 41.6 48.4
Sample size
Number of farm households 157 113 163 103 536
Total number of households 217 165 207 168 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999.households surveyed suffered damage to or
destruction of assets, which reduced their
household wealth as well as future produc-
tive capacity.
Almost all households reported having
at least one house (main house). More than
80 percent of the houses were roofed with
tiles, tin, or concrete, and the roofs of the
remaining houses (18 percent) were covered
with bamboo, straw (chhan), leaves, or jute
sticks. Less than half of all households owned
trees, a potentially important source of food as
well as of income (del Ninno and Roy 1999b).
In the sample area, 47.6 percent of house-
holds reported owning cattle and more than
76 percent owned chickens. Few households
in the sample owned more than these basic
assets, though. Only 15 percent owned a
radio and one-fourth of rural households pos-
sessed either a radio or a clock. Although
40 percent of the households owned small
agricultural equipment, only 3.43 percent
owned valuable agricultural assets such as
irrigation equipment.
The pattern of ownership of assets by the
level of welfare and the ownership of land
shows that richer households own more as-
sets in general, particularly the more valuable
assets such as transport vehicles and jewelry.
Similarly, households that own more land
tend to have more trees, cattle, chickens, and
other agricultural assets. About 8 percent of
households owning large trees belong to the
largest landholding group and they have on
average 20 large trees, compared with the
9large trees of the households with the small-
est landholdings (less than 0.02 hectares).
Similarly, large landowners owned an aver-
age of 4 cattle and 10 chickens, compared
with 1.5 and 5.6, respectively, for small
landowners.
Table 4.5 shows the losses of various tan-
gible assets by severity of ﬂood exposure.
For the 55 percent of households that lost
assets, the average loss was Tk 6,936, equiv-
alent to 16 percent of the pre-ﬂood total
value of assets.
The value of the losses of assets and the
proportion to its value varied widely accord-
ing to asset, however. The most serious
losses were for housing. In all, 47 percent of
households suffered damage or loss to hous-
ing, with the average loss equal to Tk 5,675,
or 59 percent of pre-ﬂood housing value. The
ﬂoods also caused serious damage to large
trees: 17 percent of households lost tress
with an average value of Tk 5,137. Nearly 15
percent of households lost chickens, though
the average value of the loss was only Tk
142. Note that less than 1 percent of house-
holds lost stocks of cereals.
The more severe the level of ﬂood expo-
sure, the larger the proportion of households
suffering damage to their assets—78 percent
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Table 4.4 Producing households and loss of agricultural production, by farm size and ﬂood exposure (percent)
Not exposed Exposed All
Farmland Farm Production Farm Production Farm Production
available (hectares) households loss households loss households loss
0–0.02 24.20 13.6 19.53 37.2 20.90 29.4
0.02–0.2 21.66 18.1 26.91 30.3 25.37 27.9
0.2–0.6 35.03 14.9 34.83 58.0 34.89 47.9
0.6–1.0 10.19 27.1 11.08 39.5 10.82 34.8
1.0+ 8.92 10.9 7.65 56.7 8.02 48.8
Total 100.00 23.4 100.00 55.6 100.00 48.4
Number of farm households 157 379 536.00
Percentage of farm households 72.35 70.19 70.81
Sample size 217 540 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999.
Note: Percentage loss is calculated as losses as a share of actual production plus losses.48 CHAPTER 4
Table 4.5 Households’ loss of assets, by asset type and severity of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Type of asset Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Housing (% of households that lost assets) 7.8 49.7 64.3 74.4 47.2
Average value of loss (Tk) 2,509 5,541 5,649 6,221 5,675
Share of pre-ﬂood value (%) 56.3 60.0 59.8 59.6 58.8
Productive assets (% of households that lost assets) 9.7 23.6 27.1 28.6 21.7
Average value of loss (Tk) 431 1,300 942 1,000 979
Share of pre-ﬂood value (%) 15.2 14.4 15.7 16.1 15.3
Cattle (% of households that lost assets) 0.5 7.3 7.2 5.4 4.9
Average value of loss (Tk) 1,750 3,406 2,582 3,457 3,040
Goats/sheep (% of households that lost assets) 0.9 2.4 1.9 2.4 1.8
Average value of loss (Tk) 850 574 588 500 596
Chickens (% of households that lost assets) 7.8 15.8 17.4 20.8 14.8
Average value of loss (Tk) 184 159 115 142 142
Ducks (% of households that lost assets) 1.4 6.7 5.3 7.7 5.0
Average value of loss (Tk) 166 75 206 251 180
Agricultural tools (% of households that lost assets) 0.0 1.2 5.3 7.1 3.3
Average value of loss (Tk) — 13 26 26 25
Agricultural equipment (% of households that lost assets) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.3
Average value of loss (Tk) — — — 2,216 2,216
Fishing equipment (% of households that lost assets) 0.5 1.8 2.4 1.8 1.6
Average value of loss (Tk) 1,980 793 1,026 239 850
Transport vehicles (% of households that lost assets) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1
Average value of loss (Tk) — — — 1,200 1,200
Liquid assets (% of households that lost assets) 6.9 21.2 24.2 23.8 18.5
Average value of loss (Tk) 4,692 3,094 2,906 8,428 4,722
Share of pre-ﬂood value (%) 17.2 17.6 17.8 17.3 17.5
Large trees (% of households that lost assets) 6.9 18.8 21.3 21.4 16.6
Average value of loss (Tk) 4,692 3,427 3,144 9,230 5,137
Jewelry(% of households that lost assets) 0.0 2.4 4.8 6.5 3.7
Average value of loss (Tk) — 158 567 308 302
Consumer durables (motorcycles) (% of households that lost assets) 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3
Average value of loss (Tk) 500 — — 1,000 750
Share of pre-ﬂood value (%) 2.1 2.6 1.0 1.1 1.8
Domestic assets (% of households that lost assets) 0.0 6.1 15.5 22.0 10.4
Average value of loss (Tk) — 311 177 207 208
Share of pre-ﬂood value (%) 8.5 5.1 5.4 5.6 6.2
Cereal stocks (% of households that lost assets) 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.2 0.8
Average value of loss (Tk) — — 346 1,605 766
Small household items (% of households that lost assets) 0.0 5.5 9.7 13.7 6.7
Average value of loss (Tk) — 205 436 136 265
Large household items (% of households that lost assets) 0.0 3.6 4.3 7.1 3.8
Average value of loss (Tk) — 289 94 93 145
Other assets (% of households that lost assets) 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.8
Average value of loss (Tk) — — — 2,182 2,182
Share of pre-ﬂood value 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Total (% of households that lost assets) 18.9 60.6 69.1 78.0 54.8
Average value of loss (Tk) 2,990 6,164 6,679 9,042 6,936
Share of pre-ﬂood value (%) 7.1 11.8 16.5 23.2 16.0
Number of households 217 165 207 168 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.of the very severely ﬂood-exposed house-
holds and 69 percent of the severely affected
households lost assets worth on average Tk
9,042 and Tk 6,679, respectively. By com-
parison, only 19 percent of households de-
ﬁned as not exposed to the ﬂoods suffered
loss of assets, and their average loss was only
Tk 2,990.
The percentages of households report-
ing loss of assets were similar for poorer
households and richer households (Table
4.6). For the 73 percent of households in
the ﬁrst expenditure quintile who lost assets,
the average loss was Tk 5,868, compared
with Tk 8,858 for the 69 percent of house-
holds in the top quintile who suffered losses.
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Table 4.6 Flood-exposed households’ loss of assets, by asset type and expenditure quintile
Type of asset Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 All
Housing (% of households that lost assets) 67.26 66.37 62.26 57.43 60.75 62.96
Average value of loss (Tk) 4,924 4,713 7,242 6,689 5,994 5,833
Share of pre-ﬂood value 60.37 55.13 69.39 62.99 54.84 59.79
Productive assets (% of households that lost assets) 24.78 29.20 27.36 26.73 24.30 26.48
Average value of loss (Tk) 1,020 1,291 1,068 940 921 1,059
Share of pre-ﬂood value 20.40 19.14 13.88 15.71 13.03 15.33
Cattle (% of households that lost assets) 7.08 9.73 6.60 4.95 4.67 6.67
Average value of loss (Tk) 2,601 3,264 2,989 4,012 2,604 3,075
Goats/sheep (% of households that lost assets) 4.42 0.88 2.83 — 2.80 2.22
Average value of loss (Tk) 425 450 900 — 457 554
Chickens (% of households that lost assets) 15.93 22.12 14.15 21.78 15.89 17.96
Average value of loss (Tk) 130 125 110 116 209 136
Ducks (% of households that lost assets) 7.96 7.08 8.49 5.94 2.80 6.48
Average value of loss (Tk) 316 128 182 85 113 182
Agricultural tools (% of households that lost assets) 4.42 6.19 3.77 5.94 2.80 4.63
Average value of loss (Tk) 24 21 14 20 57 25
Agricultural equipment (% of households that lost assets) — — — 0.99 0.93 0.37
Average value of loss (Tk) — — — 1,431 3,000 2,216
Fishing equipment (% of households that lost assets) 0.88 0.88 3.77 0.99 3.74 2.04
Average value of loss (Tk) 300 900 955 712 623 748
Transport vehicles (% of households that lost assets) — 0.88 — — — 0.19
Average value of loss (Tk) — 1,200 — — — 1,200
Liquid assets (% of households that lost assets) 19.47 32.74 16.98 19.80 26.17 23.15
Average value of loss (Tk) 3,445 4,866 1,855 3,385 8,350 4,726
Share of pre-ﬂood value 11.68 17.69 9.98 14.91 24.37 17.57
Large trees (% of households that lost assets) 7.70 27.43 16.04 17.82 23.36 20.56
Average value of loss (Tk) 3,727 5,662 1,824 3,607 9,236 5,197
Jewelry (% of households that lost assets) 5.31 7.96 3.77 4.95 4.67 5.37
Average value of loss (Tk) 121 507 304 391 308 345
Domestic assets (% of households that lost assets) 14.16 20.35 6.60 14.85 16.82 14.63
Average value of loss (Tk) 85 112 168 210 453 208
Share of pre-ﬂood value 6.82 6.25 5.45 5.19 4.62 5.34
Cereal stocks (% of households that lost assets) — — 0.94 1.98 2.80 1.11
Average value of loss (Tk) — — 78 69 1,459 766
Small household items (% of households that lost assets) 9.73 13.27 4.72 9.90 8.41 9.26
Average value of loss (Tk) 132 85 453 331 409 240
Large household items (% of households that lost assets) 4.42 7.08 0.94 6.93 5.61 5.00
Average value of loss (Tk) 86 138 200 76 244 138
Other assets (% of households that lost assets) 0.88 0.88 2.83 0.99 — 1.11
Average value of loss (Tk) 200 1,200 3,888 25 — 2,182
Share of pre-ﬂood value 0.37 0.45 0.28 0.22 0.45 0.36
Total (% of households that lost assets) 72.57 69.91 68.87 65.35 69.16 69.26
Average value of loss (Tk) 5,868 7,340 7,605 7,337 8,858 7,369
Share of pre-ﬂood value 30.51 23.08 18.51 15.30 11.05 16.90
Number of households 113 113 106 101 107 540
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.Poor households’ losses were concentrated
mainly in housing and productive assets
(such as cattle and poultry); richer house-
holds’losses included large trees as well as
housing. Note also that losses as a propor-
tion of pre-ﬂood value were noticeably
higher for poor households (in quintiles 1
and 2) than for richer households (quintile
5). Thus, although richer households lost
valuable assets, many poorer households
experienced a bigger relative shock as a
result of the ﬂoods because they had fewer
assets to begin with.
Labor Participation 
and Earnings
The ﬂoods disrupted economic activities as
well as destroying crops and assets. Agricul-
tural employment, transport, and the nonfarm
economy were all affected, not only while
the ﬂoodwaters covered the land, but for
several months afterward.
As shown in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.7,
the average monthly days worked fell in the
period of the ﬂoods and afterwards increased
to the same level as 12 months earlier for all
workers except day laborers.50 The decline
in employment during the ﬂoods was not very
severe for dependent workers or those em-
ployed in cottage industries. For example, de-
pendent workers’ employment fell from 27
days per month in 1997 to 24 days per month
in July through October 1998. By October–
November 1998, they were again employed
an average of 27 days per month. Day labor-
ers were more severely affected: their em-
ployment fell sharply from 19 days per month
in 1997 to only 11 days per month in July
through October, 1998. By October–Novem-
ber 1998, employment had increased to an
average of 16 days per month, still 3 days
per month less than the average for July
through October 1997.
Similarly, wage earnings also fell in the
period of the ﬂoods and had not recovered to
1997 levels by October–November 1998. For
dependent workers, average monthly wage
earnings during July–October 1998 were
16.5 percent below their average monthly
earnings one year earlier. For day laborers,
average monthly earnings in July–October
1998 were 46 percent below those in the
same months in 1997, and in October–
November 1998 were still 18 percent below
the 1997 levels. Female earnings were lower
than male earnings in all labor categories,
but the differences over the two periods were
less pronounced than the variations in male
monthly income.
This decline in number of days worked
and wage earnings occurred in the context
of a labor market with little open unemploy-
ment. Thus, underemployment increased
as workers had fewer work days, but most
workers found at least some employment.
Many people, however, were neither gain-
fully employed nor actively searching for
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50 Working people have been classiﬁed as dependent workers, day laborers, business and cottage industry entrepreneurs
(those that are engaged in self-employment activities), farmers, and unpaid family laborers. The main difference be-
tween dependent workers and day laborers is job regularity. Dependent workers are hired for a ﬁxed amount of time.
Day laborers are hired for the day and are found to be multi-occupational, being engaged in agriculture and nonfarm
activities such as commercial, transport, and industrial activities.
Figure 4.2 Average number of days in the current main job in the
periods before, during, and after the ﬂoods
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998jobs in the months immediately following
the ﬂoods.
Table 4.8 and Figure 4.3 show how the
participation rate in the labor market varied
by age and sex. The labor participation rate
has been deﬁned as the ratio of the number
of persons who are either employed or search-
ing for employment to the total population in
the 10–65 age group.51This participation rate
represents the percentage of economically
active persons (who include the employed,
those looking for work, and the discouraged)
in the population of aged 10–65 years.
We found that the aggregate labor partic-
ipation rate was very low (41 percent). On
average, participation rates for males were
higher—67 percent, compared with only 14
percent for females. The highest participation
rates were for males between 25 and 60 years
of age: 84–94 percent. Female participation
rates for those working or actively looking
for jobs were low, 15–19 percent, even for
females between 25 and 60 years of age.
Open unemployment was virtually non-
existent (below 3 percent), and it appears
that, in the post-ﬂood period, people in rural
Bangladesh were willing to work more and
increase their incomes, especially given that
about one-third of the population are very
poor and consumed fewer than 1,800 calories
per capita per day (del Ninno and Roy 1999b).
In this situation of low unemployment, yet
low participation, among some age cohorts,
it is important to understand why people did
not participate in the labor market.
Table 4.9 shows that males’main reason
for not participating was going to school, es-
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Table 4.7 Average monthly earnings of workers in current main job in the periods before, during, and after the ﬂoods
July–October 1997 July–October 1998 October–November 1998
Number Number Number Number Number Number
Worker category of par- Earnings of days of par- Earnings of days of par- Earnings of days
by gender ticipants (Tk) worked ticipants (Tk) worked ticipants (Tk) worked
Dependent worker
Male 93 7,486 27.0 91 5,645 23.4 91 2,877 27.5
Female 17 1,674 27.2 16 2,439 26.4 16 1,325 26.8
Total 110 6,587 27.0 107 5,166 23.9 107 2,645 27.4
Day laborer
Male 235 1,160 19.1 234 666 11.1 235 950 15.8
Female 11 723 20.3 11 357 11.0 11 590 16.7
Total 246 1,140 19.2 245 651 11.1 246 933 15.9
Business and cottage 
industry
Male 101 2,296 23.1 101 1,797 17.8 101 1,931 23.2
Female 6 383 15.7 6 258 12.7 7 407 17.7
Total 107 2,189 22.6 107 1,710 17.48 108 1,832 22.8
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
51 We also used an alternative deﬁnition of labor participation, which included discouraged workers. Economically dis-
couraged workers were deﬁned as those who were not employed and were not searching for a job because they be-
lieved there were no jobs available. The results did not show any difference.
Table 4.8 Labor participation rates, by age and gender, November 1998
Participation rate (%)
Age categories Male Female All Number of persons
10–14 4.3 5.3 10.0 623
15–24 54.5 14.1 34.0 698
25–34 89.8 14.8 50.3 603
35–54 94.2 18.6 60.8 828
55–60 83.9 18.9 54.0 161
61–65 74.5 15.0 56.7 67
Total 66.8 13.8 41.3 2,980
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
Note: The participation rate is deﬁned as the percentage of persons working or searching for
work.pecially in the 10–14 and 15–24 age groups
(86 and 77 percent, respectively). Of the
girls aged 10–14 years, 80 percent did not par-
ticipate in the labor force because of school-
ing. Older women were mostly engaged in
housekeeping activities, especially in the
25–60 age groups. Probit regression analysis
shows that primary education has a positive
impact on participation in the labor market,
but the values of household-owned land and
other productive assets decrease the proba-
bility of participation. Coefﬁcients on village-
level agriculture ﬂood exposure dummy
variables indicate that the ﬂoods had an
overall negative impact on labor market
participation. The low participation rate,
made worse in villages where agriculture was
severely exposed to the ﬂood, highlights how
critical was the loss of working days suffered
during the period of the ﬂoods, especially for
households that relied more on selling their
labor as a main source of income.
Labor Status and Earnings
Workers in rural Bangladesh are engaged
mostly in unskilled manual jobs, which can
be performed with little training. More than
one-third of the rural workers in our sample
were day laborers (Table 4.10). Dependent
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Figure 4.3 Labor participation rates, by age and gender, November 1998
Table 4.9 Nonparticipants’ reasons for not looking for a job
Reason for not looking for job (%)
Age categories No need No jobs Sick Student Housekeeping Other Total Number
All
10–14 0.6 1.3 0.2 82.9 10.9 4.2 100 479
15–24 1.7 1.2 0.7 42.0 49.5 4.9 100 412
25–34 1.1 0.4 0.7 3.7 91.1 3.0 100 271
35–54 2.6 1.0 2.6 0.7 92.5 0.7 100 308
55–60 3.0 — 10.6 — 77.3 9.1 100 66
61–65 7.4 — 22.2 — 66.7 3.7 100 27
Total 1.6 1.0 1.7 37.2 54.8 3.7 100 1,563
Male
10–14 0.9 1.7 — 85.8 5.6 6.0 100 233
15–24 2.3 2.3 0.8 76.5 9.1 9.1 100 132
25–34 5.3 — 5.3 31.6 15.8 42.1 100 19
35–54 30.0 5.0 20.0 — 40.0 5.0 100 20
55–60 16.7 — 25.0 — 50.0 8.3 100 12
61–65 — — 33.3 — 66.7 — 100 12
Total 3.3 1.9 3.0 71.7 11.7 8.4 100 428
Female
10–14 0.4 0.8 0.4 80.1 15.9 2.4 100 246
15–24 1.4 0.7 0.7 25.7 68.6 2.9 100 280
25–34 0.8 0.4 0.4 1.6 96.8 — 100 252
35–54 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.7 96.2 0.4 100 288
55–60 — — — — 83.3 9.3 100 54
61–65 13.3 — — — 66.7 6.7 100 15
Total 1.0 0.6 24.2 24.2 71.1 1.9 100 1,135
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.workers represented only 16 per cent of em-
ployed persons. Forty percent of workers
were self-employed in November 1998, the
majority of them engaged in nonfarm activ-
ities; one-ﬁfth of all rural employed persons
worked on their own farm. The ﬁgures are
quite different for women: more than 42 per-
cent were unpaid family workers.
Dependent workers in the sample had
relatively higher levels of education than
others, and 14 percent of them had com-
pleted 10 or more years of schooling. Those
employed in their own business were better
educated than those engaged on their own
farm. The proportion of uneducated workers
employed as day laborers was very high
compared with those in other labor status
categories. About half of the day laborers
were employed in agricultural work. The
manufacturing sector absorbed more than
one-fourth of day laborers, followed by con-
struction (including earthworks and off-farm).
The average daily wage rate was higher in
construction work, transport, and trade jobs
(del Ninno and Roy 1999b).
A large majority of dependent workers
were hired in the private sector. The gov-
ernment and government projects absorbed
one-fourth of dependent workers. The
proportionate use of dependent workers
was larger in the normal period than in the
immediate post-ﬂood period. On the aver-
age, more than two-thirds of dependent
workers were employed on a casual (tem-
porary) basis. The place of work for two-
thirds of dependent workers was outside
their home district, while more than 30 
percent worked within their own thana;this
pattern stayed the same over 1997–98. This
indicates that people who had a dependent
job did not move during the time of the
ﬂoods.
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Table 4.10 Distribution of engaged persons, by age and job category
Main current type of work (%)
Age categories Dependent Daily laborer Own business Own farm Unpaid Total Number
All
10–14 24.6 15.8 15.8 21.1 22.8 100 57
15–24 26.4 28.2 13.6 15.5 16.4 100 220
25–34 19.1 36.2 24.2 12.3 8.2 100 293
35–54 12.5 38.9 23.5 19.2 5.9 100 489
55–60 6.0 25.3 20.5 37.4 10.8 100 83
61–65 — 18.2 21.2 57.6 3.0 100 33
Total 16.5 33.5 21.2 19.2 9.5 100 1,175
Male
10–14 27.9 16.3 16.3 25.6 14.0 100 43
15–24 26.0 32.4 12.7 19.1 9.8 100 173
25–34 19.3 39.0 24.9 14.1 2.8 100 249
35–54 12.1 41.1 24.4 21.5 1.0 100 423
55–60 6.9 27.4 21.9 42.5 1.4 100 73
61–65 — 16.1 22.6 61.3 — 100 31
Total 16.2 36.2 21.9 22.2 3.5 992
Female
10–14 14.3 14.3 14.3 7.1 50.0 100 14
15–24 27.7 12.8 17.0 2.1 40.4 100 47
25–34 18.2 20.5 20.5 2.3 38.6 100 44
35–54 15.2 24.2 18.2 4.6 37.9 100 66
55–60 — 10.0 10.0 — 80.0 100 10
61–65 — 50.0 — — 50.0 100 2
Total 18.0 19.1 17.5 3.3 42.1 183
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.Summary
The ﬂoods of 1998 had a major direct impact
on rural households because of the decrease
in agricultural production and the losses of
standing crops and other assets. Overall,
agricultural production was reduced by 48
percent among survey households, with trans-
planted aman and deep water aman crop
losses exceeding 80 percent. These large crop
losses suggest the need to develop technolo-
gies that can shorten the time needed to pro-
duce other rice and nonrice crops, thereby
increasing the production possibilities for the
periods before and after the usual ﬂood peri-
ods (Hossain, Bose, and Chowdhury 2001).
Damage to houses and losses of other
valuable assets were strongly correlated with
ﬂood exposure. The values of the losses were
signiﬁcant for many households and espe-
cially for poorer households. Not only did
the poor have fewer assets than richer house-
holds, but they suffered bigger losses in per-
centage terms as well.
Even though there was little open unem-
ployment in the sample thanas, labor partic-
ipation rates were very low. The few people
in each household who relied on ﬁnding a
job in the labor market for their livelihood
worked fewer days and suffered losses of
wage earnings during and immediately after
the ﬂoods. Thus, the thinness and unrelia-
bility of the labor market increases the vul-
nerability of day laborers to large economic
shocks such as the 1998 ﬂoods.
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Impact of the Floods on Food
Consumption, Food Security,
Health, and Nutrition
O
ne of the most direct ways in which natural disasters such as ﬂoods affect people’s
lives is through deterioration in their physical well-being, the ultimate outcome of
a myriad of ﬂood-impact pathways as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The state of people’s
physical well-being in November 1998 reflected a combination of flood-related factors in
addition to their pre-flood state. These include (1) the severity of their direct exposure to
the ﬂoods; (2) the coping strategies they or their caregivers employed in response to it; and
(3) the relief from the government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that they took
advantage of. In this chapter we examine the impact of the ﬂoods on people’s physical well-
being, the impact being considered to be the combined result of all of these factors.
The chapter ﬁrst examines the effects of the ﬂoods on food consumption during the pe-
riod shortly after the water receded and the ability of households to maintain secure access
to sufﬁcient food for their members on a sustainable basis, that is, household food security.
It then takes a look at whether the ﬂoods led to any increase in gender inequality in intra-
household food distribution. After examining the effects of the ﬂoods on the quality of people’s
health environment and on illness, we turn to consideration of their effect on the nutritional
status of preschool children and women.
Household Food Consumption
Even in normal circumstances an exceptionally large percentage of households in Bangla-
desh do not consume enough food to meet their members’dietary energy requirements, close
to 50 percent—55 million people—according to the latest national food expenditures survey
(BBS 1998). Additionally, consumption of nutrient-rich animal products is far lower than rec-
ommended levels. Micronutrient deﬁciencies, for example deﬁciencies of iron, iodine, and
vitamin A, are widespread owing to low-quality diets consisting primarily of the main food
staples, rice and wheat (Bouis and Novenario-Reese 1997; UNICEF-ADB 1997; NPAN 1997;
and Ahmed et al. 1998).
During and after the ﬂoods there was no national food supply crisis (see Chapter 3). Chap-
ter 4 showed, however, that people experienced reduced incomes owing to losses of agricultural production, lack of employment, and losses
of assets. As a result, ﬁeld surveys under-
taken during the ﬂoods reveal that house-
holds experienced increased difﬁculty in
accessing food. They reported less-than-
normal food consumption, reduced number
of meals, and/or a reduction in the variety of
foods eaten, with many households eating
meals consisting only of rice (Khan and
Haque 1998; World Food Programme (WFP)
1998; Hossain and Shuaib 1998; Democracy
Watch 1998).
In addition to the reduced access to re-
sources, people faced increases in the price
of rice and other commodities. The rise in the
price of vegetables, because of the destruc-
tion of many people’s home gardens and the
lack of production as a result of water stand-
ing in the ﬁelds, was particularly harmful,
since vegetables represent the most impor-
tant source of micronutrients in the diet.
Another factor contributing to reduced
food consumption was a severe shortage of
fuel for cooking. Existing sources of fuel were
damp, difﬁcult to obtain, or being used as
emergency fodder. Additionally, it was difﬁ-
cult to light ﬁres. Thus, even households that
did have access to sufﬁcient food had difﬁ-
culty preparing it.52
By the time the ﬂoods had ended, most
households were maintaining a stable level
of total expenditures using a combination of
coping strategies (see Chapters 4 and 6). Here
we use the household survey data to exam-
ine whether, in the ﬂoods’ immediate after-
math, households nevertheless continued to
experience reduced food consumption. We
also look at whether the ﬂoods led to any
change in the types of foods eaten. To do so
we use data collected on the consumption of
256 different foods in the month before the
survey.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 list the types of foods
consumed and compare their importance in
the diet of sample households. Rice is by far
the most important food. Almost all house-
holds consumed some rice on a daily basis;
it accounted for the majority of calories con-
sumed (67 percent; Table 5.1) and the largest
budget share (44 percent; Table 5.2). The
other major staple in the diet, wheat, was con-
sumed by about 58 percent of households but
played a much less important role in terms of
calories and the food budget. Vegetables and
ﬁsh are almost universally consumed and
have the next highest budget shares after rice
(Table 5.2). Additional important food items
from a nutritional standpoint are meat, eggs,
and milk. These foods have a high protein
and micronutrient content, but are not widely
consumed.
Whereas total food expenditures changed
very little across the ﬂood exposure groups,
Table 5.1 shows that the quantities consumed
of individual foods did. Rice consumption
appears to decline signiﬁcantly with in-
creased severity of ﬂood exposure: house-
holds in the very severely exposed group
consumed 20 percent less rice than those
not exposed. Consumption of wheat, which
was distributed as food aid in the post-ﬂood
period (see Chapter 7) and was relatively
cheaper than rice, registered a substantial in-
crease. However, the total quantity of rice and
wheat consumed declined across the groups.
There was no substantial difference in rice
and wheat prices across groups (Table 5.2),53
but the total budget share for these two com-
modities declined from 52 percent in the
non-exposed group to 47 percent in the very
severely exposed group.
Consistent with ﬁeld reports, a steep de-
cline can be found in the consumption of
vegetables—a reduction of 42 percent be-
tween the very severely exposed and non-
exposed households. This trend was matched
by a steep increase in the price of vegetables
(Table 5.2). Although not as strong, the same
trends can be found for fruits. Other foods
with price increases across the groups are
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52 Sources: HKI 1998a, Khan and Haque 1998, WFP1998, del Ninno and Roy 1999a, BHC 1998, Hena and Kabir 1998,
Rahman and Choudhury 1998.
53 This is consistent with the ﬁnding that rice prices increased after the boro harvest and remained high and that they did
not vary very much across regions.ﬁsh, meat, eggs, and prepared foods. Never-
theless, no decline in the consumption of
these foods across the groups is apparent.
Consequently, their budget shares increased
(with the exception of eggs). This trend is
particularly noticeable for prepared foods,
on which ﬂood-exposed households were
probably more dependent given the destruc-
tion of their homes and continued difﬁculties
in meal preparation. Even though the price
of milk declined, there was a large fall in 
its consumption and budget share with in-
creased severity of ﬂood exposure. One of
the few commodities to experience an in-
crease in the budget share was ﬁsh, probably
from an increase in catches from open water.
As a result of the trends in consumption
patterns presented above, the reduction in
the most calorie-dense foods in the diet
likely explains a large part of the reduction
in ﬂood-exposed households’ calorie con-
sumption, shown at the bottom of Table 5.1.
Average mean daily calorie consumption
was 2,234 kilocalories per person, just below
the minimum energy requirement of 2,273.54
The ﬂood-exposed households as a group
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Table 5.1 Households consuming 15 foods and daily per capita quantities consumed, by severity of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All households
Percent Quan- Percent Quan- Percent Quan- Percent Quan- Percent Quan- Calorie
Type con- tity con- tity con- tity con- tity con- tity share
of food suming (grams) suming (grams) suming (grams) suming (grams) suming (grams) (%)
Rice 99.5 498.7 98.8 436.1 99.5 386.6 98.8 402.4 99.2 433.0 66.65
Wheat 45.6 42.2 59.4 51.7 67.6 59.6 60.7 60.4 58.0 53.1 8.52
Bread and 
other 
cereals 15.7 2.2 14.6 1.7 17.4 1.8 19.6 1.9 16.8 1.9 0.30
Pulses 80.7 14.6 77.0 19.5 82.6 20.2 86.9 18.2 81.8 18.0 3.00
Oil 98.6 8.3 97.0 8.9 98.6 7.7 98.8 8.4 98.3 8.3 3.49
Vegetables 99.5 236.7 100.0 204.8 100.0 171.7 99.4 166.5 99.7 196.4 5.08
Meat 51.6 9.5 50.9 10.9 55.6 10.1 51.8 9.9 52.6 10.0 0.52
Eggs 63.1 4.1 57.6 4.7 54.1 3.0 57.7 3.8 58.3 3.9 0.29
Milk 55.8 22.2 38.8 17.3 36.7 11.3 39.3 13.9 43.2 16.3 0.44
Fruits 71.0 32.1 66.7 27.4 68.6 25.0 74.4 29.6 70.2 28.6 0.88
Fish 97.2 39.6 98.2 45.5 98.6 42.1 98.8 47.6 98.2 43.3 2.30
Spices 99.5 24.7 100.0 27.1 99.5 25.6 99.4 24.8 99.6 25.5 1.72
Sugar and 
snacks 88.0 25.1 85.5 27.6 86.0 24.3 88.1 24.1 86.9 25.2 4.15
Drinks and 
others 65.9 5.7 69.7 12.9 75.9 11.8 78.6 9.2 72.3 9.7 0.42
Prepared 
foods 19.8 6.2 24.2 24.0 30.0 18.6 32.7 19.0 26.4 16.3 2.24
Per capita 
daily 
calories 2,411.0 2,295.0 2,063.0 2,157.0 2,234.0
Per capita 
daily 
protein 75.9 76.1 70.2 72.6 73.7
Number of 
house-
holds 217 164 206 168 755
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
54 These numbers can be compared with those reported for rural households in the 1995/96 national food expenditures
survey: 2,263 calories (BBS 1998).consumed 248 calories per person less than
those not exposed. This may seem a small
difference, but it means that members of
ﬂood-exposed households were much more
likely to consume fewer calories than are
needed for a healthy and active life. The per-
centage of non-exposed households falling
below the minimum requirement was 45.6
percent; for exposed households it rose to 60
percent.
Figure 5.1 shows that per capita calorie
consumption is strongly related to current
per capita total expenditures, our proxy meas-
ure for income. Within each ﬂood exposure
group, per capita calorie consumption rises
steeply with total expenditures. The ﬁgure
also gives an indication that richer house-
holds as a group experienced fewer negative
effects on their food consumption as a result
of the ﬂoods. The difference between non-
exposed and exposed households’per capita
calorie consumption in the highest expendi-
ture quintile is less than 1 percent. That is,
being exposed to the ﬂoods is associated
with basically no change in rich households’
calorie consumption. In contrast, the differ-
ence between non-exposed and exposed for
the poorest quintile is 11 percent.
Table 5.3 reports regression results ex-
amining the overall effect of the ﬂoods on
household per capita calorie consumption.
As in previous models, ﬂood exposure is
captured using dummy variables represent-
ing moderate, severe, and very severe ﬂood
exposure. In addition to the independent vari-
ables used in the previous chapter, we in-
clude the food price index since we expect
food prices to affect calorie consumption in-
dependently of the ﬂoods. However, because
the ﬂoods themselves are associated with an
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Table 5.2 Food budget shares and price indexes of 15 foods, by severity of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All households
Budget Price Budget Price Budget Price Budget Price Budget Price
Type of food share (%) index share (%) index share (%) index share (%) index share (%) index
Rice 48.61 0.97 43.08 0.99 41.14 0.99 41.95 1.00 43.88 0.99
Wheat 3.39 0.97 4.4 0.99 5.6 1.00 5.49 1.03 4.68 1.00
Bread and other 
cereals 0.28 0.97 0.27 1.05 0.32 1.12 0.26 0.88 0.28 1.00
Pulses 2.20 0.99 3.13 1.01 3.44 0.98 3.44 1.00 3.02 0.99
Oil 2.85 1.01 3.27 1.01 2.92 0.97 3.17 0.99 3.03 1.00
Vegetables 13.37 0.95 12.59 1.06 12.49 1.09 11.85 1.10 12.62 1.05
Meat 3.23 0.96 3.56 0.98 3.79 1.02 3.60 1.05 3.54 1.00
Eggs 1.34 0.98 1.34 0.98 1.13 1.01 1.21 1.03 1.25 1.00
Milk 2.07 1.08 1.44 1.01 1.05 0.96 1.03 0.89 1.42 1.00
Fruits 2.44 0.92 2.55 0.96 2.69 1.07 2.87 1.04 2.63 1.00
Fish 8.02 1.02 8.60 1.03 9.03 1.11 9.58 1.06 8.77 1.06
Spices 4.94 1.00 5.88 1.01 5.96 1.02 4.95 1.02 5.43 1.01
Sugar and snacks 3.72 0.99 4.23 0.99 4.41 1.05 4.52 1.05 4.20 1.02
Drinks and others 2.59 0.91 3.87 0.89 4.55 1.08 3.88 1.13 3.69 1.01
Prepared foods 0.95 1.09 1.80 0.91 1.47 0.95 2.2 1.11 1.55 1.02
Food budget share 72.1 69.9 69.2 71.1 70.6
Total per capita 
expenditures 
per month 761.0 793.0 715.0 740.0 751.0 
Number of 
households 217 164 206 168 755
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Figure 5.1 Household daily per capita calorie consumption, by
expenditure quintile and severity of ﬂood exposure
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
55 In any case we found that the results of the model without the price variable—to capture the full effect of the ﬂoods—
did not change very much.
56 The coefﬁcients of the ﬂood exposure dummy variable in a ﬁxed effects model for a sample of 108 households living
in severely ﬂood-exposed villages were large and signiﬁcant.
increase in food prices, the full impact of
the ﬂoods might be mediated by the price
changes.55
The regressions conﬁrm that the ﬂoods
led to a reduction in food consumption for
many households. Ahousehold located in a
village that was moderately exposed to the
ﬂoods likely experienced no decline in its
calorie intakes. However, a household lo-
cated in a severely exposed village experi-
enced a decline of more than 216
kilocalories, as indicated by the regression.
The coefﬁcient on the very severe exposure
dummy variable is negative, smaller, and
not statistically signiﬁcant. Though house-
holds in very severely exposed villages
probably experienced some reduction in
their food consumption, the reductions were
likely smaller than for those in severely ex-
posed villages, possibly because of the
greater food aid allocated to the for-
mer (see Chapter 7).
The model with household-level ﬂood ex-
posure and village ﬁxed effects (presented
in the last two columns of Table 5.3) shows
that, after taking into account village-level
characteristics, including ﬂood exposure, the
difference between the way individual house-
holds in the same village were exposed to the
ﬂoods did not have any impact on their level
of caloric consumption. On the other hand,
we found that households exposed to the
ﬂoods and living in a more severely ﬂood-
exposed village were worse off than non-
flood-exposed households living in the same
village in terms of caloric consumption.56
Household Food Security
The reduced level of caloric consumption
and the additional expenses that households
incurred in order to maintain the same level
of consumption had an impact on the level of
households’food security. In this section we
propose a measure of household food secu-
rity and try to analyze the strength of the link
between level of household food security and
exposure to the ﬂoods.
Several indicators of household food se-
curity have been proposed in the literature
(Haddad et al. 1994; Maxwell et al. 1999).
Most of them revolve around measures of
food consumption (Bouis 1993), though some
studies expand the concept of food security
to include other dimensions of poverty be-
sides income poverty and to include values
of assets, the risks of facing shocks, and the
adoption of coping strategies (Frankenberger
1992; Maxwell and Frankenberger 1992).
The indicators used in the analysis in
this report have been calculated following
the conceptual framework presented by John-
son and Toole (1991) and used by the Accra
Study Team (1998), which looks at food
availability and the constraints faced by
households in acquiring food. In practice, we
deﬁned food security using the combination
of adequacy of caloric availability and pro-
portion of total current expenditure allocated
to food. Households that do not consume
adequate amounts of calories and that allo-
cate a large share of their budget to food aredeﬁned as food insecure. Similarly, house-
holds that consume adequate amounts of
calories and that allocate a smaller portion
of their budget to food are clearly food se-
cure. Households that allocate a high propor-
tion of their budget to food and that consume
adequate amounts of calories are deﬁned as
“vulnerable” because, if the level of total ex-
penditure is reduced, their level of caloric
consumption will fall as well, since they have
little scope for increasing expenditure to meet
their caloric requirements. Finally, house-
holds that do not consume adequate amounts
of calories and do not allocate a large portion
of their budget to food are deﬁned as “ques-
tionable” in regard to food security status.
This is because they could increase the level
of expenditure on food to meet their caloric
requirements, but they have other constraints
that prevent them from doing so or they sim-
ply choose not to do so.
The resulting classiﬁcation of house-
holds into the food security categories out-
lined above is presented in Figure 5.2 and
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Table 5.3 Determinants of household daily per capita calorie consumption: Regression results
Household-level ﬂood 
Village-level exposure with
ﬂood exposure village ﬁxed effects
Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Female-headed household −599.36 −3.42* −706.81 −4.15*
Age of household head −3.77 −0.73 −0.24 −0.06
Percent males 0–4 −7.00 −0.51 −5.39 −1.18
Percent males 5–14 −3.94 −0.59 −5.14 −1.19
Percent males 15–19 −4.68 −0.72 −6.06 −1.18
Percent males 20–34 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01
Percent males 35–54 −2.57 −0.55 −3.01 −0.72
Percent females 0–4 −13.25 −3.03* −13.02 −3.02*
Percent females 5–14 −10.60 −2.55* −10.82 −2.74*
Percent females 15–19 −3.95 −0.78 −5.88 −1.17
Percent females 20–34 −4.73 −0.85 −5.29 −1.29
Percent females 35–54 5.07 1.34 2.41 0.62
Household size −110.86 −0.95 −98.83 −1.97*
Number of males: Any primary education 36.40 0.80 8.44 0.20
Number of males: Any secondary education 52.07 0.93 55.51 0.89
Number of females: No education 26.57 0.16 −21.93 −0.25
Number of females: Any primary education 49.42 0.29 41.14 0.44
Number of females: Any secondary education 76.47 0.44 134.50 1.22
Pre-ﬂood value of land (Tk thousand) −0.53 −0.30 −0.39 −0.25
Productive asset value (Tk thousand) 78.28 1.88* 89.98 2.69*
Liquid asset value (Tk thousand) −4.43 −0.58 −2.40 −0.26
Housing asset value (Tk thousand) 39.01 4.03* 31.89 3.03*
Domestic asset value (Tk thousand) 178.01 1.24 171.25 1.47
Other assets value (Tk thousand) 282.09 1.58 367.69 1.28
Food price index −328.77 −0.70 19.91 0.04
Moderately ﬂood exposed −10.80 −0.08 3.77 0.03
Severely ﬂood exposed −181.80 −1.56 −4.17 −0.03
Very severely ﬂood exposed −93.14 −0.65 −49.26 −0.37
Constant 3,518.67 7.03* 3,048.38 5.13*
R2 .19 .17
Number of observations 753 751
Number of villages 117 117
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
Notes: The food price is represented by an index running from 0.74 to 1.55.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.Tables 5.4 and 5.5. We used a cutoff of 1,818
calories, equal to 80 percent of the recom-
mended daily intake in Bangladesh (BBS
1998), and a cutoff of expenditure allocated
to food equal to 70 percent of the budget
(similar to the mean for all households).
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of
households above and below the minimum
caloric requirement by their share of expen-
diture on food. Looking at the distribution of
households that meet their minimum caloric
requirement, we see that, by allocating an in-
creasing share of their budget to food, house-
holds are able to maintain an adequate level
of caloric consumption and are therefore
moving from a situation of food security to
vulnerability. It is also interesting to note that
over 20 percent of the households allocate
between 70 and 80 percent of their budget to
food, just past the cutoff of 70 percent.
The distribution of households that do
not meet their minimum caloric requirement
(Figure 5.2) contains fewer households and
therefore lies under the distribution of house-
holds that meet their minimum caloric re-
quirement. Moving from right to left in this
case, we go from households that are food
insecure towards households that have a
questionable food security status.
It is evident from this graph that a small
adjustment in the cutoff for the budget share
indicator would have a relatively large effect
on the number of households classiﬁed as
food insecure.
Table 5.4 shows that, although the share
of food expenditure did not change very
much across categories of ﬂood exposure,
the average daily consumption of calories
decreased from 2,411 for households not
exposed to the ﬂoods to 2,097 and 2,158 for
households severely and very severely ex-
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Figure 5.2 Distribution of households with consumption above
and below the minimum caloric requirement, by share of expenditure
on food
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
Table 5.4 Food security by severity of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe Total
Food share of expenditure 72.1 69.9 69.2 71.1 70.6
Per capita monthly expenditure 760.9 793.2 715.5 739.8 750.9
Per capita daily calories 2,410.7 2,320.3 2,096.7 2,157.2 2,248.9
Percent of households spending > 70% 
on food 60.4 60.0 54.6 57.1 58.0
Percent of households consuming 
< 1,818 calories per capita daily 19.4 32.7 38.7 35.7 31.2
Food insecure 12.0 15.2 15.5 16.1 14.5
Vulnerable 48.4 44.9 39.1 41.1 43.5
Food secure 32.3 22.4 22.2 23.2 25.4
Questionable 7.4 17.6 23.2 19.6 16.6
Number of households 217 165 207 168 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.posed to the ﬂoods, respectively. As a result,
only 12.0 percent of the households not ex-
posed to the ﬂoods are food insecure, com-
pared with 16.1 percent of those exposed
severely to the ﬂoods, while the percentage
of food secure households decreased from
32.3 percent for non-exposed households to
around 22 percent for households exposed to
the ﬂoods.
The difference in the level of food secu-
rity for ﬂood-exposed households across
expenditure quintiles is, as expected, quite
large (Table 5.5). Only 2 percent of the house-
holds in the ﬁrst quintile are food secure
whereas practically no households in the top
two quintiles are food insecure.
To assess the impact of the ﬂoods on
different levels of food security we ran two
sets of models. In the ﬁrst, we tried to ex-
plain the level of each of the outcomes of
the food security indicators described above
using logit models, ﬁrst using a village-level
ﬂood exposure variable and then using a
household-level ﬂood exposure variable
with village random and ﬁxed effects. In
the second, we modeled the alternative
outcomes of food security status using a
multinomial logit model in which we look
at the probability of food secure house-
holds becoming food insecure, vulnerable,
or questionable.
The results of the ﬁrst set of models
(Tables 5.6(a), (b), and (c)) show that the
probability that food security status of house-
holds changes to questionable when exposed
to the ﬂoods increases in all the models.
Households exposed to the ﬂoods also have
a higher probability of being food insecure,
even though the coefﬁcient of the model
with the village-level ﬂood exposure vari-
able is signiﬁcant only with 80 percent prob-
ability. Moreover, in the ﬁxed effects model
the probability that the food security status
of households changes to being secure de-
creases, and the probability that it changes
to vulnerable increases, if they have been
exposed to the ﬂoods. This means that the
differential ﬂood exposure of households
from the same village had a large impact on
the level of food security.
The results of the multinomial logit
model (Table 5.7) conﬁrm the results ob-
tained above. The probability that the food
security status of food secure households
changes to questionable or insecure is posi-
tive, even though the coefﬁcient of ﬂood
exposure for the food insecurity outcome is
not very signiﬁcant.
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Table 5.5 Food security by expenditure quintile for ﬂood-exposed households
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total
Food share of expenditure 73.2 72.5 71.6 68.5 63.9 70.0
Per capita monthly 
expenditure 343.1 505.8 648.9 842.6 1434.3 746.8
Per capita daily calories 1,367.6 1,836.5 2,194.8 2,460.8 3,140.4 2,183.8
Percent of households 
spending > 70% on 
food 66.4 59.3 66.0 50.5 0.4 0.6
Percent of households 
consuming < 1,818 
calories per capita daily 79.7 50.4 24.5 12.9 0.1 0.4
Food insecure 47.8 16.8 9.4 0.0 0.9 15.6
Vulnerable 18.6 42.5 56.6 50.5 41.1 41.5
Food secure 1.8 7.1 18.9 36.6 51.4 22.6
Questionable 31.9 33.6 15.1 12.9 6.5 20.4
Number of households 113 113 106 101 107 540
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.Gender Discrimination 
in Intrahousehold 
Food Distribution
Discrimination against Bangladeshi females
in the consumption of animal products has
been well documented. These foods are the
most preferred in the Bangladeshi diet,
which explains why they are the locus of the
most pronounced discrimination; they also
have high concentrations of protein and bio-
available micronutrients, nutrients in which
Bangladeshi women are particularly deﬁ-
cient (Bouis and Novenario-Reese 1997;
Bouis et al. 1998a; Ahmed et al. 1998).57
Further, although there is no evidence of in-
tentional anti-female discrimination in the
distribution of high-calorie staple foods, fe-
males of all ages are more calorie deﬁcient
than males (Bouis and Novenario-Reese
1997), and the prevalence of chronic energy
deﬁciency among women is the highest in
the world.
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Table 5.6a Determinants of food security status: Village ﬂood exposure logit model
Food insecure Vulnerable Food secure Questionable
Odds z- Odds z- Odds z- Odds z-
Variable ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic
Female headed household 2.28 1.54 0.75 −0.67 0.37 −1.63 1.85 1.03
Age of household head 1.01 0.79 1.00 −0.01 0.99 −0.89 1.01 0.43
Percent males 0–4 1.03 1.81* 0.98 −1.75* 0.99 −0.71 1.02 1.39
Percent males 5–14 1.00 0.29 1.00 −0.46 0.99 −0.52 1.01 0.82
Percent males 15–19 1.01 0.43 0.98 −1.90* 1.02 1.09 1.02 0.79
Percent males 20–34 0.98 −1.01 0.99 −1.28 1.02 1.70* 1.01 0.31
Percent males 35–54 0.99 −0.78 0.99 −1.03 1.01 1.09 1.01 0.69
Percent females 0–4 1.01 0.63 0.97 −2.29* 1.00 0.00 1.04 2.51*
Percent females 5–14 1.02 1.71* 0.99 −1.04 0.99 −1.08 1.01 0.84
Percent females 15–19 1.02 0.79 1.01 0.73 0.99 −0.78 0.98 −0.86
Percent females 20–34 1.01 0.77 0.99 −0.77 1.01 0.48 1.00 −0.03
Percent females 35–54 1.00 0.01 0.99 −0.72 1.01 1.22 0.99 −0.55
Household size 1.15 0.78 1.08 0.63 0.79 −1.55 1.04 0.26
Number of males: Any primary education 0.80 −1.46 0.99 −0.15 1.12 0.89 1.14 1.00
Number of males: Any secondary education 0.91 −0.38 0.69 −2.27* 1.60 2.82* 1.01 0.04
Number of females: No education 1.15 0.44 0.82 −0.85 1.11 0.41 1.00 −0.01
Number of females: Any primary education 0.79 −0.71 0.93 −0.33 1.31 0.97 1.09 0.27
Number of females: Any secondary education 0.95 −0.11 0.71 −1.16 1.35 0.96 1.38 0.81
Pre-ﬂood value of land (Tk thousand) 0.99 −1.41 1.00 −0.24 1.00 0.37 1.00 1.54
Productive asset value (Tk thousand) 0.84 −1.03 1.02 0.19 1.09 0.91 0.99 −0.11
Liquid asset value (Tk thousand) 1.06 1.98* 0.96 −0.90 1.00 0.19 0.88 −1.22
Housing asset value (Tk thousand) 0.98 −0.41 1.04 1.37 1.03 0.91 0.90 −2.33*
Domestic asset value (Tk thousand) 0.74 −0.59 0.98 −0.09 1.34 1.01 0.77 −0.63
Other assets value (Tk thousand) 0.31 −0.57 0.17 −1.47 9.94 1.91* 0.33 −0.71
Flood exposure (dummy) 1.75 1.86* 0.55 −3.29* 0.98 −0.07 2.12 2.65*
Number of observations 753 753 753 753
χ2 77.01 56.03 93.38 40.02
Prob χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 .12 .05 .11 .07
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.
57 See Harriss (1995) for a review of past studies on gender discrimination in intrahousehold food distribution in South
Asia. The studies’ conclusions have varied widely, and many have relied on measures of discrimination that are not
considered valid owing to the difﬁculties of interpersonal comparisons raised later in this section.Given the already precarious nutri-
tional state of large numbers of girls and
women in Bangladesh—and the close as-
sociation between the health and nutrition
of children and their mothers (see below)
—any further increase in discrimination
against females in food consumption
would have serious consequences for cur-
rent and future generations. We investigate
whether the ﬂoods led to such an increase
by asking two questions. First, did females
experience greater reductions in staple
food consumption than males? Second, did
the ﬂoods exacerbate existing discrimina-
tion against females in the consumption of
animal products?
To answer these questions, data on indi-
viduals’consumption of meals containing six
key foods—rice, wheat, ﬁsh, meat, milk, and
eggs—were collected as part of the house-
hold survey. As seen above, rice and wheat
are by far the main sources of dietary energy.
The rest of the foods are the animal products
on which discrimination centers. Together,
the six foods made up more than 75 percent
of total calorie consumption (see Table 5.1).
The data were collected using a 24-hour re-
call food weighing method.58 Note that the
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Table 5.6b Determinants of food security status: Household-level ﬂood exposure logit model with village random effects
Food insecure Vulnerable Food secure Questionable
Odds z- Odds z- Odds z- Odds z-
Variable ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic
Female-headed household 2.19 1.37 0.75 −0.64 0.37 −1.64 1.90 1.05
Age of household head 1.01 0.54 1.00 0.17 0.99 −0.95 1.01 0.42
Percent males 0–4 1.03 1.79* 0.98 −1.65* 0.99 −0.87 1.02 1.48
Percent males 5–4 1.01 0.32 1.00 −0.27 0.99 −0.63 1.01 0.73
Percent males 15–19 1.01 0.42 0.97 −1.96* 1.02 1.03 1.02 0.85
Percent males 20–34 0.98 −1.08 0.99 −1.14 1.02 1.57 1.00 0.28
Percent males 35–54 0.98 −0.88 0.99 −0.90 1.01 1.16 1.01 0.49
Percent females 0–4 1.01 0.58 0.97 −2.22* 1.00 0.01 1.04 2.58*
Percent females 5–14 1.02 1.63 0.99 −1.01 0.99 −1.17 1.01 0.92
Percent females 15–19 1.01 0.75 1.01 0.78 0.99 −0.83 0.98 −0.76
Percent females 20–34 1.01 0.79 0.99 −0.91 1.00 0.37 1.00 0.23
Percent females 35–54 1.00 0.15 0.99 −0.75 1.01 1.01 0.99 −0.36
Household size 1.16 0.78 1.07 0.51 0.81 −1.41 1.07 0.38
Number of males: Any primary education 0.78 −1.51 0.98 −0.20 1.11 0.84 1.16 1.07
Number of males: Any secondary education 0.90 −0.38 0.69 −2.22* 1.62 2.89* 0.99 −0.05
Number of females: No education 1.22 0.58 0.83 −0.82 1.10 0.36 0.97 −0.11
Number of females: Any primary education 0.81 −0.61 0.92 −0.34 1.30 0.95 1.07 0.21
Number of females: Any secondary education 0.90 −0.22 0.75 −0.97 1.36 0.97 1.28 0.62
Pre-ﬂood value of land (Tk thousand) 0.99 −1.38 1.00 −0.34 1.00 0.38 1.00 1.75*
Productive asset value (Tk thousand) 0.80 −1.19 1.01 0.15 1.09 0.92 0.98 −0.19
Liquid asset value (Tk thousand) 1.07 2.04* 0.96 −0.98 1.01 0.26 0.86 −1.32
Housing asset value (Tk thousand) 0.99 −0.16 1.03 1.10 1.03 0.99 0.89 −2.32*
Domestic asset value (Tk thousand) 0.58 −0.99 1.11 0.36 1.17 0.55 0.76 −0.62
Other assets value (Tk thousand) 0.28 −0.62 0.15 −1.49 9.23 1.83* 0.34 −0.67
Flood exposure (dummy) 1.12 0.37 0.82 −1.06 0.64 −2.22* 3.17 3.78*
Number of observations 753 753 753 753
Number of villages 117 117 117 117
χ2 52.58 39.85 79.92 43.13
Prob χ2 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.
58 The information on individual food consumption was collected from the person (a woman) who was responsible for
food preparation. She was ﬁrst asked to list the dishes prepared for each meal of the previous day and the amounts of
the six key foods used. She was then asked which household members ate the dishes containing the foods. Finally, the  data used here are the quantities, measured
in grams, that people consumed of “dishes”
containing the six foods rather than of the
foods themselves. For rice and wheat, the
dishes generally contained only that one food.
For the other foods, one dish (for example,
ﬁsh curry) may have contained other ingre-
dients as well (for example, vegetables or
oil).59The sample consisted of 1,613 females
and 1,647 males over the age of three years.
Turning ﬁrst to the main staples, Figure
5.3(a) shows how female and male con-
sumption of rice and wheat combined varies
across the ﬂood exposure severity groups.
Both male and female consumption de-
clined across the groups. Male consumption
fell precipitously with moderate and severe
exposure. Female consumption declined
from the non-exposed to the moderately ex-
posed group and then remained ﬂat. Table
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Table 5.6c Determinants of food security status: Household-level ﬂood exposure logit model with village ﬁxed effects
Food insecure Vulnerable Food secure Questionable
Odds z- Odds z- Odds z- Odds z-
Variable ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic
Female-headed household 2.11 1.08 0.53 −1.28 0.52 −0.98 2.10 1.05
Age of household head 1.00 −0.15 1.01 0.97 1.00 0.07 0.99 −0.48
Percent males 0–4 1.04 1.63 0.98 −1.68* 0.99 −0.71 1.02 1.21
Percent males 5–14 1.01 0.51 1.00 −0.03 0.99 −0.88 1.00 0.22
Percent males 15–19 1.00 0.09 0.97 −2.30* 1.02 1.17 1.02 1.02
Percent males 20–34 0.98 −0.84 0.99 −1.01 1.03 1.69* *0.99 −0.30
Percent males 35–54 0.98 −0.92 0.99 −0.89 1.02 1.61 1.00 −0.23
Percent females 0–4 1.00 0.04 0.98 −1.89* 1.00 0.18 1.03 1.96*
Percent females 5–14 1.02 1.26 0.99 −1.25 0.99 −0.79 1.01 0.67
Percent females 15–19 1.01 0.61 1.01 0.53 1.00 −0.30 0.99 −0.67
Percent females 20–34 1.01 0.71 0.98 −1.55 1.01 0.94 1.01 0.50
Percent females 35–54 1.02 0.83 0.99 −1.28 1.01 0.67 1.00 −0.08
Household size 1.05 0.20 1.16 1.07 0.75 −1.49 1.08 0.39
Number of males: Any primary education 0.74 −1.48 0.92 −0.74 1.20 1.26 1.18 1.07
Number of males: Any secondary education 0.90 −0.35 0.68 −2.12* 1.88 3.10* 0.96 −0.17
Number of females: No education 1.57 1.16 0.77 −1.04 1.07 0.20 0.97 −0.08
Number of females: Any primary education 0.92 −0.22 0.90 −0.40 1.26 0.69 0.99 −0.02
Number of females: Any secondary education 0.84 −0.35 0.84 −0.55 1.48 1.04 1.25 0.53
Pre-ﬂood value of land (Tk thousand) 0.98 −1.49 1.00 −0.09 1.00 0.03 1.01 1.74*
Productive asset value (Tk thousand) 0.75 −1.31 1.01 0.10 1.20 1.44 0.97 −0.24
Liquid asset value (Tk thousand) 1.07 1.90* 0.93 −1.13 1.01 0.22 0.89 −0.95
Housing asset value (Tk thousand) 1.01 0.19 1.02 0.66 1.02 0.49 0.89 −1.98*
Domestic asset value (Tk thousand) 0.72 −0.50 0.82 −0.61 1.38 0.89 0.78 −0.45
Other assets value (Tk thousand) 0.11 −0.80 0.18 −1.34 4.11 1.35 0.14 −1.03
Flood exposure (dummy) 0.46 −1.43 1.69 1.72* 0.53 −1.96* 2.17 1.71*
Number of observations 444 717 657 485
Number of villages 69 111 101 75
χ2 73.56 53.18 101.37 36.39
Prob χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.
amount eaten of the dishes by each member was determined using direct food weighing or standardized tables of por-
tion weights by portion size. If any member was not present at a meal, that person was interviewed to determine the
quantities eaten of the six foods. If the person was not available for interview, then the primary respondent was asked
to estimate the amount they had eaten.
59 Because our measures of differences between people in food consumption do not rely on direct comparisons of quan-
tities or nutrients consumed, this factor does not affect the results of the analysis.5.8 reports regression results examining
whether the ﬂoods had a differential impact
on male and female consumption. The
household-level measure of ﬂood exposure
with village ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation is
employed. The results conﬁrm that the
ﬂoods led to declines in staple food con-
sumption for both males and females in all
exposure groups, with the greatest declines
being associated with moderate exposure.
Using the regression coefﬁcients, we esti-
mate that the staple consumption of the av-
erage male living in a ﬂood-exposed house-
hold declined by 13.6 percent; that of the av-
erage female declined by 8.4 percent.60
Thus, for the most important source of calo-
ries in the diet, female consumption likely
did not decline by more than that of males.
In fact, the opposite may have occurred.
This indicates that, after a major disaster
such as the ﬂoods, interventions targeted di-
rectly to ﬂood-exposed households in
Bangladesh can be very effective in in-
creasing their consumption of staple foods.
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Table 5.7 Determinants of food security status: Village-level ﬂood exposure multinomial logit model
Questionable Vulnerable Food insecure
Variable Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z-statistic
Female-headed household 4.21 1.80* 1.95 1.03 4.59 2.02*
Age of household head 1.01 0.89 1.01 0.66 1.02 1.12
Percent males 0–4 1.03 1.50 1.00 −0.20 1.03 1.71*
Percent males 5–14 1.02 0.92 1.00 0.22 1.01 0.50
Percent males 15–19 1.00 0.15 0.98 −1.51 1.00 −0.15
Percent males 20–34 0.99 −0.52 0.98 −1.65* 0.97 −1.61
Percent males 35–54 1.00 0.05 0.99 −1.13 0.98 −1.13
Percent females 0–4 1.03 1.83* 0.99 −1.11 1.01 0.57
Percent females 5–14 1.02 1.29 1.00 0.37 1.03 1.84*
Percent females 15–19 0.99 −0.24 1.01 0.86 1.02 1.01
Percent females 20–34 1.00 −0.24 0.99 −0.64 1.01 0.36
Percent females 35–54 0.98 −0.99 0.99 −1.14 0.99 −0.64
Household size 1.24 1.05 1.25 1.36 1.36 1.40
Number of males: Any primary education 1.01 0.07 0.90 −0.82 0.75 −1.59
Number of males: Any secondary education 0.74 −1.26 0.59 −2.84* 0.66 −1.44
Number of females: No education 0.95 −0.15 0.85 −0.58 1.03 0.09
Number of females: Any primary education 0.87 −0.38 0.78 −0.82 0.66 −1.04
Number of females: Any secondary education 1.05 0.12 0.67 −1.18 0.77 −0.51
Pre-ﬂood value of land (Tk thousand) 1.01 0.98 1.00 −0.33 0.99 −1.36
Productive asset value (Tk thousand) 0.93 −0.54 0.94 −0.64 0.79 −1.24
Liquid asset value (Tk thousand) 0.87 −1.21 0.97 −0.69 1.04 1.40
Housing asset value (Tk thousand) 0.89 −2.25* 1.00 0.17 0.96 −0.72
Domestic asset value (Tk thousand) 0.66 −0.90 0.83 −0.61 0.61 −0.87
Other assets value (Tk thousand) 0.14 −1.05 0.09 −1.72* 0.09 −0.98
Flood exposure (dummy) 2.00 2.14* 0.75 −1.28 1.69 1.52
Number of observations 753
LR χ2 206.61
Prob >χ 2 0.00
Pseudo R2 .11
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
Note: The base is food security.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.
60 These percentages are calculated using a weighted average of the coefﬁcients for the ﬂood exposure severity dummy
variable, where the weights are the proportion of ﬂood-exposed individuals falling into each group.changed across the ﬂood exposure groups.
The latter three foods are grouped together
because of the small numbers of households
in which they are consumed on a daily basis.
As would be expected, male consumption
was always higher than female consump-
tion. Male consumption of ﬁsh-containing
meals declined more steeply with ﬂood ex-
posure severity than female consumption.
Consumption of the three non-ﬁsh animal
products declined across the groups for both
males and females, but the disparity between
male and female consumption was wider for
the very severe exposure group than for the
not-exposed group.
Although these ﬁgures are revealing,
deliberate discrimination in food consump-
tion (or a change in its degree) is difﬁcult to
detect by directly comparing nutrient or food
consumption across groups of people. Prob-
lems arise because people of different
genders, sizes, and activity patterns have dif-
ferent consumption requirements, which
are not known for certain (Bouis and
Novenario-Reese 1997). Further, a person or
group of people could eat less food than
needed simply because they and other
household members are not aware of their
requirements.
To determine whether the ﬂoods led to
an increase in discrimination against fe-
males in animal product consumption, we
used two measures. The ﬁrst indicates sim-
ply whether or not a person consumed a
particular food. The average of the measure
for a group then gives the group’s con-
sumption incidence of that food. If the fe-
male consumption incidence fell by more
than the male incidence as a consequence of
the ﬂoods, this is telling evidence that dis-
crimination in the consumption of that food
has increased. A second measure, based on
the approach of Bouis et al. (1998b), com-
pares the proportions consumed of differ-
ent foods across individuals in their own
household. The Individual Relative Con-
sumption Share (IRCS) is a ratio of the pro-
portion an individual consumes of a food
IMPACT OF THE FLOODS ON FOOD CONSUMPTION, FOOD SECURITY,  HEALTH, AND NUTRITION 67
Figure 5.3 Female and male consumption of meals
containing six staple foods, by severity of ﬂood exposure
a. Rice plus wheat
b. Fish-containing dishes
c. Meat-, egg-, and milk-containing dishes
Turning next to ﬂood impacts on individ-
uals’ consumption of animal products, Fig-
ures 5.3(b) and 5.3(c) show how female and
male consumption of meals containing ﬁsh
and those containing meat, eggs, or milkto the average proportion for all members of
their household. If the person’s proportion is
greater than the average for a particular food
(IRCS > 1), they are considered favored in
the consumption of that food; if it is less
(IRCS < 1), they are disfavored.61 A third
measure of whether or not male favoritism
exists in a household can then be con-
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Table 5.8 Determinants of female and male consumption of main staples: Regression results
(household-level ﬂood exposure with village ﬁxed effects)
Female Male
Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Female-headed household 68.90 0.73 110.91 0.79
Age of household head −2.19 −1.30 −1.09 −0.55
Percent males 5–14 −4.24 −2.64* −0.06 −0.03
Percent males 15–19 0.58 0.28 6.95 2.93*
Percent males 20–34 −0.03 −0.02 4.69 2.09*
Percent males 35–54 0.30 0.13 2.18 0.78
Percent males 55+− 0.47 −0.16 2.58 0.77
Percent females 0–4 −3.63 −2.18* −0.28 −0.13
Percent females 5–14 −3.03 −1.87* −2.19 −1.09
Percent females 15–19 −0.79 −0.36 −3.68 −1.33
Percent females 20–34 1.14 0.51 1.75 0.63
Percent females 35–54 −0.49 −0.22 2.76 1.01
Percent females 55+− 1.86 −0.81 −1.80 −0.65
Household size 23.95 3.18* 15.39 1.73*
Household has educated female 84.65 2.65* 126.10 3.37*
Household has educated male −1.07 −0.03 −90.78 −2.19*
Pre-ﬂood asset value (Tk thousand) 6.53 2.69* 6.53 2.28*
Age 33.48 15.29* 59.27 22.84*
Age-squared −0.44 −13.56* −0.72 −19.08*
Flood exposure
Moderate  −138.18 −2.82* −263.21 −4.41*
Severe −90.69 −1.79* −242.38 −3.96*
Very severe −116.73 −2.09* −175.96 −2.64*
R2 .169 .316
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Signiﬁcance of village effects (p-value) .000 .000
Number of observations 1,613 1,647
Number of villages 117 117
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
Note: The dependent variable is grams of cooked rice + grams of cooked wheat.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.
61 More formally, the individual relative consumption share of any household member i = 1, . . . , n, for food j = 1, . . . ,
k, where k is the number of foods in the diet, is deﬁned as:
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This differs from Bouis et al.’s (1998b) measure, called “Food share over energy share” (FE/ES), in two ways: (a) the
numerator of the FS/ES measure is the individual proportion of total household consumption of a food and the de-
nominator is the individual proportion of total household consumption of all foods combined; (b) the FS/ES measure
uses calories in the denominator ratio under the presumption that households will maintain relative equality in hunger
satiation across their members. We cannot do that here because we have information only on the dishes, for which a
calorie conversion is not possible, rather than on the foods. In the absence of the difference due to (b), the two meas-
ures are mathematically equivalent.structed, equaling 1 if the average male
IRCS is greater than the average female
IRCS, and zero otherwise.62
Table 5.9 reports summary statistics on
the three measures. Since discrimination can
be detected only in households where a food
is consumed, the measures are reported only
for consuming households. Gender differ-
ences in the incidence of ﬁsh consumption
are negligible. However, males are much
more likely than females to consume milk,
eggs, and meat. With an IRCS close to 1.0
for both males and females, there is little
gender discrimination in the consumption of
ﬁsh. However, for meat, eggs, and milk, the
female IRCS is considerably below 1 and the
male IRCS considerably above. Male fa-
voritism in the consumption of these foods—
or discrimination against females—exists in
60 percent of households.
Did the ﬂoods lead to any increase in
gender discrimination in the consumption
of the preferred animal products? Figure 5.4
compares the three measures across individ-
uals and households in the ﬂood exposure
groups. Starting with ﬁsh, whereas the female
consumption incidence increases slightly
across the groups (5.4(a)), the male con-
sumption incidence declines (5.4(b)). The
female IRCS for ﬁsh increases (5.4(c)), with
a corresponding decline in the percentage of
households with male favoritism in ﬁsh con-
sumption, from 56 percent in non-exposed
households to 50 percent in exposed house-
holds as a group (5.4(d)).
For meat, eggs, and milk, the female con-
sumption incidence rises with moderate ex-
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Table 5.9 Gender differences in consumption of animal products
Consumption
incidence in con- Individual relative
suming households consumption share
Households with
Foods Female Male Female Male male favoritism (%)
Fish 93.4 93.9 1.011 1.05 51.7
Meat, eggs, and milk 64.0 80.0* 0.810 1.26* 59.9
Number of people 371 401 371 397
Number of households 157
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
* denotes that the female–male difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
Figure 5.4 Comparison of three measures of intrahousehold food
distribution across non-ﬂood-exposed and ﬂood-exposed households
62 Given the nature of the data employed, the conclusions with respect to consumption of individual foods using these
measures are based on the assumption that the proportion a person eats of a food is equal to the proportion they eat of
the dish containing it.
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.posure but then declines with severe and
very severe exposure. The male incidence
falls but then rises for the very severe group.
The female IRCS shows a consistent declin-
ing trend. There is a corresponding increase
in the percentage of households with male
favoritism. These descriptive results suggest
no increase in discrimination against fe-
males in the consumption of ﬁsh (and per-
haps a decrease) but a slight increase in
discrimination in the consumption of the
meat, eggs, and milk, which are among the
most preferred foods.
Table 5.10 presents the results of the
logit model, in which we examine whether
the same ﬁndings are evident when indi-
vidual, household, and village characteris-
tics are controlled for. The dependent
variables are (1) whether or not an individ-
ual consumed the food, for both males and
females,63 and (2) whether or not male
favoritism in the consumption of the food
exists in a household. Because of insufﬁ-
cient variation in consumption incidences
among individuals of the same gender
within villages, it is possible to employ
only the village-level ﬂood exposure meas-
ure in these regressions. The household-
level ﬂood exposure measure is employed
in male favoritism regressions.
The results conﬁrm that the male likeli-
hood of consuming ﬁsh declined as a result
of the ﬂoods, but only in severely exposed
villages. They indicate no change in the fe-
male likelihood. Further, the likelihood of
male favoritism in the consumption of ﬁsh
declined for very severely exposed house-
holds. In the case of meat, eggs, and milk, the
regression results detect no change in the
consumption incidences for either females
or males. However, they detect a decline in
male favoritism in the consumption of these
foods in severely ﬂood-exposed households,
contrary to the pattern of Figure 5.4(d).
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Table 5.10 Impact of ﬂooding on gender-based discrimination in consumption of ﬁsh, meat, eggs, and milk: Summary of
regression results
Likelihood of
Likelihood of consuming protein fooda
male favoritismb Female Male
Flood exposure Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z-statistic
Fish
Moderate 1.59 1.24 1.35 0.75 0.84 −0.42
Severe 0.75 −0.96 0.53 2.01* 0.74 −0.69
Very severe 0.78 −0.66 0.60 −1.38 0.38 −2.06*
Prob >χ 2 0.47 0.08 0.07
Number of people 1,170 1,203
Number of households 458
Meat, milk, and eggs
Moderate 1.55 1.31 0.77 −0.75 0.92 −0.13
Severe 1.08 0.27 0.83 −0.57 0.30 −2.14*
Very severe 1.14 0.33 1.87 1.15 1.43 0.44
Prob >χ 2 0.02 0.35 0.00
Number of people 369 396
Number of households 53
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
a Village-level ﬂood exposure.
b Household ﬂood exposure with village ﬁxed effects.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.
63 In addition to the independent variables included in previous regressions, here we include the age and age-squared of
the individual.These ﬁndings, taken together, suggest
that the 1998 ﬂoods were associated with
(a) a slightly greater decline in the consump-
tion of the main staples, rice and wheat,
among men than among women; (b) a de-
cline in discrimination against females in the
consumption of ﬁsh, a widely consumed
preferred food; and (c) a possible increase
in discrimination against females in the con-
sumption of meat, eggs, and milk, foods that
are preferred by not widely consumed. This
means that the ﬂoods led to no signiﬁcant,
widespread increase in discrimination against
females in intrahousehold food distribution.
This is not to say that such discrimination did
not continue to exist in the aftermath of the
ﬂoods, only that its degree did not change
signiﬁcantly as a result of the ﬂoods.
Health Environment 
and Illness
In this section we describe people’s health
environment during the ﬂoods and in the
immediate post-ﬂood period, including the
state of their shelter and daily living envi-
ronment, access to safe water, and state of
sanitation. We ask whether the ﬂoods led to
a deterioration in the quality of the health
environment in and surrounding people’s
homes. We then turn to look at the impact of
the ﬂoods on people’s health.
Health Environment
Most rural Bangladeshi people live in homes
that are by their very nature structurally vul-
nerable to ﬂood damage, with walls made
of jute, bamboo, or mud, and with earthen or
bamboo ﬂoors (Mitra et al. 1997). The aver-
age ﬂood-exposed household in the study
sample had 2.7 feet of water in the house,
rising to 4.5 feet for the very severely ex-
posed households, far above the previous
year’s level of 0.1 feet (see Table 5.11). The
average very severely exposed household
had water in the home for over two months,
and almost three-quarters experienced dam-
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Table 5.11 Health environment characteristics, by severity of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All households
Shelter and living environment
Height of water in home during 1998 ﬂoods (feet) 0.0 1.2 2.5 4.5 1.9
Height of water in home during 1997 ﬂoods (feet) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Height of water in homestead during 1998 ﬂoods (feet) 0.0 1.4 2.4 3.6 1.8
Days water in home during 1998 ﬂoods 0.0 14.2 32.5 61.0 25.5
Experienced damage to home (% of households) 5.1 45.6 61.0 72.4 43.9
Percent value of home lost due to ﬂoods 1.3 11.0 16.5 23.3 12.4
Percent of households forced to leave home due to ﬂoods 0.0 11.5 20.8 41.7 17.4
Average number of days displaced due to ﬂoods 0.0 2.9 6.2 20.6 6.9
Safe watera
Obtain drinking water from tubewell (% of households) 98.2 95.1 97.6 95.2 97.0
Obtain cooking water from tubewell  82.0 52.4 36.2 27.0 50.9
Obtain washing water from tubewell  62.2 36.6 31.4 31.0 41.3
Water source is outside of home (% of households) 53.0 68.3 65.1 61.5 38.5
Distance to out-of-home water source (feet) 70.0 78.0 69.0 89.0 76.0
Time taken to collect water per day (hours) 0.93 1.17 1.20 1.30 1.15
Amount of water collected (liters) 60.1 47.3 50.2 50.4 51.9
Sanitation
Household has sanitary latrineb 29.0 25.3 21.8 18.3 23.9
Number of householdsc 217 165 207 168 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
a Tubewells are the only source of safe water available to the large majority of rural residents. The other sources (not safe) are ponds, rivers, and canals.
bAsanitary latrine is one that is sealed to prevent waste from spreading into the surrounding environment (traditional pit toilet, water-sealed slab latrine, or
facility with septic tank).
c Some of the variables have a small number of missing cases.age to their home during the ﬂoods. Even
moderately exposed households had much
more water in their home than in the previ-
ous year, and 45 percent had damage to their
home.
Under these conditions, many people
were directly exposed to ﬂoodwaters—and
the pathogens they contain—on a daily
basis. The amount of time and energy de-
voted to caring for young children and pro-
tecting household possessions, including
animals, was greatly increased. Carrying on
regular activities, such as cooking, eating,
cleaning, going to work or school, and even
sleeping, became more difﬁcult. Many
people’s homes were so unlivable that they
were forced to leave, relocating to either a
raised road, a government or NGO shelter,
or another home (HKI 1998a). Among the
ﬂood-exposed sample households, 24 per-
cent had members who were displaced dur-
ing the ﬂooding. This number rose to 42
percent for very severely exposed house-
holds, with the average amount of time dis-
placed being three weeks.
One of the most important elements of
a proper health environment is access to
adequate safe drinking water. Most house-
holds in rural Bangladesh normally get their
drinking water from tubewells, the safest
water source available (Mitra et al. 1997).
Other major sources of water are ponds,
rivers, or canals. Flood ﬁeld reports indicate
that many households’tubewells were dam-
aged or contaminated with ﬂoodwater dur-
ing the ﬂoods. However, many people were
aware of the need for safe water to avoid ill-
ness and carried water to their homes from
undamaged tubewells—often traveling great
distances to do so. Others drank dirty water
either because they could not ﬁnd any clean
water or because they lacked the knowledge
or ability to treat it. In some cases, tubewells
that had been contaminated were not disin-
fected; in others, people drank contaminated
water because fuel was too wet to boil it
(BHC 1998; WFP1998; Hossain and Shuaib
1998; Islam 1998).
As shown in Table 5.11, during the time
of the survey in November 1998, most
households had been able to maintain tube-
wells as their main source of drinking water.
However, use of tubewell water for cooking
and washing dropped precipitously across
the ﬂood exposure severity groups. Further,
the proportion of households obtaining water
outside of their home rose from 53 percent
of non-exposed households to 62 percent of
very severely exposed households. The time
spent collecting water increased from just
under one hour for non-exposed households
to about an hour and a quarter for the se-
verely exposed households. Consequently,
the amount of water collected dropped from
60 to 50 liters across these two groups. These
numbers indicate that safe water from tube-
wells was still scarce and more difﬁcult to
obtain than usual even after the ﬂoodwaters
receded. Note that the large majority of the
water collected is by females: 20.8 percent
by adolescent girls and 70.7 percent by adult
women.
With regard to sanitation, in normal cir-
cumstances most Bangladeshi households
either rely on open latrines, in which waste
is not prevented from spreading into the sur-
rounding environment, or have no sanitation
facility at all (30 percent). The rest use more
hygienic, closed latrines, either traditional pit
toilets, water-sealed slab latrines, or modern
facilities with septic tanks (Mitra et al. 1997).
Flood ﬁeld reports indicate that during the
floods many open latrines had ﬁlled with
water and were overﬂowing, and that many
closed latrines were destroyed (BHC 1998;
HKI 1998a). Table 5.11 shows that the share
of sample households with closed (sanitary)
latrines in fact declined across the ﬂood
exposure severity groups, from 29 percent
of non-exposed households to 18 percent of
those very severely exposed.
Illness
The ﬂoods were thus associated with a major
deterioration in the quality of households’
health environments, both during the actual
72 CHAPTER 5ﬂooding period itself and continuing into the
following months. Common ﬂood-related ill-
nesses, such as diarrhea,64 acute respiratory
infections, and skin lesions did not reach
acute or epidemic proportions during the
floods. There was concern, however, that
illnesses would become more widespread
when the ﬂoodwaters receded owing to in-
creased water contamination (Hossain and
Shuaib 1998; Khan and Haque 1998; Islam
1998). The analysis of this section shows
that this was indeed the case.
Table 5.12 reports the percentage of peo-
ple in the survey households experiencing an
illness in the previous two weeks by severity
of ﬂood exposure, in addition to prevalences
of the three most commonly reported ill-
nesses: diarrhea, respiratory illness, and fever.
About 30 percent of people had been sick,
and diarrhea (10 percent) and fever (9 per-
cent) were the most common illnesses. The
prevalences of all the illnesses rose precip-
itously across the four ﬂood exposure sever-
ity groups. Only 23 percent of people in
non-exposed households were sick in the two
weeks prior to the survey. The prevalence in
the moderately exposed group was only
slightly higher (26 percent), but in very se-
verely exposed households it jumped to 40
percent. The greatest increase associated
with ﬂood exposure occurred in respiratory
illness, whose prevalence tripled across the
non-exposed (1.86 percent) and exposed
(5.74 percent) groups. The incidence of
fever rose by 55 percent and that of diarrhea
by 25 percent over the two groups. These
numbers indicate that the ﬂoods left quite a
large increase in morbidity in their wake.
Table 5.13 reports logit model results for
illness risk in the ﬂoods’aftermath using the
village-level measure of ﬂood exposure.65A
person living in a village that was moder-
ately exposed to the ﬂoods had an increased
risk of contracting an illness of about one-
third. The increased risk was almost double
for people in severely exposed villages and
greater than two and a half times for people
living in very severely exposed villages. In
terms of individual illnesses, a person living
in a severely exposed village had a 1.6 times
increased chance of contracting diarrhea, a
doubled risk of contracting a respiratory ill-
ness, and an almost doubled risk of contract-
ing a fever. For very severe exposure the
diarrhea risk more than doubled, the respira-
tory illness risk tripled, and the fever risk
nearly tripled as well. Conﬁrming the de-
scriptive results, the risk rose the most for
respiratory illness. Note that, when the house-
hold ﬂood exposure measure is employed,
the results are largely statistically insigniﬁ-
cant. This suggests that targeting of health
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64 Diarrhea among children was reportedly quite high during the ﬂood period itself, with the situation being classiﬁed as
an “outbreak” (see BHC 1998; Hossain and Shuaib 1998; and Islam 1998).
65 When the household ﬂood exposure measure with village ﬁxed effects is employed, the results are largely statistically
insigniﬁcant except for respiratory illnesses.
Table 5.12 Prevalence of any illness, diarrhea, respiratory illness, and fever, by severity of
ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Any illness 23.03 25.89 34.79 39.43 30.72
Diarrhea 8.17 5.50 11.74 12.73 9.64
Respiratory illness 1.86 4.24 5.87 7.05 4.70
Fever 6.41 8.25 10.56 10.80 9.00
Number of people 1,077 873 1,193 880 4,023
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.interventions to ﬂood-exposed villages
(rather than to individual households) is an
efﬁcient mechanism for addressing health
needs in the aftermath of covariate shocks
such as the ﬂoods.
Figure 5.5 shows the prevalence of ill-
ness across ﬂood exposure severity groups
by age group and gender. Strong gender dif-
ferences in the impact of ﬂood exposure for
the sample as a whole are not apparent. All
age groups exhibit a pattern of increased ill-
ness with greater severity of ﬂood exposure.
Table 5.14 compares the ﬂood exposure odds
ratios derived from logistic regression for
children (0–10 years), adolescents (10–18),
and adults (18 and over) in the sample. All
adults living in ﬂood-exposed villages expe-
rienced increased illness risk. Adolescents
living in very severely exposed villages were
over three and a half times more likely to
contract an illness than those living in non-
exposed villages. Children in severely ex-
posed villages had a slightly increased illness
risk, and for those in very severely exposed
villages the risk more than trebled. Thus, al-
though adolescents experienced the greatest
increase in illness risk due to the ﬂoods, the
consequences of illness among children are
more serious than among either adolescents
or adults, since illness can put a child’s life
in danger. Acute respiratory infections and
diarrhea, in particular, are major contributors
to child mortality in Bangladesh (Mitra et al.
1997). Thus the heightened illness among
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Table 5.13 Determinants of prevalence of any illness, diarrhea, respiratory illness, and fever: Regression results 
(village-level ﬂood exposure logit model)
Any illness Diarrhea Respiratory illness Fever
Odds z- Odds z- Odds z- Odds z-
ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic
Female-headed household 1.29 0.97 1.36 0.82 0.59 −0.66 0.88 −0.31
Age of household head 1.00 −0.81 1.00 0.09 0.99 −1.01 0.99 −0.92
Percent males 5–14 0.98 −3.53* 0.99 −1.78* 0.97 −4.15* 0.99 −1.53*
Percent males 15–19 0.98 −3.80* 0.99 −1.64 0.99 −0.72 0.98 −2.18*
Percent males 20–34 0.98 −3.66* 0.99 −1.59 0.97 −2.87* 0.98 −2.30*
Percent males 35–54 0.99 −1.66* 0.98 −1.62 0.98 −1.08 0.99 −1.20
Percent males 55+ 0.98 −1.89* 0.98 −1.78* 1.01 0.33 0.99 −1.00
Percent females 0–4 0.99 −2.30* 1.00 0.63 0.98 −2.70* 0.99 −2.08*
Percent females 5–14 0.98 −3.84* 1.00 −0.66 0.97 −2.96* 0.99 −1.16
Percent females 15–19 0.98 −2.92* 0.99 −1.36 0.98 −1.39 0.99 −0.94
Percent females 20–34 0.98 −2.43* 0.99 −0.62 1.00 0.11 0.99 −0.87
Percent females 35–54 0.98 −2.87* 0.99 −1.05 0.97 −2.03* 1.00 −0.52
Percent females 55+ 0.98 −3.91* 0.98 −1.73* 0.96 −3.01* 0.99 −1.02
Household size 0.91 −4.35* 0.90 −2.84* 0.97 −0.69 0.85 −4.12*
Household has educated female 0.99 −0.08 1.15 1.01 0.56 −3.20* 0.98 −0.12
Household has educated male 0.89 −1.30 1.00 −0.01 1.29 1.31 0.75 −2.04*
Total pre-ﬂood asset value 
(Tk thousand) 1.01 1.89* 1.00 0.37 1.00 −0.07 1.03 3.47*
Age 0.99 −1.19 0.96 −5.24* 0.93 −5.83* 1.01 1.54
Age-squared 1.00 3.08* 1.00 5.51* 1.00 5.11* 1.00 −0.65
Sex 1.08 1.06 0.85 −1.34 1.02 0.09 0.96 −0.39
Flood exposure
Moderate 1.30 2.53* 1.16 0.88 0.92 −0.32 1.35 1.74*
Severe 1.88 6.88* 1.57 3.14* 2.01 3.32* 1.86 4.07*
Very severe 2.77 9.30* 2.15 4.70* 3.28 5.36* 2.82 6.17*
Pseudo R2 .044 .041 .0976 .0472
Prob >χ 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 4,007 4,007 4,007 4,007
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.children represents the most serious health
consequence of the ﬂoods.
Nutritional Status 
of Preschool Children 
and Women
Preschool Children
Bangladesh has some of the highest child
malnutrition rates in the world. Even under
normal conditions over half of all preschool
children (0- to 5-year-olds) in the country are
stunted, signaling that they have experienced
long-term inadequate nutrition and/or poor
health. Roughly 15 percent are wasted—hav-
ing recently experienced substantial weight
loss, usually owing to an acute shortage of
food or a severe illness (ACC/SCN 2000;
BBS 1997; Mitra et al. 1997).66Besides being
a cause of much physical and emotional suf-
fering, child malnutrition has long-term
consequences for a country’s overall devel-
opment because it impairs cognitive ability,
reduces productivity, and increases demands
on social services. It is also a leading cause
of death among young children (ACC/SCN
2000).
One of the reasons child malnutrition
rates are so high in Bangladesh is the lack
of proper caring practices for children, es-
pecially feeding practices (MHFW 1995;
UNICEF 1998; UNICEF-ADB 1997). After
six months of age, as well as continued
breastfeeding, children need frequent nutri-
tious meals free of pathogens in order to
continue to grow and thrive. They also need
extra feeding during and after illnesses (ACC/
SCN 2000). Reports from the ﬂood front in-
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Figure 5.5 Prevalence of any illness in previous two weeks, by gender,
age group, and severity of ﬂood exposure
Table 5.14 Impact of ﬂood exposure on
prevalence of any illness for children,
adolescents, and adults: Summary of
regression results (village-level ﬂood
exposure logit model)
Odds ratio z-statistic
Children
Flood exposure
Moderate 1.23 0.99
Severe 1.47 2.09*
Very severe 3.23 5.34*
Prob >χ 2 0.00
Number of people 980
Adolescents
Flood exposure
Moderate 1.50 1.42
Severe 2.68 4.02*
Very severe 3.53 4.43*
Prob >χ 2 0.00
Number of people 909
Adults
Flood exposure
Moderate 1.30 1.86*
Severe 2.02 5.50*
Very severe 2.64 6.23*
Prob >χ 2 0.000
Number of people 1,983
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and au-
thors’calculations.
Notes: Child regressions include parents’ages and educa-
tion plus mother’s height as regressors. All other regressions
contain the same variables as listed in Table 5.13.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the
10% level or less.
66 Achild is deﬁned as wasted (stunted) if the child’s weight-for-height (height-for-age) z-score is less than −2 standard
deviations from the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics/World Health Organization international reference stan-
dard for the child’s age. Severe wasting (stunting) is deﬁned as a z-score of less than −3.
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
a. All ages
b. Children, adolescents, and adultsdicate that fulﬁlling these special needs be-
came quite difﬁcult during the ﬂoods, which
would be expected given the damage to
homes and the increased efforts needed to
obtain food and cook it, obtain safe water,
and maintain a clean living environment.
Some mothers had difﬁculty obtaining or
preparing supplementary food for their chil-
dren, and others were producing insufﬁcient
breastmilk owing to their own reduced food
consumption. Children could not always be
protected from the ﬂoodwaters and were
exposed to contaminants in them or became
ill from wearing wet clothes (del Ninno and
Roy 1999a; Hena and Kabir 1998; Hossain
and Shuaib 1998; Khan and Haque 1998;
Rahman and Choudhury 1998). Not surpris-
ingly, data collected during the ﬂood months
as part of Bangladesh’s ongoing Nutrition
Surveillance Project revealed a dramatic in-
crease in wasting in the ﬂood-affected areas
of the country from June to August 1998,
contradicting the normal pattern at that time
of year (HKI 1998b).
The ﬁrst column of Table 5.15 shows the
nutritional status of preschool children in
the study sample. In the period immediately
following the recession of the ﬂoodwaters,
24 percent were wasted and 55 percent were
stunted. The prevalence of wasting and
stunting across the ﬂood exposure severity
groups is shown in Figure 5.6. The wasting
rate rose from 21.0 percent for children liv-
ing in non-exposed households to 25.3 per-
cent for those living in very severely exposed
households. The graph also indicates that the
ﬂoods led to an increase in stunting among
children in households severely and very se-
verely exposed to the ﬂoods.67
The logistic regression results using 
the household-level ﬂood exposure measure
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Table 5.15 Nutritional status of preschool children, adolescent girls, and nonpregnant 
women (percent)
Adolescent girls and 
Preschool children nonpregnant women
Wasting 23.5
Severe 3.9
Stunting 55.3
Severe 24.0
Body mass index 18.1
Chronic energy deﬁciency (%) 60.4
Severe chronic energy deﬁciency (%) 15.0
Number 409 654
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
Figure 5.6 Wasting and stunting among
preschool children, and chronic energy
deﬁciency among women, by severity of
ﬂood exposure
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
Note: CED = chronic energy deﬁciency.
67 It was somewhat surprising to notice an impact on the rates of stunting only a few months after the end of the ﬂoods.
This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Helen Keller International (HKI 1998a, 1998b) and with our data, which report
an increase in illness at the onset of the ﬂoods in July 1998.(Table 5.16) conﬁrm that the ﬂoods led to a
big increase in wasting that remained even
after the ﬂoodwaters receded.68 A child liv-
ing in a household that was severely exposed
to the ﬂoods had a seven times greater risk of
being wasted than one not exposed at all. The
increased risk was still quite large for very
severe exposure (almost ﬁve times greater
risk). This indicates that to respond to wast-
ing it is necessary to target individual house-
holds rather then relying on village targeting.
An example of an intervention would be
extra support for lactating mothers and en-
suring easily prepared supplementary foods
are available for ﬂood-exposed households
with preschoolers.
The last column in Table 5.16 presents
the results for stunting using the village-level
ﬂood exposure measure. They conﬁrm that
the ﬂoods led to a signiﬁcant increase in
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Table 5.16 Determinants of wasting and stunting among preschool children: Regression results
Wasting Stuntinga
Household ﬂood exposure
Village ﬂood exposure with village ﬁxed effects Village ﬂood exposure
Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z–statistic
Percent males 5–14 1.03 1.36 1.04 1.53 1.01 0.82
Percent males 15–19 1.04 1.19 1.10 1.93* 1.05 1.51
Percent males 20–34 0.98 −0.59 1.01 0.26 1.02 0.80
Percent males 35–54 1.02 0.81 1.05 1.27 1.00 −0.15
Percent males 55+ 1.04 0.95 1.11 2.03* 0.95 −1.50
Percent females 0–4 1.01 0.62 1.01 0.45 1.04 2.31*
Percent females 5–14 1.04 1.96 1.07 2.24* 1.02 1.00
Percent females 15–19 1.07 2.06* 1.14 2.70* 1.00 0.01
Percent females 20–34 1.05 1.37 1.09 1.81* 1.05 1.67*
Percent females 35–54 1.01 0.31 1.00 −0.04 1.02 0.76
Percent females 55+ 1.04 1.37 1.08 1.81* 1.00 −0.16
Household size 0.85 −1.66* 0.89 −0.77 1.13 1.56
Mother’s height 1.01 0.22 1.01 0.19 0.90 −4.37*
Mother’s age 1.05 1.18 1.09 1.58 1.04 0.96
Father’s age 0.94 −1.80* 0.95 −1.29 1.00 0.01
Mother has any education 0.89 −0.38 0.65 −0.90 0.70 −1.28
Father has any education 0.90 −0.34 1.10 0.18 0.97 −0.10
Pre-ﬂood asset value (Tk thousand) 1.00 −1.15 0.96 −0.80 0.98 −0.85
Age (months) 1.03 0.79 1.02 0.41 1.10 3.33*
Age-squared 1.00 −0.93 1.00 −0.50 1.00 −2.85*
Gender 0.36 −2.21* 0.42 −1.80* 0.42 −2.18*
Flood exposure
Moderate 1.14 0.37 2.90 1.26 0.69 −1.15
Severe 0.72 −0.96 7.30 2.25* 0.90 −0.36
Very severe 0.92 −0.22 4.87 1.76* 2.18 2.04*
Pseudo R2 .080 .144
Prob >χ 2 0.094 0.079 0.000
Number of children 384 247 384
Number of villages 60
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
a When this regression is undertaken using household-level ﬂood exposure and village ﬁxed effects, the observations from 34 villages and 78 households are
dropped because there is no variation across households within villages in the dependent variable. When the household ﬂood exposure measure without vil-
lage ﬁxed effects is employed, the ﬂood exposure variables are insigniﬁcant except for the moderate exposure dummy, which has a coefﬁcient (odds ratio)
of less than one.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.
68 Note that the regression coefﬁcients on the ﬂood exposure variables are not signiﬁcant when the village-level ﬂood ex-
posure measure is employed.stunting for children living in very severely
exposed villages.69 The impact of the ﬂoods
on stunting is not surprising because most
of the children that lived in more severely
exposed villages suffered the consequences
of poor sanitation at the onset of the ﬂoods
in July 1998, four months before the survey.
Women
As noted above, the nutritional status of
Bangladeshi women is also extremely poor.
Bangladesh has the world’s highest known
rate among women of chronic energy
deﬁciency (CED)—signifying that a per-
son is underweight owing to insufﬁcient
energy intakes.70 Malnutrition of women
in turn leads to intrauterine growth retar-
dation and low birthweight babies. It also
hinders mothers from providing adequate
care to children after they are born
(ACC/SCN 2000). The prevalence of CED
among nonpregnant women aged 19–49
years in the study sample is 60 percent
(Table 5.15).71
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Table 5.17 Determinants of chronic energy deﬁciency (CED) among nonpregnant women:
Regression results
Household ﬂood exposure
Village ﬂood exposure with village ﬁxed effects
Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z-statistic
Female-headed household 0.99 −0.02 0.93 −0.11
Age of household head 0.99 −0.94 1.01 0.52
Percent males 5–14 1.00 0.00 1.00 −0.10
Percent males 15–19 1.00 0.15 0.98 −1.08
Percent males 20–34 0.99 −1.05 0.98 −0.94
Percent males 35–54 1.00 −0.02 0.99 −0.50
Percent males 55+ 1.00 0.03 0.97 −1.06
Percent females 0–4 1.00 0.39 1.00 −0.08
Percent females 5–14 0.99 −1.25 0.97 −2.09*
Percent females 15–19 1.01 0.38 0.99 −0.32
Percent females 20–34 0.97 −2.01* 0.95 −2.74*
Percent females 35–54 0.99 −0.34 0.98 −1.11
Percent females 55+ 1.01 0.50 0.98 −0.99
Household size 0.93 −1.33 0.84 −2.35*
Household has educated female 0.95 −0.25 1.08 0.30
Household has educated male 0.78 −1.13 0.69 −1.40
Pre-ﬂood asset value (Tk thousand) 0.95 −3.49* 0.95 −2.71*
Age 0.75 −2.48* 0.75 −2.05*
Age-squared 1.00 2.70* 1.00 2.12*
Flood exposure
Moderate 0.917 −0.368 0.519 −1.742*
Severe 1.345 1.361 0.476 −1.784*
Very severe 1.162 0.553 0.390 −1.968*
Pseudo R2 .072
Prob >χ 2 0.000 0.003
Number of people 650 561
Number of villages 97
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.
69 The household-level measure of ﬂood exposure could not be employed in the regression for stunting owing to insuf-
ﬁcient variation in stunting across children in villages.
70 A person is classiﬁed as being chronically energy deﬁcient if her or his body mass index (weight divided by height-
squared) is less than 18.5. Aperson is severely energy deﬁcient if his or her BMI is less than 16.
71 For comparison, the percentage of nonpregnant women aged 15–49 in Bangladesh among women with children under
five years of age is reported by Mitra et al. (1997) to be 52 percent. It is reported in ACC/SCN (2000) to be 51.3 percent
for women aged 20–49. These numbers are calculated using the 1996–97 Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey.Figure 5.6 also shows the prevalence of
CED across the ﬂood exposure severity
groups. Although it drops for moderate ex-
posure, it is slightly elevated for severe and
very severe ﬂood exposure. Logistic regres-
sion results for CED risk are reported in
Table 5.17. The results when the village-
level ﬂood exposure measure is employed
suggest that a woman living in a ﬂood-
exposed village had no greater risk of be-
coming undernourished than those living in
non-exposed villages. When the household-
level ﬂood exposure measure is employed,
the results suggest that the ﬂoods led to a
decline in undernourishment among women
in households in all three ﬂood exposure
categories, although these results are not
strongly signiﬁcant. In conclusion, we found
no evidence that the ﬂoods had a negative
impact on women’s nutritional status.
Summary
The 1998 ﬂoods in Bangladesh reduced
people’s food consumption. It also compro-
mised households’ability to meet their food
needs on a sustainable basis; in other words,
it increased food insecurity. We have found
that households exposed to the ﬂoods prob-
ably experienced reduced food consumption
during the ﬂood period itself, and the major-
ity continued to consume less food than usual
even after the ﬂoodwaters receded.
In an effort to maintain normal con-
sumption of other foods whose prices had
increased, households reduced their con-
sumption of rice (substituting some with
wheat). They also reduced their consumption
of three non-staple foods: micronutrient-rich
vegetables and fruit, whose prices remained
higher than normal owing to continued
scarcities, and milk. These changes in their
consumption baskets resulted in a reduction
in the level of calories consumed and in-
creased the number of households character-
ized as questionable in terms of food security
(that is, they consumed less than 1,818 calo-
ries/person/day but spent less than 70 percent
of their budgets on food). Per capita calorie
consumption of households not exposed to
the ﬂoods was on average 160–200 calories
per person higher than for households se-
verely or very severely exposed to the ﬂoods.
Other immediate needs in the post-ﬂood
period may have prevented the questionable
households from increasing their spending
on food, however. We found no evidence that
the ﬂoods led to any widespread increase in
discrimination against females in food con-
sumption within households. This is not to
say that females are not discriminated
against, only that its degree did not change
signiﬁcantly as a result of the ﬂoods.
The ﬂoods led to a major deterioration in
the quality of households’ health environ-
ments. They damaged or destroyed people’s
homes, reduced their access to safe water,
and destroyed or damaged their toilet fa-
cilities. These factors, combined with the
reduction in food consumption, led to sub-
stantial increases in illness among all age
groups. Although adolescents had the great-
est increase in illness, the increase in illness
among children was an even more serious
health problem posed by the ﬂoods because
illness has more serious consequences for
children, even threatening their survival.
We also conﬁrmed that the ﬂoods caused
many preschool children to lose weight and/
or to fail to grow at a critical period in their
physical and mental development. This situ-
ation was brought about by a combination of
factors, including reduced food consump-
tion, increased difﬁculties of providing proper
care for children owing to disruptions in home
life, and increases in child illness. We found
no evidence that the ﬂoods were harmful to
women’s nutritional status, at least in their
immediate aftermath.
Our ﬁndings that caloric consumption
and other health outcomes were affected by
ﬂood exposure measures at village level are
an indication that interventions at the village
level could have been effective in reducing
the adverse impact of the ﬂoods. On the
other hand, the degree of individual house-
hold ﬂood exposure was a signiﬁcant deter-
minant of individual consumption of staple
foods and of wasting, suggesting a possible
positive impact of individual targeting in
these cases.
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Household Coping Strategies
W
hen households suffer a shock such as the ﬂoods, they do not remain passive but
employ several coping strategies. These coping strategies are fallback mechanisms
for when habitual means of meeting needs are disrupted (Frankenberger 1992).
The ﬁrst thing households do when they suffer a shock is to attempt to minimize risks and
manage losses to ensure some minimal level of sustenance. The second strategy employed
by households in distress is divestment, or the gradual disposal of assets. Frankenberger
(1992) classiﬁes asset disposal as a coping strategy into several phases, with liquid assets,
such as jewelry, being disposed of ﬁrst, and productive assets later. When productive assets
are disposed of, it becomes more difﬁcult for the person or household to return to a pre-crisis
state. Finally, the household or individual may embark upon distress migration, which is a
sign of failure to cope with the crisis.
This chapter looks at the kinds of coping strategies that were employed by people during
the ﬂoods of 1998 and in their immediate aftermath. We ﬁrst report the strategies mentioned
by ﬂood-exposed people both in the ﬁeld interviews of a rapid appraisal done by the Food
Management and Research Support Project of the International Food Policy Research Insti-
tute (IPFRI-FMRSP) during the ﬂoods (del Ninno and Roy 1999a) and in other similar studies.
Using the household survey, we then quantify some of the coping strategies employed by
rural households in Bangladesh to see how widespread they were and whether they were
directly associated with ﬂood exposure.
Self-Reported Coping Strategies
At the time of the ﬂoods and soon after, several rapid appraisal missions were conducted by
the FMRSP-IFPRI project and by several other organizations. The main goal was to under-
stand the extent of the damage caused by the ﬂooding, how well people were doing in the
circumstances, and the type of coping strategies that had been employed. The ultimate pur-
pose of those ﬁeld visits was to improve the immediate alleviation policies that were designed
at the time of the ﬂoods and in the immediate aftermath.
The results of the rapid appraisal show that the agricultural sector and the labor market
were hit particularly hard by the ﬂoods. In most cases farmers could not plant their usual
crops and did not have enough fodder to feed their livestock. In response to that situation
farmers cultivated alternative crops and found alternative means of feeding their livestock.Similarly, they found alternative forms of
employment within the water sector, such as
boating and ﬁshing.
One key coping strategy mentioned by
almost all studies is borrowing. According to
the results of the interviews (summarized
in Table 6.1), money was borrowed from all
sorts of sources, including moneylenders, rel-
atives, and neighbors. Purchasing of food on
credit was also mentioned. Although purchas-
ing food on credit is very common in several
developing countries, extensive borrowing
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Table 6.1 Coping strategies employed by Bangladeshi people in response to the 1998 ﬂoods, self-reported in ﬁeld surveys
Coping strategy employed Study
Change agriculture and livestock practices
Change cropping pattern HKI a, b (1998)
Cultivate land on lease Hossain and Shuaib (1998)
Use emergency fodder (e.g., jackfruit, tree leaves, sugarcane BHC (1998); Save the Children (1998)
tops, banana stems, water hyacinth)
Change employment or working pattern
Become engaged in ﬁshing (catch and sell) and boating or  WFP (1998); Save the Children (1998)
cutting long grass for cattle
Advance labor Khan and Haque (1998); HKI (1998)
Borrow moneya Democracy Watch (1998); HKI (1998)
From local money lenders Khan and Haque (1998); Hena and Kabir (1998); WFP (1998); 
Rahman and Choudhury (1998); Hossain and Shuaib (1998); del
Ninno and Roy (1999a)
From relatives or neighbors WFP (1998); Rahman and Choudhury (1998); HKI (1998); 
IFPRI-Sat (1999)
From a nongovernmental organization Rahman and Choudhury (1998); BHC (1998); del Ninno and Roy 
(1999)
Purchase rice on credit from a farmer Khan and Haque (1998)
From a bank BHC (1998); del Ninno and Roy (1999)
Change eating habitsb
Reduce food consumption, including size of meals Khan and Haque (1998); Save the Children (1998); del Ninno and 
Roy (1999)
Reduce frequency of meals WFP (1998); Save the Children (1998); del Ninno and Roy (1999)
Change types of food eaten, including eating jute leaves Save the Children (1998)
Starve Save the Children (1998)
Consume assets
Eat seed reserves BHC (1998)
Use fencing or rooﬁng materials for cooking fuel Khan and Haque (1998); WFP (1998)
Sell assets
Domestic assets (e.g., tin from roof of house, furniture, trees, del Ninno and Roy (1999); Banu and Hussain (1998); WFP (1998);
utensils, clothing) Khan and Haque (1998); Democracy Watch (1998); HKI (1998)
Sell rice stocks to buy other essential commodities IFPRI-Saturia (1998)
Sell means of transport IFPRI-Saturia (1999); Banu and Hussain (1998); HKI (1998)
Sell livestock (cattle, buffalo, chicken, ducks, hens) Khan and Haque (1998); Hena and Kabir (1998); Rahman and 
Choudhury (1998); HKI (1998); Save the Children (1998); del
Ninno and Roy (1999); Banu and Hussain (1998); WFP (1998)
Sell jewelry HKI (1998); Save the Children (1998); del Ninno and Roy (1999);
Banu and Hussain (1998)
Sell or mortgage land HKI (1998); Save the Children (1998); del Ninno and Roy (1999);
WFP (1998)
Other
Defer monthly installments on loans WFP (1998)
Deplete savings Democracy Watch (1998); HKI (1998); Save the Children (1998)
Have faith in God (Allah) Save the Children (1998)
Move valuables to higher ground, especially cows and buffalo Save the Children (1998); BHC (1998)
Float household items (for example, on banana leaves) Save the Children (1998)
Sources: Compiled from the sources cited. IFPRI-Saturia (1999) denotes individual interviews in Saturia, January 1999.
a Credit uses: repair damage, buy seeds and food (BHC 1998).
b Women ate after men and children; sometimes they ate nothing (del Ninno and Roy 1999a).is peculiar to Bangladesh and is explored
later in the chapter.
Another coping strategy was a modiﬁca-
tion of eating habits and a reduction in the
frequency of meals consumed when house-
holds suffered income loss and failed to get
enough credit to purchase the same amount
of food. The consumption and sale of do-
mestic liquid assets and livestock assets
were also reported as a way of meeting con-
sumption needs. Finally, other forms of
coping consisted of trying to protect assets
and thus minimize losses from the ﬂoods,
deferring loan payments, and using savings.
The Coping Strategies
Identiﬁed by the 
Quantitative Analysis
Borrowing
The analysis of the household data set con-
ﬁrmed that borrowing was one of the main
coping mechanisms used by households in
response to the ﬂoods. The demand for ﬁnan-
cial credit during the ﬂood period appears
to have been extensive. The percentage of
households that took a loan increased during
the ﬂood period for all uses taken together
(Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2), but especially for
food. The percentage of households who
took a loan for food was only 7.0 percent in
the month preceding the onset of ﬂooding.
By the last month of ﬂooding (October) this
had increased to 15.9 percent. By that time,
more than 60 percent of households exposed
to the ﬂoods had an outstanding loan of an
average value of almost Tk 6,000, on loans
contracted after July 1, 1998.72
The majority of the loans were contracted
for purchasing food. In fact more than half of
the poor households in the bottom two quin-
tiles had outstanding loans for food for a
value of almost Tk 3,000, which is close to
the average amount spent in a month by a
household to buy food. The percentage of
households that had outstanding loans for
other purposes was much lower, but the av-
erage size of the loans for farming and busi-
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72 There is usually an increase in borrowing in September and October, before the aman harvest, and in March and April,
before the boro harvest, but it is clear that in 1998 the extent of borrowing had increased. In fact, as of January 1998
very few households had extensive debts, compared with December 1998, when many households were in debt.
Figure 6.1 Percentage of households taking loans, by month and reason in 1998
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.ness was larger (between Tk 3,000 and Tk
13,000) and they were more often contracted
by households in the higher expenditure
quintiles. It is interesting to observe that 
the average size of total outstanding loans
was higher for people in the upper quintiles
(Table 6.2). This may be due to greater ac-
cess to credit by richer households, in part be-
cause they borrowed relatively large amounts
for farming and business reasons. The re-
verse is true for poor households, which
borrowed lower amounts and mostly for food
consumption.
Households that were not exposed to the
ﬂoods borrowed money as well, but not in
the same proportion. Only 28 percent of
households not directly exposed to the ﬂoods
had outstanding loans for food during and
following the ﬂoods. The average size of
loans for all uses was higher for households
not exposed to ﬂooding. This was because
the average size of loans for farming use was
consistently higher than loans for food con-
sumption use, regardless of the category of
ﬂood exposure.
Table 6.3 details the sources of loans and
their interest rates by severity of ﬂood expo-
sure. Most of the loans were received from
neighbors and relatives, with 23 percent of
the households receiving loans from rela-
tives and over 31 percent from neighbors.
Other loan sources were NGOs, commercial
banks and cooperatives, and local money-
lenders (called mahajans).
Across the sample, interest rates ranged
widely, from a low of zero to a high of 120
percent. Only 23 percent of loans were at zero
interest rate. Neighbors and relatives were
more likely not to charge any interest than
the other sources. NGOs charged the lowest
interest rates, while banks and cooperatives,
mahajans, and neighbors charged annual in-
terest rates of almost 50 percent on average.
It appears that people more exposed to
the ﬂoods (Table 6.3) borrowed more, but
they had more access to cheaper loans from
NGOs and in general received more free
loans and paid lower interest rates. These
results suggest that, even though people in
distress are usually willing to pay higher in-
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Table 6.2 Percentage of ﬂood-exposed households with outstanding loans taken after July 1, 1998, and average debt, by
total expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 All
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
of Average of Average of Average of Average of Average of Average
house- amount house- amount house- amount house- amount house- amount house- amount
Reason holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk)
Food 52.2 2,954 54.9 2,645 46.2 3,205 32.7 3,132 38.3 5,201 45.2 3,328
Education/
health 12.4 990 5.3 1,235 6.6 3,228 9.9 2,730 5.6 4,900 8.0 2,339
Farming 6.2 8,733 3.5 5,255 7.5 2,656 9.9 6,087 15.0 9,613 8.3 7,068
Business 4.4 3,080 12.4 3,999 10.4 9,023 8.9 6,261 8.4 13,386 8.9 7,239
Repay loan 2.7 3,258 2.7 5,017 2.8 6,020 4.0 2,513 5.6 8,615 3.5 5,507
Marriage 
and 
dowry 
expenses 0.0 . . . 3.5 7,375 0.9 4,375 1.0 6,000 1.9 4,090 1.5 6,007
Others 11.5 4,271 6.2 6,318 3.8 2,406 12.9 5,702 9.3 9,251 8.7 5,872
All 66.4 4,400 69.9 4,268 62.3 5,034 55.4 6,036 61.7 10,141 63.3 5,868
Number of
house-
holds 113 113 106 101 107 540
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.terest rates, not too many people took advan-
tage of the situation. It also appears that in-
formal sources of credit were more effective
than traditional microcredit programs (as
noted also in Zaman 1999) at providing
households with the cash necessary to smooth
consumption.
Purchasing Food on Credit
From the discussion above it is evident that
loans for food were an important coping
strategy for ﬂood-exposed households. In
addition to the loans for food, we also looked
at the value of food that was purchased on
credit in the month prior to the survey period.
This is a reﬂection of a common practice of
purchasing basic necessities on credit from
local shops, which was conﬁrmed in our
analysis. Table 6.4 shows that almost 50 per-
cent of all households purchased food on
credit in the month of the survey for an
average of Tk 998. Only 30 percent of the
households not exposed to the ﬂoods pur-
chased food on credit, compared with 57 per-
cent of the households very severely exposed
to the ﬂoods, which had to purchase rice,
pulses, oil, and other products on credit.
Table 6.5 shows the pattern of food pur-
chased on credit for ﬂood-exposed house-
holds by expenditure quintiles. Although
the percentage of people purchasing food on
credit was slightly lower in the upper quin-
tiles, they were able to obtain a larger amount
of credit (Tk 1,336 in the top quintile), which
could be used for more expensive foods
compared with poorer people (Tk 774 in the
bottom quintile).
Changing Eating Behavior
When a household has insufﬁcient access to
food, and faces other constraints, the primary
persons responsible for feeding household
members can do one or more of the follow-
ing (Maxwell et al. 1999): (a) reduce the
number of meals eaten in a day or go whole
days without eating; (b) rely on less preferred
and less expensive foods; and (c) limit por-
tions at meal times.
We have already seen that households
reduced their food consumption and limited
their purchases of relatively expensive foods
in response to the ﬂoods (Chapter 5). In order
to determine whether they had reduced the
number of meals eaten, households were
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Table 6.3 Loans taken, by source and severity of ﬂood exposure (percent)
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Loans An- Loans An- Loans An- Loans An- Loans An-
at nual at nual at nual at nual at nual
zero inter- zero inter- zero inter- zero inter- zero inter-
Loans inter- est Loans inter- est Loans inter- est Loans inter- est Loans inter- est
Source taken est rate taken est rate taken est rate taken est rate taken est rate
Big NGO 3.7 0.0 15.8 5.5 0.6 11.1 3.4 0.0 12.4 6.0 0.0 12.4 4.5 0.1 12.9
Commercial 
bank/ 
cooperative 6.9 0.0 41.2 5.5 0.0 48.6 11.6 0.5 33.5 10.1 1.8 35.0 8.6 0.5 37.8
Mahajan 4.1 1.8 64.0 17.6 9.1 29.1 14.0 6.8 30.9 7.7 2.4 54.4 10.6 4.9 37.8
Neighbors 29.5 15.2 43.9 30.3 15.8 41.1 34.8 20.8 32.3 29.8 12.5 59.7 31.2 16.2 43.1
Relatives/ 
friends 18.4 11.1 26.4 22.4 11.5 41.7 24.2 15.0 19.6 28.0 19.6 22.1 23.0 14.1 26.5
All 53.5 21.2 36.1 62.4 23.0 38.4 62.8 23.2 28.9 65.5 25.6 40.1 60.6 23.1 35.5
Number of 
households 217 165 207 168 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.asked to report the number of meals each
member had eaten in the three days prior to
the survey. If a member skipped a meal, the
respondent was asked why they had done
so. The results are not reported for children
under two years because most were breast-
feeding and breastfeeding behaviors were not
recorded in detail.
The incidence of meal skipping for the
sample as a whole was 20 percent, which is
quite high (Table 6.6). The incidence tended
to increase with increased ﬂood exposure
severity, being 17 percent for the not exposed
group and rising to 23 percent for the severely
exposed group. It fell slightly between the
severely and very severely exposed groups,
to 20 percent, which may be a reﬂection of
the latter group’s greater access to aid from
the government and NGOs. The most com-
mon reason by far given for skipping a meal
was “not enough food.” These ﬁgures verify
that meal skipping was indeed part of the
menu of coping strategies that some house-
holds employed in response to the scarcities
brought about by the ﬂoods.
Disposal of Assets
Disposal of assets is often mentioned as a
very important coping strategy for house-
holds exposed to shocks. In fact it is not
uncommon for rural households to meet con-
sumption requirements by consuming some
of their assets or selling them in order to ac-
quire the means to purchase other foods.
To isolate the impact of the ﬂoods, we
compared the trend in disposal of assets in
three periods: the period before the ﬂoods
(December 1997 to June 1998), the period
of the ﬂoods (July to October 1998), and 
the month after the ﬂoods (November 1998).
Table 6.7 shows that more households sold
assets during the ﬂoods (16.8 percent) than
in the period before or after the ﬂoods. In
particular, more households sold goats (1.9
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Table 6.4 Percentage of households purchasing food on credit and average amount purchased (in the month prior to
survey), by food group and severity of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
of Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean
house- value house- value house- value house- value house- value
Type of food holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk)
Rice 16.1 1,179 30.3 960 44 951 47.6 950 33.8 984
Wheat 2.3 203 13.3 200 16.4 270 13.7 221 11.1 234
Bread and other cereals 0.9 62 2.4 89 2.4 50 0.6 40 1.6 64
Pulses 4.1 38 12.1 136 27.1 122 20.2 124 15.7 119
Oil 7.4 79 16.4 98 28 78 25.6 102 19 89
Vegetables 10.1 86 12.1 133 16.9 134 16.7 176 13.9 135
Meat 0.5 160 0.6 53 4.3 106 5.4 165 2.6 132
Eggs 1.4 68 1.8 23 2.4 55 3 84 2.1 61
Milk 2.3 90 1.2 39 5.3 130 3.6 95 3.2 105
Fruits 0.5 12 1.2 40 4.8 62 4.8 53 2.8 54
Fish 1.4 47 1.8 147 6.3 160 6.5 288 4 194
Spices 4.6 49 9.1 226 16.4 168 14.9 153 11.1 160
Sugar and snacks 8.8 68 6.1 85 13.5 87 15.5 138 11 98
Drinks and other 0.9 136 1.8 163 9.2 222 11.3 106 5.7 163
Prepared foods 0.5 255 0.0 . . . 2.9 181 2.4 264 1.5 218
Total 29.5 768 44.8 895 59.9 1,055 57.1 1,158 47.3 998
Number of households 217 168 207 165 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.percent), chickens (6.2 percent), and trees
(2.3 percent) than in the period before the
ﬂoods.
The patterns of disposal across cate-
gories of severity of ﬂood exposure were
quite different (Table 6.8). Households not
exposed to ﬂooding tended to consume a
larger share of their assets, mostly cereals and
chickens. Households exposed to ﬂooding
tended to sell a larger proportion of their as-
sets. For example, 7.3 percent of the house-
holds exposed moderately to the ﬂoods sold
cattle, compared with 3.2 percent of the
households not exposed to the ﬂoods. It is
also the case that households exposed mod-
erately and severely to the ﬂoods were more
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Table 6.5 Percentage of ﬂood-exposed households purchasing food on credit and average amount purchased (in the month
prior to survey), by food group and expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 All
Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per-
cent cent cent cent cent cent
of Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean
house- value house- value house- value house- value house- value house- value
Type of food holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk)
Rice 44.3 687 45.1 1,028 40.6 992 41.6 1,017 32.7 1,097 40.9 953
Wheat 24.8 251 12.4 209 16.0 329 11.9 185 7.5 112 14.6 236
Bread and other 
cereals 1.8 34 0.9 51 0.0 . . . 1.0 40 5.6 81 1.9 64
Pulses 20.4 91 17.7 125 19.8 105 19.8 128 24.3 170 20.4 125
Oil 19.5 46 20.4 84 23.6 87 28.7 79 27.1 143 23.7 90
Vegetables 10.6 83 15.9 121 17.0 127 16.8 116 16.8 270 15.4 148
Meat 2.7 75 1.8 52 5.7 103 3.0 228 4.7 172 3.5 131
Eggs 1.8 31 2.7 54 0.9 6 4.0 45 2.8 118 2.4 59
Milk 2.7 26 0.0 . . . 7.6 103 2.0 355 5.6 77 3.5 109
Fruits 1.8 79 2.7 55 2.8 56 5.9 48 5.6 57 3.7 56
Fish 2.7 83 2.7 48 5.7 177 5.0 115 9.4 366 5.0 211
Spices 10.6 103 15.0 111 14.2 145 11.9 231 16.8 271 13.7 175
Sugar and snacks 6.2 82 12.4 84 9.4 46 12.9 77 18.7 183 11.9 107
Drinks and other 6.2 86 7.1 123 9.4 162 4.0 168 11.2 238 7.6 164
Prepared foods 0.0 . . . 2.7 91 0.9 17 0.0 . . . 5.6 309 1.9 214
Total 55.8 774 57.5 1,029 56.6 1,031 51.5 1,128 50.5 1,336 54.4 1,048
Number of 
households 113 113 106 101 107 540
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
Table 6.6 Meal eating and skipping, by severity of ﬂood exposure (for the three days preceding
the survey)
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Average number of meals eaten 8.7 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.6
Average number of meals skipped 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Incidence of meal skipping (%) 17.3 19.4 23.0 19.8 20.0
Number of people 970 755 1,073 798 3,596
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
Note: This table excludes children under 2 years old, a large number of whom were breastfeeding, and people who were ab-
sent from the household in any of the previous three days.likely to sell assets than were those exposed
very severely to the ﬂoods (see the sales of
chickens and large trees for example). These
results are probably determined by the fact
that households exposed more severely to
the ﬂoods lost more assets, and they there-
fore had fewer assets to consume (especially
chickens) and maybe to sell. In fact, whereas
3.0 percent of households exposed moder-
ately to ﬂooding sold trees, only 0.6 percent
of those severely exposed did so.
Looking at the distribution of ﬂood-
exposed households consuming and selling
assets by expenditure quintile (Table 6.9),
it emerges that, whereas more of the richer
households sold cattle (7.9 percent and 5.6
percent in the fourth and the ﬁfth quintiles,
respectively, compared with 3.5 percent in the
bottom quintile), more of the poorer house-
holds sold large trees and chickens. This
means not only that poorer households had
fewer assets to sell, but also that they had to
sell what they had to raise some cash to main-
tain their level of current expenditure. In con-
clusion, however, it does not appear that a
very large number of people sold many of
their productive assets and valuable assets.
Determinants of Households’
Coping Strategy
Table 6.10 summarizes some of the coping
strategies employed by the households. It
shows that the percentage of households in
debt was very large. A total of 60.6 percent
were in debt for a value equal to 143.6 per-
cent of monthly expenditure. This percent-
age increases even more for the households
in the bottom quintile, which have, on aver-
age, a debt of 222.3 percent. Purchases of
food on credit were linked to borrowing. Only
29.5 percent of non-ﬂood-exposed house-
holds purchased food on credit, whereas some
56.6 percent of ﬂood-exposed households
in the bottom three quintiles resorted to pur-
chasing food on credit in the month preced-
ing the survey (October 1998). The value of
those expenses on credit were also sizable,
especially for poor households (purchases
of food on credit accounted for 39.1 percent
of total monthly household expenditure for
households in the bottom quintile).
Government transfers were also impor-
tant in terms of the number of people receiv-
ing them but not in terms of the average
amount received, which was equivalent to
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Table 6.7 Households disposing of assets before the ﬂoods, during the ﬂoods, and after the
ﬂoods, by asset type (percent)
December 1997– July 1998–
June 1998 October 1998 November 1998
Type of asset Consumed Sold Consumed Sold Consumed Sold
House 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00
Large trees 0.00 0.40 0.00 2.25 0.13 0.40
Cereals 25.63 3.04 24.17 0.26 22.19 0.66
Cattle 0.13 2.64 0.00 2.51 0.40 1.85
Goats/sheep 0.00 0.66 0.26 1.85 0.00 1.32
Chickens 9.11 3.96 7.27 6.21 7.40 7.00
Ducks 0.40 0.92 0.79 1.85 1.06 1.59
Fishing equipment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.13
Motorcycle 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.19 0.00 0.26
Transport vehicle 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cheap household items 0.53 0.13 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.26
Radio/watch 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jewelry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00
Total 21.66 10.57 31.57 16.78 30.52 13.34
Number of households 757 757 757 757 757 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.only 2.0 percent of total household monthly
expenditures, especially if compared with the
size of their debts. From a ﬁrst observation it
appears that government transfers were tar-
geted more towards the poor than towards
ﬂood-exposed households. In fact, 66.4 per-
cent of the households in the bottom quintile
received transfers, compared with 32.7 per-
cent in the top quintile; and 52.6 percent of
the ﬂood-exposed households received trans-
fers, compared with 33.6 percent of non-
ﬂood-exposed households (Table 6.10). A
more detailed analysis of the distribution 
of government transfers will follow in Chap-
ter 7.
The last of the coping strategies reported
here is the selling of assets. Exposed house-
holds and non-exposed households sold as-
sets in the same proportion (between 20 and
22 percent). As we saw before, it was not
the selling of the assets that characterized
the households exposed to the ﬂoods, but the
types of assets sold. In general, the value of
the assets sold was around 50 percent of the
88 CHAPTER 6
Table 6.8 Percentage of households disposing of assets after July 1998, and average value, by type of assets and severity
of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
of of of of of
house- Value house- Value house- Value house- Value house- Value
Type of asset holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk)
Consumed
Productive assets
Cattle 0.5 1,600 0.0 . . . 0.5 1,600 0.6 6,250 0.4 3,150
Chickens 21.7 251 10.9 169 6.8 188 0.6 65 10.6 219
Ducks 1.8 84 1.8 96 1.5 95 0.6 48 1.5 87
Domestic assets
Cereals 41.0 4,024 30.3 3,817 15.9 4,294 16.1 3,352 26.3 3,925
Liquid assets
Large trees 0.0 . . . 0.6 3,267 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 0.1 3,267
Total consumed 45.2 3,794 32.7 3,656 18.8 3,941 17.3 3,340 29.1 3,727
Sold
Productive assets
Cattle 3.2 2,100 7.3 3,213 3.9 3,550 3.6 6,217 4.4 3,605
Goats/sheep 3.2 1,171 4.9 401 2.9 967 1.8 367 3.2 763
Chickens 9.2 187 13.3 192 17.4 291 11.3 272 12.8 244
Ducks 1.4 90 3.6 116 5.8 340 3.0 591 3.4 308
Fishing equipment 0.0 . . . 0.6 600 0.5 500 0.0 . . . 0.3 550
Domestic assets
Cereals 1.8 1,463 1.2 1,750 0.5 3,500 0.0 . . . 0.9 1,836
Cheap household items 0.0 . . . 0.6 1,300 0.0 . . . 1.8 290 0.5 543
Housing
House 0.0 . . . 0.6 5,000 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 0.1 5,000
Liquid assets
Large trees 2.3 260 3.0 636 4.4 4,759 0.6 1,500 2.6 2,441
Jewelry 0.0 . . . 0.6 700 0.5 1,000 0.0 . . . 0.3 850
Consumer durables
Motorcycle 2.3 6,875 1.8 13,000 1.0 14,125 0.0 . . . 1.3 10,163
Total sold 18.9 932 31.5 1,282 26.1 1,859 17.3 1,878 23.3 1,476
Number of households 217 165 207 168 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES 89
Table 6.9 Percentage of ﬂood-exposed households disposing of assets after July 1998 and average value, by total
expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 All
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
of of of of of of
Type of house- Value house- Value house- Value house- Value house- Value house- Value
asset holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk) holds (Tk)
Consumed
Productive assets
Cattle 0.0 . . . 1.8 3,925 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 0.4 3,925
Goats/
sheep 0.9 500 0.9 7,000 0.0 . . . 0.0 0.0 0.4 3,750
Chickens 2.7 56 5.3 151 7.5 194 5.9 183 9.3 201 6.1 174
Ducks 1.8 48 0.9 96 0.9 48 3.0 127 0.0 . . . 1.3 89
Liquid assets
Large 
trees 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 1.0 3,267 0.0 . . . 0.2 3,267
Domestic assets
Cereals 18.6 3,315 15.9 4,026 20.8 4,049 21.8 3,653 25.2 4,130 20.4 3,846
Total 
con-
sumed 20.4 3,060 21.0 4,206 23.0 3,942 25.7 3,273 27.1 3,914 22.6 3,672
Sold
Housing assets
House 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 1.0 5,000 0.0 . . . 0.2 5,000
Productive assets
Cattle 3.5 3,550 4.4 5,600 2.8 2,500 7.9 4,013 5.6 3,743 4.8 4,010
Goats/
sheep 5.3 715 3.5 550 5.7 520 0.0 . . . 0.9 500 3.1 595
Chickens 16.8 200 21.2 209 13.2 214 13.9 341 5.6 551 14.3 258
Ducks 6.2 723 7.1 175 1.9 250 4.0 69 1.9 248 4.3 336
Fishing 
equip-
ment 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 1.0 600 0.9 500 0.4 550
Liquid assets
Large 
trees 4.4 810 1.8 1,125 1.9 2,050 2.0 1,790 3.7 8,383 2.8 3,168
Jewelry 0.9 700 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 1.0 1,000 0.0 . . . 0.4 850
Domestic assets
Cereals 0.9 200 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 1.0 3,500 0.9 3,300 0.6 2,333
Cheap
house-
hold
items 0.0 . . . 0.9 290 0.9 1,300 0.0 . . . 1.9 290 0.7 543
Consumer durables
Motor-
cycle 0.0 . . . 0.9 10,000 1.9 14,125 0.0 . . . 1.9 5,525 0.9 9,840
Total sold 30.1 950 29.2 1,305 18.9 1,074 26.7 1,716 19.6 3,733 25.0 1,641
Number of 
house-
holds 113 113 106 101 107 540
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.value of monthly expenditure, which is not
negligible but is much smaller than the value
of debt.
Though there are multiple coping strate-
gies, which are simultaneously determined,
here we present the results of reduced-form
logit models for one coping strategy at a time,
with only exogenous variables on the right-
hand side. This model is similar to those
used in the other sections of the report. The
models look at the probability of borrowing,
purchasing food on credit, skipping meals,
and disposing of assets.
The results of the models (Table 6.11)
conﬁrm that borrowing, and especially bor-
rowing for food, was one of the coping
strategies most employed by the households
exposed to ﬂooding. There is a positive and
signiﬁcant correlation between borrowing
and ﬂood exposure in the model with village
flood exposure variables and also in the
household ﬂood exposure random effects
model, but not in the ﬁxed effects model.
This means that the common situation with
respect to the ﬂoods was more important
than the differences among the people in
determining the probability of borrowing.
On the other hand, the probability of pur-
chasing food on credit is strongly related to
the level of ﬂood exposure in all the models
(Table 6.11). In the village ﬂood exposure
model, households severely and very se-
verely exposed to the ﬂoods are more than
four times as likely to purchase food on credit
than non-ﬂood-exposed households. This re-
lationship, even if not so strong, remains in
the ﬁxed effects model, which means that, at
the level of the same village, the difference in
ﬂood exposure makes a difference in the de-
cision to purchase food on credit.
The results on the determination of skip-
ping meals do not show any correlation with
ﬂood exposure. As we saw in the descriptive
section, the data on eating behavior were
collected only after the ﬂoods. Moreover, the
difference between ﬂood-exposed and non-
ﬂood-exposed households was relative only
to the distribution of the incidence of meal
skipping among household members of dif-
ferent gender.
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Table 6.10 Coping strategies, ﬂood exposure, and poverty
Flood exposed
Not All
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 All exposed households
Monthly household 
expenditure (Tk) 1,979.6 2,848.9 3,725.4 4,234.6 7,720.6 4,063.6 3,843.5 4,000.5
Share of food 
expenditures (%) 72.8 72.0 70.8 68.2 62.2 67.4 68.4 67.7
Households in debt (%) 66.4 69.9 62.3 55.4 62.62 63.5 53.5 60.6
Share of monthly 
expenditure (%) 222.3 149.8 135.1 142.5 131.3 144.4 140.2 143.6
Households purchasing food 
on credit (%) 55.8 57.5 56.6 51.5 50.5 54.4 29.5 47.3
Share of monthly 
expenditure (%) 39.1 36.1 27.7 26.6 17.3 25.8 20.0 25.0
Households receiving 
government transfers (%) 66.4 54.9 60.4 47.5 32.7 52.6 33.6 47.2
Share of monthly transfer on 
expenditure (%) 4.3 2.4 2.8 1.9 0.8 2.0 2.1 2.0
Households selling assets (%) 26.5 23.9 17.9 24.8 15.9 21.9 20.3 21.4
Share of monthly 
expenditure (%) 51.9 39.0 54.4 48.0 75.3 51.9 44.2 49.9
Number of households 113 113 106 101 107 540 217 757
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.Finally, the regression results provide
further evidence that ﬂood-exposed house-
holds did not consume and sell assets to a
greater extent than did non-ﬂood-exposed
households. Consumption of assets is in fact
negatively correlated with severity of ﬂood
exposure in the village ﬂood exposure model,
perhaps in part because only households that
did not lose or sell their assets had the option
to consume them.
Rather than selling assets, ﬂood-exposed
households adopted borrowing or credit pur-
chases of food as their predominant coping
strategy—a strategy that, however, left most
of them in debt for an amount equal on av-
erage to almost 150 percent of their current
monthly expenditures. The choice of bor-
rowing rather than sales of assets by ﬂood-
exposed households suggests that households
that had not lost their assets in the ﬂood had
adequate access to credit. This enabled them
to cope with the ﬂoods with only limited
sales of liquid assets and to avoid selling
more valuable assets.
In some ways, these results are a little
different from the hypothesis at the begin-
ning of the chapter in which we did not ex-
pect that borrowing would play such a big
and determinant role. We also found that,
although all the coping strategies mentioned
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Table 6.11 Determinants of individual household coping strategies: Summary of regression results
Household ﬂood exposure Household ﬂood exposure
Village ﬂood exposure Random effects Fixed effects
Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z-statistic Odds ratio z-statistic
Borrowing
Moderate 1.52 1.89* 1.69 1.95* 1.23 0.61
Severe 1.75 2.63* 1.15 0.53 0.66 −1.13
Very severe 1.28 0.95 1.64 1.78* 1.15 0.35
Prob >χ 2 0.00 0.05 0.07
Number of observations 753 753 645
Purchase of food on credit
Moderate 1.67 2.24* 2.21 2.84* 1.80 1.64
Severe 2.92 4.93* 3.53 4.60* 2.23 2.07*
Very severe 4.58 5.60* 2.70 3.43* 1.41 0.84
Prob >χ 2 0.00 0.00 0.10
Number of observations 753 753 645
Skipping meals
Moderate 0.47 −1.12 0.87 −0.24 0.70 −0.29
Severe 1.22 0.38 0.98 −0.03 0.38 −0.89
Very severe 1.17 0.27 0.86 −0.27 0.46 −0.68
Prob >χ 2 0.00 0.08 0.01
Number of observations 720 753 211
Selling assets
Moderate 0.94 −0.25 2.29 2.71* 1.79 1.54
Severe 0.99 −0.04 1.40 1.09 1.25 0.55
Very severe 0.48 −2.25* 0.96 −0.12 1.10 0.21
Prob >χ 2 0.09 0.21 0.14
Number of observations 753 753 531
Consuming assets
Moderate 0.69 −1.36 0.85 −0.36 1.07 0.12
Severe 0.24 −5.00* 0.48 −1.49 1.02 0.02
Very severe 0.21 −4.05* 0.59 −1.00 1.36 0.42
Prob >χ 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of observations 753 753 384
Sources: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998 and authors’calculations.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level or less.in the rapid appraisals done in the ﬁeld dur-
ing and after the ﬂoods were used by some
of the households, some were employed more
often (borrowing) than others (selling assets)
and more by poor ﬂood-exposed households
than by others.
Summary
In this chapter we have carried out an analy-
sis of the coping strategies used by rural
people in Bangladesh to deal with the losses
sustained in the aftermath of the ﬂoods. We
found that the coping strategies listed in the
rapid appraisal reﬂected the pattern expected
of households affected by a large covariate
shock such as the ﬂoods. These strategies in-
cluded selling assets, borrowing, and reduc-
ing food consumption.
The analysis of the household survey
showed that the predominant form of cop-
ing strategy used by ﬂood-exposed house-
holds was to borrow money or to purchase
food on credit. Loans were mostly con-
tracted from informal sources to cover
consumption shortfalls and also to get re-
sources for productive reasons. This of
course had become more necessary, since
the farming and producing households had
to use their savings and assets to cope with
the hardships of the ﬂoods. This means that,
even though households were able to use
borrowing as a way to smooth their con-
sumption, they were left in debt and at fur-
ther risk of not recovering from another
individual or aggregate shock.
Selling assets, in contrast, was not found
to be a major form of coping strategy. Some
people did sell some livestock to raise some
cash, but this was probably also a way to
reduce the expense of caring for them.
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Impacts of Government 
Food Relief Operations
T
he government of Bangladesh, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private
individuals implemented numerous programs in order to meet the immediate needs of
ﬂood-affected households. These efforts varied over time. They began with immedi-
ate relief efforts involving the provision of shelter, clothing, food, and clean water while the
ﬂoodwaters still covered much of the country in August and September 1998. Subsequently,
relief efforts gradually gave way to ﬂood rehabilitation programs, involving not only food
transfers and income support, but rehabilitation of infrastructure, credit for future agricul-
tural production, and other development efforts. This chapter focuses mainly on food relief
efforts during the ﬁrst ﬁve months of the ﬂood and post-ﬂood periods (August through De-
cember 1998). We explore the effectiveness of the targeting of government programs and al-
ternatives to direct food transfers.
Targeting of Government Food Relief and Other Transfers
Two major channels dominated government food relief efforts following the ﬂoods: Gratu-
itous Relief (GR), designed to provide emergency relief to disaster victims, and Vulnerable
Group Feeding (VGF), aimed at assisting households over a longer period (ultimately, from
September 1998 through April 1999).73Immediate short-term relief through GR was targeted
by location. In contrast, the VGF program covered all areas of the country (both ﬂooded and
non-ﬂood-affected areas), and was administratively targeted to poor households through se-
lection by local committees (del Ninno and Roy 1999a). The size of these programs was lim-
ited, however, both by available wheat stocks (up to early November when government
commercial imports and food aid arrivals added to government stocks) and by the ﬁnancial
cost of the programs (covered to a large extent by food aid).
Major ﬂood relief efforts began in August 1998 through the provision of 20,400 metric
tons of rice through Gratuitous Relief (GR) in ﬂood-affected thanasand an additional 30,800
metric tons of rice in September. In addition, the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) program
began on a large scale in August with an initial distribution of 1.3 million cards entitling the
73 Food for Work (FFW) programs began on a large scale only in December 1998, following the aman rice harvest when
soils were dry enough to permit manual earthworks to build roads and culverts.holder to 8 kilograms of rice per month. Dur-
ing August and September, a total of 27,500
metric tons of rice were distributed through
this program. At 8 kilograms/card, an esti-
mated 1.35 and 2.13 million households
received VGF rations in August and Sep-
tember, respectively. Almost no wheat was
distributed through relief channels in the
early months of the ﬂoods. At the urging of
the World Food Programme (WFP), the gov-
ernment of Bangladesh expanded the VGF
program to 4 million cards with an allotment
of 16 kilograms of grain per card—half rice
and half wheat in October, and all wheat
thereafter (del Ninno and Dorosh 2001).
Table 7.1 provides evidence of the extent
to which these programs were well targeted
with respect to ﬂood exposure. In the seven
thanasof the household survey sample of the
International Food Policy Research Institute
Food Management and Research Support
Project, 47.2 percent of all households re-
ceived some form of government transfers.
The GR program was better targeted to-
wards ﬂood-exposed households than was
the VGF program. Only 9.7 percent of GR
recipients, compared with 19.4 percent of
VGF recipients, were not directly exposed to
the ﬂoods. On the other hand, among the
very severely exposed households, 35.7 per-
cent received GR transfers and 21.4 pecent
received VGF transfers. Neither program
achieved large coverage though: 69.6 per-
cent of ﬂood-affected households did not re-
ceive GR and 77.2 percent did not receive
VGF. In contrast to the VGF program, trans-
fers from NGOs were particularly well tar-
geted to households exposed to the ﬂoods:
22.6 percent  of very severely ﬂood-exposed
households received transfers from NGOs,
compared with only 3.2 percent of non-
ﬂood-exposed households.
Even though the VGF program was not
very well targeted toward ﬂood-exposed
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Table 7.1 Percentage of households receiving transfers and average value of transfers, by
severity of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Total government transfers
Percent 33.6 44.2 53.1 60.1 47.2
Value (Tk) 317.7 322.4 318.0 350.2 327.9
Gratuitous Relief (GR)
Percent 9.7 23.6 31.4 35.7 24.4
Value (Tk) 125.4 125.6 164.2 198.3 162.7
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)
Percent 19.4 22.4 24.2 21.4 21.8
Value (Tk) 295.4 332.7 290.7 332.0 310.3
Other government transfers
Percent 7.4 9.1 12.6 17.3 11.4
Value (Tk) 509.3 344.9 327.1 354.3 373.3
NGO transfers
Percent 3.2 7.3 12.1 22.6 10.8
Value (Tk) 273.1 468.6 315.0 328.0 339.9
Private transfers
Percent 8.8 10.9 9.7 7.1 9.1
Value (Tk) 5,122.2 5,937.8 6,083.2 3,495.8 5,330.7
Total transfers
Percent 41.5 49.1 62.8 70.2 55.4
Value (Tk) 1,362.0 1,683.5 1,269.5 771.5 1,229.2
Number of households 217 165 207 168 757
Note: The value of transfers is over the four months from July 15 to November 15, 1998, for receiving households.households, it was better targeted to the poor
than was GR (Table 7.2). In total, 66.4 per-
cent of ﬂood-exposed households in the ﬁrst
quintile received some type of government
transfer; 35.4 percent of these households re-
ceived VGF grain (mainly wheat) and 38.1
percent received GR grain (mainly rice). VGF
was fairly well targeted by expenditure; none-
theless, 17.8 percent and 7.5 percent of ﬂood-
exposed households in quintiles 4 and 5,
respectively, were participants. In compari-
son, 19.6 percent of ﬂood-exposed house-
holds in the top expenditure quintile received
GR transfers. The size of these transfers was
relatively small, though. The average value
of grain received by participating house-
holds between July and November 1998 was
only Tk 310 for VGF and Tk 163 for GR.
Private transfers were not highly corre-
lated with ﬂood exposure, but it is notable
that the poorest 20 percent of households
received only about one-ﬁfth as much in
transfers as the average household in the
sample. Therefore it does not appear that
government transfers crowded out private
transfers, as they appear to have done in
other countries.74
Logit models of the determinants of par-
ticipation in GR and VGF programs provide
further evidence of the degree to which these
programs were targeted towards the poor
and ﬂood-affected households (Table 7.3).
The dummy variables for village-level ﬂood
exposure, and particularly the dummy vari-
ables for severe and very severe ﬂood expo-
sure, are highly signiﬁcant in explaining
receipt of GR transfers. Households in ﬂood-
exposed villages were four to six times more
likely to receive GR transfers than households
in non-ﬂood-exposed villages. In the ﬁxed
effects model, the odds ratios relative to 
the variable for households with very severe
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Table 7.2 Percentage of ﬂood-exposed households receiving transfers and average value of transfers, by 
expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 All
Total government transfers
Percent 66.4 54.9 60.4 47.5 32.7 52.6
Value (Tk) 343.0 273.9 412.5 328.9 256.9 330.6
Gratuitous Relief (GR)
Percent 38.1 35.4 34.0 23.8 19.6 30.4
Value (Tk) 174.1 148.6 165.8 184.5 173.7 167.5
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)
Percent 35.4 24.8 27.4 17.8 7.5 22.8
Value (Tk) 338.4 255.6 357.8 331.0 221.0 315.4
Other government transfers
Percent 10.6 12.4 17.0 13.9 11.2 13.0
Value (Tk) 391.9 277.4 419.1 303.4 297.9 342.2
NGO transfers
Percent 10.6 17.7 13.2 11.9 15.9 13.9
Value (Tk) 297.7 327.8 300.1 297.7 474.2 346.2
Private transfers
Percent 4.4 7.1 11.3 9.9 14.0 9.3
Value (Tk) 940.0 4277.6 3016.3 4701.2 9891.0 5409.9
Total transfers
Percent 68.1 63.7 67.0 56.4 48.6 60.9
Value (Tk) 441.5 826.8 940.8 1170.1 3181.1 1192.8
Number of households 113 113 106 101 107 540
Note: The value of transfers is over the four months from July 15 to November 15, 1998, for receiving households.
74 See World Bank (2000) and Cox and Jimenez (1998).ﬂood exposure is 3.09. This means that, in
flood-exposed villages, very severely ex-
posed households were three times more
likely to receive GR transfers than other
households in the same village.
For VGF targeting, ﬂood exposure does
not appear to have been a criterion for tar-
geting households. In fact, the coefﬁcients
for the village-level ﬂood exposure variables
and the household ﬂood exposure variables
in the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Instead, the odds ratio
relative to household size is larger than 1 and
signiﬁcant and all the coefﬁcients relative
to asset ownership are less than 1. The coef-
ﬁcient on the dummy variable for female
household head is also larger than 1, though
not statistically very signiﬁcant.
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Table 7.3 Determinants of participation in Gratuitous Relief and Vulnerable Group Feeding programs: Regression results
Household ﬂood exposure
Village ﬂood exposure logit ﬁxed effects logit
Gratuitous Vulnerable Gratuitous Vulnerable
Relief group feeding relief group feeding
Odds z- Odds z- Odds z- Odds z-
Independent variables ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic ratio statistic
Female-headed household 0.92 −0.15 2.25 1.57 0.44 −1.19 2.32 1.45
Age of household head 1.03 2.11* 0.99 −0.90 1.02 1.21 0.99 −0.85
Percent males 0–4 years 1.02 1.52 0.97 −1.55 1.00 0.26 0.97 −1.39
Percent males 5–14 years 1.03 2.25* 0.95 −3.16* 1.02 1.43 0.95 −3.13*
Percent males 15–19 years 0.99 −0.35 0.98 −0.99 0.99 −0.56 0.98 −1.17
Percent males 20–34 years 1.01 0.73 0.95 −2.93* 1.00 0.12 0.95 −2.71*
Percent males 35–54 years 1.05 3.30* 0.98 −1.60 1.03 2.00* 0.98 −1.24
Percent females 0–4 years 0.98 −1.15 1.01 0.50 0.99 −0.64 1.01 0.76
Percent females 5–14years 0.98 −1.30 1.02 1.77* 0.98 −1.22 1.03 1.85*
Percent females 15–19 years 0.99 −0.51 1.04 2.12* 1.00 0.17 1.04 1.83*
Percent females 20–34 years 0.99 −0.69 1.02 1.25 0.99 −0.60 1.01 0.84
Percent females 35–54 years 0.99 −0.72 1.01 0.57 1.00 −0.34 1.01 0.55
Household size 0.69 −2.12* 1.53 2.16* 0.78 −1.22 1.67 2.32*
Number of males: Any primary education 1.15 1.13 1.35 2.02* 1.13 0.82 1.37 1.90*
Number of males: Any secondary education 0.69 −1.57 1.24 0.90 0.61 −1.73* 1.20 0.68
Number of females: No education 1.83 2.00* 0.45 −2.40* 1.66 1.42 0.39 −2.51*
Number of females: Any primary education 1.40 1.08 0.42 −2.53* 1.08 0.23 0.34 −2.77*
Number of females: Any secondary education 1.13 0.28 0.25 −2.64* 0.78 −0.51 0.24 −2.51*
Pre-ﬂood value of land (Tk thousand) 1.01 1.33 1.00 −0.43 1.01 1.46 0.99 −0.92
Productive asset value (Tk thousand) 0.82 −1.53 0.76 −1.26 0.73 −1.84* 0.73 −1.31
Liquid asset value (Tk thousand) 0.99 −0.25 0.86 −1.05 1.03 0.26 0.87 −0.95
Housing asset value (Tk thousand) 0.88 −2.83* 0.89 −1.75* 0.85 −2.74* 0.86 −2.10*
Domestic asset value (Tk thousand) 2.14 2.01* 0.37 −1.79* 1.41 0.57 0.53 −1.05
Other assets value (Tk thousand) 3.42 1.28 0.02 −1.03 4.15 0.99 0.01 −1.14
Number of dependent workers 0.81 −0.95 0.95 −0.20 0.76 −1.02 0.93 −0.27
Number of day laborers 1.01 0.05 1.19 0.83 1.21 0.87 1.15 0.59
Persons engaged in business and cottage industry 0.84 −0.74 0.89 −0.41 0.74 −1.03 0.83 −0.59
Persons in own farm 1.11 0.59 1.14 0.61 1.07 0.31 1.11 0.43
Moderately ﬂood exposed 4.61 4.85* 0.38 −2.93* 1.48 0.88 0.67 −1.04
Severely ﬂood exposed 6.64 6.16* 0.61 −1.73* 2.16 1.62 0.76 −0.75
Very severely ﬂood exposed 5.48 4.90* 0.64 −1.26 3.09 2.18* 0.71 −0.88
Number of observations 753 753 544 442
Number of villages 83 66
Wald χ2 103.83 57.21
Prob χ2 > 0 0.00 0.00
Lr χ2 129.54 73.73
Prob χ2 > 0 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 .15 .11
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.Impact of Government 
Food Relief
We have established that government trans-
fers were small but that they played a very
important role in helping households, espe-
cially in the period of the ﬂoods. Did they
have any impact on other measures of out-
come? To answer this question we looked 
at the impact of GR transfers on per capita
calorie consumption. The results of the model
are reported in Table 7.4.
In the ﬁrst regression, we run a modi-
ﬁed model of the determinants of per capita
calorie consumption as a function of house-
hold characteristics, pre-ﬂood assets, and
village ﬂood exposure. In the second model
we added to these explanatory variables the
value of GR transfers received. As expected,
the value of the coefﬁcient was negatively
correlated with the amount of calorie con-
sumption. This means that, as we have no-
ticed in the previous analysis, households that
were poorer and consumed fewer calories
were more likely to receive GR transfers.
In order to account for this apparent prob-
lem, we use an instrumental variable model
(for example, Ravallion and Wodon 2000;
Rivers and Vuong 1988). The results of this
model (Table 7.4) show that the GR transfers
did indeed have a small, but positive, impact
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Table 7.4 Determinants of per capita calorie consumption due to village ﬂood exposure and
amount received in GR transfers: Regression results
Ordinary least  2-stage least
squares model squares model
Independent variables Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Female-headed household −614.82 −3.55* −576.58 −2.82*
Age of household head −3.47 −0.68 −5.77 −0.96
Percent males 0–4 years −7.31 −0.54 −7.49 −0.53
Percent males 5–14 years  −3.85 −0.59 −7.40 −0.99
Percent males 15–19 years  −4.59 −0.72 −6.01 −0.82
Percent males 20–34 years 0.44 0.07 −0.53 −0.08
Percent males 35–54 years −0.79 −0.16 −11.64 −1.49
Percent females 0–4 years −13.47 −3.06* −9.04 −1.72*
Percent females 5–14years −10.80 −2.65* −6.96 −1.47
Percent females15–19 years −3.35 −0.69 −2.37 −0.40
Percent females 20–34 years  −4.25 −0.78 −4.63 −0.71
Percent females 35–54 years 5.21 1.40 12.9 12.54*
Household size −100.64 −0.93 −56.16 −0.48
Number of males: Any primary education 36.40 0.82 63.17 1.23
Number of males: Any secondary education 41.66 0.79 77.97 1.14
Number of females: No education 22.47 0.14 −39.46 −0.22
Number of females: Any primary education 40.55 0.25 16.55 0.09
Number of females: Any secondary education 68.62 0.41 51.03 0.28
Pre-ﬂood value of assets (Tk thousand) 30.39 4.61* 33.55 4.37*
Moderately ﬂood-exposed −18.13 −0.16 −175.41 −1.26
Severely ﬂood-exposed −198.83 −2.07* −516.20 −2.92*
Very severely ﬂood-exposed −130.62 −1.03 −405.20 −1.83*
Value of GR transfer receiveda −0.74 −2.49* 4.80 1.88*
Constant 3,209.07 8.02* 3,138.80 6.73*
Number of observations 753 734
R2 .18
a Value of GR transfer received has been instrumented using: Female-headed household; age of household head; proportion
males: 0–4 years, 5–14 years, 15–19 years, 20–34 years, 35–54 years; proportion females: 0–4 years, 5–14years, 15–19 years,
20–34 years, 35–54 years; household size; number of males: any primary education, any secondary education; number of fe-
males: no education, any primary education, any secondary education; pre-ﬂood value of assets (Tk thousand); moderately
ﬂood-exposed; severely ﬂood-exposed; very severely ﬂood-exposed; number of household members engaged in dependent
work, day work, own farm, or own business; number of buildings; house with a tin roof; availability of electricity; owner-
ship of cattle.
* denotes that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or less.on the level of per capita calorie consump-
tion.75 This conﬁrms the hypothesis that 
the program was well targeted and had a
positive impact on the well-being of poor
households.
Cash Transfers for 
Short-Term Flood Relief
Direct distribution of food and relief sup-
plies was vitally important during the ﬂoods
and in the immediate post-ﬂood period. By
late September 1998, the ﬂoodwaters had
receded in most of the country and transport
links had been reestablished nearly every-
where. Yet many people still faced critical
problems of insufﬁcient food. Unfortunately,
as discussed above, because of delayed food
aid arrivals and limited government stocks,
the availability of foodgrains in government
warehouses was a constraint on the expan-
sion of VGF and other programs.
Given that, by late September, poor
households in most of the country had ac-
cess to well-supplied markets, their food
consumption was constrained by lack of
purchasing power rather than by food avail-
ability per se. The months of September and
October are normally slack periods of labor
demand in rural areas, and the ﬂoods made it
even more difﬁcult for the rural poor to ﬁnd
employment. Increasing purchasing power
to affected households was a feasible alter-
native to direct food distribution and in-
creased food aid in the short run because, in
the post-ﬂood, pre-harvest period (from mid-
September to end-November), food supply
was no longer a constraint at the local or
national levels. As discussed above, private
sector imports kept rice prices at import par-
ity and markets supplied with rice.
Moreover, much of the 1997/98 boro
and 1998/99 aman harvests remained in
private stocks. The 1998 boro harvest was
about 8.0 million metric tons, and the ﬂood-
damaged aus rice crop was 1.6 million met-
ric tons (down by 300,000 metric tons from
the target of 1.9 million metric tons). Thus,
about 9.6 million metric tons of rice had been
harvested in Bangladesh from May through
September. In addition, the private sector
had imported 0.5 million metric tons from
India between July and mid-September (and
continued to import more than 200,000
metric tons per month from September 1998
through March 1999). Since average national
rice consumption is about 1.4 million metric
tons per month, the 10.1 million metric tons
of total rice supply from the previous boro
and  aus harvests, combined with imports
through mid-September (adjusted for losses),
could have covered consumption for at least
six months, that is, until December 1998.
Moreover the December aman harvest was
expected to add another 7.6 million metric
tons of rice, and several thousand metric tons
of food aid wheat were scheduled to arrive
by December as well.
Thus, following the ﬂoods of 1998, ex-
cept in the immediate post-ﬂood period,
household food security in Bangladesh was
constrained not by food availability in mar-
kets, but by household access to food. How-
ever, government distribution of food faced
two other constraints as well: the availability
of public foodgrain stocks and the ﬁnances
for relief and rehabilitation efforts.
Food aid eventually eased these two con-
straints on public distribution. By providing
food, it eased the government stock situa-
tion. And, because the food aid was given as
a grant, it placed no added burden on the
government treasury. Yet, additional use of
cash payments could have enabled the gov-
ernment and donors to provide even more
immediate help to ﬂood victims. Had donors
provided cash to supplement direct food
distribution, the total value of the VGF pro-
gram could have been substantially increased
without endangering government foodgrain
stocks.
There were, in effect, three distinct peri-
ods following the ﬂoods, each with its own
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75 We also tested the signiﬁcance of the impact of the predicted value of the GR transfers by adding the predicted value
of the residual of the ﬁrst-stage regression, which we found to be signiﬁcantly different from zero.constraints on household food security and
policy options. Immediately after the ﬂoods
(mid-July to mid-September in most regions),
household food security was constrained
both by the availability of foodgrains in local
markets as well as by purchasing power.
With transport networks and markets dis-
rupted, the immediate food needs of ﬂood
victims could be met only by direct food dis-
tribution. Later, when foodgrain availability
in markets was no longer a constraint but
government foodgrain stocks had not yet
been replenished through government com-
mercial imports or food aid (late September
to mid-November), relief efforts were con-
strained by government stocks and the ﬁnan-
cial cost of aid.76 Finally, once government
stocks had again been built up (mid-Novem-
ber), relief efforts were constrained only by
the ﬁnancial and administrative costs of the
programs.
One argument often advanced against
the use of cash payments is that leakages are
likely to be larger than in the case of food.
This need not occur if transparency is main-
tained at both the local and national levels.
In order to minimize losses through cash
programs, one option could be to give the
NGOs and other local institutions a major
role in seeing that the money allocated for
relief in a particular locality actually reaches
poor ﬂood-affected households. Nonetheless,
even if leakages in cash distribution are some-
what higher, these costs must be weighed
against the beneﬁts of increasing the value of
aid to the poor before the arrival of large food
aid shipments.
Implications for Food Aid and
Targeting Distribution
Food security at the household level depends
on the availability of food in markets as well
as on access to food.77 Liberalization of pri-
vate sector imports of rice and wheat in the
early 1990s and ensuing government policies
supporting trade in 1998 enabled private im-
ports to stabilize market prices and supplies.
Government direct distribution programs,
though small compared with private imports,
nonetheless increased poor households’ ac-
cess to food. Given the tight resource con-
straints on the size of distribution programs,
effective targeting is crucial. Immediate
relief efforts were well targeted to ﬂood-
affected households, as were transfers from
NGOs. VGF, a medium-term program, cov-
ered non-ﬂood-affected regions and, even
in ﬂood-affected thanas, was not well tar-
geted to households directly exposed to the
floods. Nonetheless, according to survey data
from seven ﬂood-affected thanas, the pro-
gram was relatively well targeted to poor
households, with households in the three
lowest expenditure quintiles receiving an
estimated 75 percent of the foodgrains dis-
tributed through this program.
More broadly, the Bangladesh experience
with the 1998 ﬂood illustrates the dual role
of food aid in increasing availability and pro-
viding resources for enhancing the access of
food insecure households. In a liberalized
trade regime where private imports respond
to price signals, food aid’s contribution to the
total availability of food may be minimal.
Nonetheless, foreign assistance, in kind or in
cash, can provide resources for subsidized,
targeted distribution to food-insecure house-
holds—assistance not otherwise possible
under tight government budget constraints.
Summary
In this chapter we have shown that food aid
and government transfers were effective in
providing some relief to poor households
exposed to the ﬂoods. These transfers were
small in size and too limited in coverage,
however, to have a major impact on the re-
covery of households from the ﬂoods. None-
theless, Gratuitous Relief transfers were
well targeted towards poor ﬂood-exposed
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76 In addition, the difﬁculties of administering a large-scale, targeted emergency program slowed deliveries initially.
77 As discussed in Chapter 5, intrahousehold distribution is an important aspect of food security (utilization) for individual
household members.households and appear to have had an impact
on the level of per capita calorie consump-
tion. Moreover, these government transfers
did not crowd out private transfers, which
were received by only a small number of
people who were not necessarily poor or
exposed to the ﬂoods.
We have also shown that the government
of Bangladesh and the donor community
played an important role in procuring the
resources necessary for the use and expan-
sion of already existing programs. The Bang-
ladesh experience, along with other cases
cited in the World Development Report 2000
(World Bank 2000), suggests that it is much
easier to expand programs that are already
in place at the time of a shock than to design
speciﬁc new programs. Unfortunately, in
Bangladesh the expansion of relief pro-
grams in the immediate aftermath of the
ﬂoods was constrained by the levels of gov-
ernment stocks. Given that private markets
were well supplied by rice and wheat from
domestic sources as well as by a steady ﬂow
of private sector imports, cash transfer pro-
grams could have been used instead of grain,
especially in the GR program, without lead-
ing to increases in foodgrain prices. Such
cash transfers could have been extremely ef-
fective, because many households contracted
large debts in order to buy food.
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Conclusions and Lessons 
from the 1998 Floods
Summary of Findings
This report has described the extent of the damage caused by the 1998 Bangladesh ﬂoods to
production, transport infrastructure, markets, private assets, and the lives and the well-being
of people. Yet, despite a 2.2 million ton shortfall of aman and aus rice because of the ﬂoods,
there was no food crisis in Bangladesh. No one died from lack of food, market price increases
were small (particularly in comparison with the crisis of 1974), and there was no large mi-
gration of people to urban areas in search of food. Households did suffer because of the
ﬂoods, as documented in this report and elsewhere, but a combination of private market food-
grain imports, food aid, public foodgrain distribution and relief, and household coping strate-
gies (including borrowing and shifts in food expenditures) kept the ﬂoods from becoming a
truly major disaster.
The availability of foodgrains in the market in Bangladesh after the ﬂoods was maintained
mainly through an increase in imports of rice from India, and to a lesser extent through wheat
from food aid and government commercial imports. The government of Bangladesh, which
had launched an appeal for relief efforts in August 1998, was able to increase the distribu-
tion of foodgrains in the country by only a small amount in the period immediately after the
ﬂoods. However, careful management of public foodgrain stocks may have contributed to
market stability, by reducing the likelihood of short-term and localized shortages. Because
of this combination of private sector imports, public foodgrain distribution, and stock policy,
the market prices of rice and wheat in late 1998 were only slightly higher than those in the
early part of the year (following a poor rice harvest in December 1997). Moreover, with do-
mestic foodgrain markets functioning well, regional price variations were similar to those in
other years.
Nevertheless, even though foodgrains were available at a reasonable price, households
still did not have access to enough food, because the losses they suffered during the ﬂoods
reduced their level of income and wealth. Losses of assets in terms of damage to homes, trees,
and small livestock were very large. Income losses were caused by loss of agricultural pro-
duction and lack of jobs, especially during the ﬂoods, in both the agricultural and the non-
agricultural sectors because of the slowing down of the economy. Employment opportunitiespicked up again after the ﬂoods to a level
similar to that of the previous year, but it was
not enough make up for the income losses
suffered.
The deterioration in the economic situ-
ation and the health environment had a
major negative impact on food consump-
tion, food security, and health outcomes. For
many households, food consumption was
reduced and food insecurity increased, but
there was no evidence of an increase in the
bias in the food allocated to women. A sub-
stantial increase in illness, especially diar-
rhea and respiratory illnesses, was noticed
during the ﬂoods and in the immediate post-
ﬂood period. The ﬂoods also led to increases
in both wasting and stunting among pre-
school children.
In response to reduced employment op-
portunities, losses of assets, and higher food
prices, households adjusted by reducing con-
sumption and by borrowing. Flood-exposed
poor households adjusted their food expen-
ditures by reducing consumption of vegeta-
bles and other goods in short supply, and
ultimately by consuming fewer calories.
Most of all, they borrowed heavily from
friends, neighbors, and local moneylenders
to ﬁnance food and other expenditures, sug-
gesting that additional cash transfers and
credit programs could have enhanced
households’ ability to cope with the ﬂoods
and helped them to recover in the medium
term. Nonetheless, through these coping
strategies and government transfers, private
households managed to get through a period
of low incomes and higher food prices.
Programs by the government, donors,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
brought emergency relief in the initial period
of ﬂooding and increased the access of poor,
ﬂood-exposed households to food through
direct distribution of food and other re-
sources. This report shows that direct trans-
fers by the government and NGOs during the
ﬂoods were well targeted to ﬂood-exposed
households. Government transfers in the
period after the ﬂoods were better targeted
towards poor households than towards areas
more affected by the ﬂoods.
Policy Implications
Both short-term and long-term policies
played major roles in preventing the 1998
ﬂoods from resulting in a major food security
disaster in Bangladesh. Public sector invest-
ments in agricultural research and extension
in the 1980s and 1990s, together with mainly
private sector investments in small-scale irri-
gation, led to substantial increases in wheat
and bororice production, making the country
less at risk from ﬂooding by increasing total
foodgrain production in the country, reducing
the length of time between major crops
from 12 months to only about 6 months,
and leading to a shift away from highly
ﬂood-susceptible deepwater aman cultiva-
tion in the monsoon season to boro cultiva-
tion in the dry season. Continued investment
in research and extension could further in-
crease production efﬁciency and reduce the
vulnerability of the food sector to ﬂoods.
In addition, long-term public investments
in infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity,
and telephones) contributed to efﬁcient
marketing systems that enabled the private
sector grain trade to supply markets through-
out the country following the ﬂoods. Gov-
ernment policies also encouraged private
sector participation in the grain trade. In
particular, the liberalization of rice and
wheat imports in the early 1990s enabled
private sector imports to quickly supply do-
mestic markets and stabilize prices at their
import parity levels following the ﬂoods.
Short-term policies such as the removal of
the import tariff on rice in early 1998 and
instructions to expedite port clearance of
private sector foodgrain imports also pro-
vided clear signals to the private sector of
government support for this trade. Moreover,
these private sector imports proved to be a
far less costly alternative for maintaining
foodgrain availability than distribution of
government commercial imports or public
stocks, the mechanisms by which the gov-
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from the 1988 ﬂoods, 10 years earlier.
Donors responded to the ﬂood situation
with major increases in food aid. These
eventually permitted a major expansion of
targeted foodgrain distribution through the
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) and
Food for Work (FFW) programs. However,
almost inevitable delays and uncertainties
in food aid arrivals resulted in only a small
net increase in public distribution beyond
pre-ﬂood plans until December 1998, in
part because existing government stocks of
wheat were insufﬁcient for a large expansion
in distribution. (Rice stocks were kept in re-
serve for possible use in stabilizing markets
later.) Apolicy of holding more stocks might
not have been a better option, though, given
substantial costs in procurement of grain,
handling, and eventual distribution. With
foodgrain supplies and prices stabilized by
private sector imports, targeted cash transfers
to supplement direct food transfers could
have been used to increase household access
to food (and other basic needs) without in-
creasing market prices of foodgrains.
Nonetheless, programs already in place
and a rapid expansion of the VGF program
to more than 4 million households enabled
public foodgrain distribution following the
ﬂoods to be well targeted to the poor. Poor
women and children, many of whom were
chronically malnourished, were effectively
targeted through the VGF program. More
targeted credit programs would have been
useful, however, given that poor households
borrowed heavily in the informal private
market during the ﬂoods and NGO credit
programs were limited in scope. To avoid
delays and to minimize leakages, these rural
credit programs for disaster relief should be
designed and put in place before disasters
occur. Maintaining a structure of social pro-
grams that can be scaled up in the event of a
disaster is more important that maintaining
a large stock of food.
To reduce even further the impact of an-
other natural disaster like the ﬂoods of 1998,
it is necessary to improve the scope and the
quality of the interventions so as to provide
food, water, and shelter at the time of the dis-
aster and in its immediate aftermath. Relief
should be targeted at both the village and in-
dividual levels. This report has shown that
interventions at the village level, such as
providing shelter, improving sanitary condi-
tions, and creating economic opportunities,
were effective in alleviating the adverse im-
pact of the ﬂoods. We have also presented
evidence that targeting to individual poor,
ﬂood-exposed households can have a posi-
tive impact on the well-being of individual
children. Finally, government policies to
foster economic growth in rural areas and 
to provide income-earning alternatives to
poor households can both help to reduce
poverty as well as increase the capacity of
households to withstand shocks resulting
from natural disasters.
Conclusions
The combined efforts of the government 
of Bangladesh, donors, NGOs, and ﬂood-
affected households themselves, together with
private trade operating in well-functioning
markets, were in general extremely success-
ful in mitigating the effects of the 1998
ﬂoods at the household level and avoiding
a major food crisis. Thus, the Bangladesh
example illustrates the importance of coor-
dinated actions at the sectoral and household
levels, by both public and private sectors, in
maintaining the availability of and access to
food to ensure food security following major
supply disruptions. Private trade alone might
have provided sufﬁcient availability of food,
though this would in itself not have solved
the problem of access to food for millions of
households. Public sector actions enhanced
access to food by ﬂood-exposed households,
though these interventions were too small to
have a major direct effect on overall avail-
ability and market prices. Ultimately, food
security in Bangladesh was largely main-
tained through an appropriate mix of public
interventions, private market trade ﬂows,
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ing. Continued investments in agricultural
research, extension, roads, electricity, and
other rural infrastructure, along with policies
promoting efﬁcient markets and programs
to provide targeted transfers and credit to
poor households, could help further to en-
hance the food security of the poor.
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Distribution and Plots of Category
Variables Used for the Flood 
Exposure Index
P
eople in rural Bangladesh in the period of the ﬂoods appear to have been exposed in
different ways. We calculated an index of household exposure to the ﬂood that used
a combination of indicators (Table A.1 and Figure A.1).
Table A.1 Frequency distribution of category variables used for the ﬂood exposure index
Category Frequency Percentage
Depth of water in homestead (feet)
0 0 246 32.50
0.1–1.0 1 110 14.53
1.1–2.0 2 142 18.76
2.1–3.0 3 175 23.12
3.1–4.0 4 53 7.00
4.1+ 5 31 4.10
Depth of water in house (feet)
0 0 246 32.50
0.1–1.0 1 80 10.57
1.1–2.0 2 147 19.42
2.1–3.0 3 173 22.85
3.1–4.0 4 43 5.68
4.1–5.0 5 39 5.15
5.1+ 6 29 3.83
Number of days of water in the home
0 0 247 32.63
0–7.0 1 74 9.78
7.1–15.0 2 89 11.76
15.1–30.0 3 130 17.17
30.1–60.0 4 133 17.57
60.1+ 5 84 11.10106 APPENDIX A
Figure A.1 Frequency distribution of households by various variables
of ﬂood exposureAPPENDIX B
Supplementary Tables
Table B.1 Monthly average price of high-yielding varieties of coarse rice, 1998 (Tk per kilogram)
Average Standard Maximum/
Division price deviation Maximum Minimum minimum
Barisal division
June 11.87 0.44 11.75 9.75 1.21
August 12.92 0.41 13.67 12.50 1.09
October 14.20 0.54 14.78 13.33 1.11
Chittagong division
June 11.83 0.42 12.42 10.88 1.14
August 13.36 0.71 14.18 12.15 1.17
October 14.27 0.85 15.33 13.00 1.18
Dhaka division
June 11.25 0.70 12.53 9.76 1.28
August 13.45 0.68 15.10 12.56 1.20
October 14.33 0.62 15.35 13.06 1.18
Khulna division
June 11.18 0.57 11.75 9.75 1.21
August 13.02 0.39 13.67 12.50 1.09
October 14.09 0.56 14.78 13.33 1.11
Rajshahi division
June 10.83 0.63 12.08 9.82 1.23
August 12.97 0.56 13.85 12.23 1.13
October 14.01 0.60 14.92 13.10 1.14
Sylhet division
June 11.53 0.86 12.70 10.79 1.18
August 13.94 0.25 14.25 13.64 1.05
October 14.67 0.83 15.75 13.77 1.14
All Bangladesh
June 11.31 0.69 12.70 9.75 1.30
August 13.23 0.62 15.10 12.15 1.24
October 14.21 0.65 15.75 13.00 1.21
Source: DAM data and authors’calculations.108 APPENDIX B
Table B.2 Total value of assets owned, by severity of ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Asset category Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Productive 6,787 7,604 6,409 4,926 6,448
Domestic 2,066 1,659 1,508 1,573 1,716
Housing 25,475 28,076 22,661 21,132 24,310
Liquid 8,049 12,113 7,679 12,413 9,661
Consumer durables 2,619 3,375 1,434 1,911 2,393
Others 2,130 1,512 1,148 1,351 1,525
Total 40,767 45,476 35,839 35,840 39,352
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
Table B.3 Number of households that suffered any asset losses, by ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Asset category Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Productive 21 39 56 48 164
Domestic — 10 32 37 79
Housing 17 82 133 125 357
Liquid 15 35 50 40 140
Consumer durables 1 . . . . . . 1 2
Others . . . . . . . . . 6 6 
Total 41 100 143 131 415
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.
Table B.4 Total value of assets lost for households that suffered any losses, by ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Asset category Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Productive 413 1,300 942 1,000 979
Domestic . . . 311 177 207 208
Housing 2,509 5,541 5,649 6,221 5,675
Liquid 4,692 3,094 2,906 8,428 4,722
Consumer durables 500 . . . . . . 1,000 750
Others . . . . . . . . . 2,182 2,182
Total 2,990 6,164 6,679 9,042 6,936
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 109
Table B.5 Total value of assets owned for households that suffered any losses, by ﬂood exposure
Flood exposure
Asset category Not exposed Moderate Severe Very severe All
Productive 5,439 13,408 8,034 6,437 8,512
Domestic . . . 2,213 2,148 2,257 2,207
Housing 13,368 28,735 22,198 22,235 23,292
Liquid 12,669 15,432 11,577 26,353 16,880
Consumer durables 6,000 . . . . . . 5,000 5,500
Others . . . . . . . . . 2,578 2,578 
Total 39,551 49,872 38,055 38,244 41,110
Source: IFPRI-FMRSP, Household Survey 1998.References
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